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ABSTRACT		FILM	AFTER	AUTHORITY	THE	TRANSITION	TO	DEMOCRACY	AND	THE	END	OF	POLITICS		by		Kalling	Heck			The	University	of	Wisconsin-Milwaukee,	2017	Under	the	Supervision	of	Professor	Patrice	Petro				A	comparison	of	films	made	after	the	transition	from	authoritarianism	or	totalitarianism	to	democracy,	this	dissertation	addresses	the	ways	that	cinema	can	digest	and	extend	moments	of	political	transition.	By	comparing	films	from	four	different	nations—the	Italian	Germany	Year	Zero,	Hungarian	Sátántangó,	South	Korean	Woman	on	
the	Beach,	and	American	Medium	Cool—in	relation	to	ideas	drawn	from	critical	and	political	theory,	this	project	examines	how	and	why	these	wildly	diverse	films	turn	to	ambiguity	as	their	primary	means	to	disrupt	the	ravages	of	unchecked	authority.	By	intervening	in	discussions	of	aesthetics	and	politics,	this	dissertation	contends	that	ambiguous	aesthetics	has	the	capacity	to	help	us	see	the	world	differently,	and	is	therefore	productive	for	any	revolutionary	undertaking.	Accounting	for	questions	of	art	and	authority	more	broadly,	this	project	examines	the	perhaps	impossible	task	of	creating	a	work	of	art	that	can	at	once	create	meaning	and	reject	its	own	authority.	The	significant	conclusion	of	my	project,	then,	is	that	ambiguity	is	a	coherent	response	to	the	end	of	authoritarian	politics,	but	that	its	total	rejection	of	authority	always	rediscovers	the	difficulties	of	inaction	and	ineffectiveness	that	arise	from	the	assumption	that	extension	and	waiting	are	the	only	solutions	that	can	yield	radical	change.	
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INTRODUCTION		 Four	Angels			 There	are	at	least	two	versions	of	Jean-Luc	Godard	and	Jean-Pierre	Gorin’s	Vladimir	
et	Rosa	(1971,	credited	to	the	filmmaking	collective	The	Dziga	Vertov	Group).	The	major	version	to	have	been	distributed	tells	the	story	of	the	group	of	eight	political	activists	charged	for	inciting	to	riot	at	the	Democratic	National	Convention	in	1968.	Shot	in	the	aggressive	and	abstract	style	that	the	pair	was	known	for	at	the	time,	the	film	explores	the	court	case	but	refuses	to	report	on	either	the	case’s	context	or	its	outcome.	It	is	instead	content	to	vaguely	allegorize	the	trial	and	to	satirize	the	authority	figures	for	their	perpetration	of	what	was	surely	a	farce.	Through	bold	colors,	direct	address,	smash	cuts,	and	general	discord,	the	film,	rather	than	directly	rebuking	the	case,	renders	the	trial	totally	incoherent,	an	abstract	collage	of	competing	images	and	dialogue	that	mirrors	the	nonsensical	charges	brought	against	the	defendants.		 The	second	version	is	remarkably	different.	The	film’s	chief	financier	Barney	Rosset	organized	and	recorded	a	screening	for	two	of	the	defendants	from	the	actual	case,	the	irreverent	and	sardonic	Abbie	Hoffman	and	Jeffrey	Rubin,	and	recorded	the	results.1	Displeased	with	the	film,	the	pair	laugh	and	yell	at	the	screen,	mocking	its	ambiguity	and	its	unwillingness	to	accurately	represent	the	specifics	of	the	trial.	“It’s	not	keeping	my	interests”	Rubin,	towards	the	beginning	of	the	film,	posits,	his	head	rested	in	his	hand.	“It’s	ridiculous,”	he	continues,	as	Hoffman	laughs.	This	version	of	the	film	continues	by	cutting	between	Godard	and	Gorin’s	footage	and	this	new	audience	of	Hoffman	and	Rubin,	the	audio	of	the	film	heard	aloud	in	the	theater	linking	the	two	spaces.	The	longer	the	film																																																									1	Douglas	Martin,	“Barney	Rosset	Dies	at	89;	Defied	Censors,	Making	Racy	a	Literary	Staple,”	The	New	York	Times	(New	York,	NY),	Feb.	22,	2012.	
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continues,	the	more	frustrated	Rubin	and	Hoffman	become.	The	primary	concern	of	these	viewers	moves	at	some	point	from	speculation	as	to	which	characters	in	the	film	represent	them	and	their	fellow	defendants—an	investigation	that	quickly	leads	nowhere—to	a	discussion	of	the	broader	goals	of	the	film.	Hoffman	at	one	point	proposes,	once	familiar	with	the	film’s	style,	that	the	major	function	of	this	film	is	to	provide	coded	messages	to	The	Weather	Underground—a	radical	leftist	group—laughing,	but	refusing	details.	While	Hoffman	continues	to	attempt	to	decode	the	film’s	hidden	meanings,	Rubin	grows	increasingly	irritated:	“The	trial	was	more	exciting	than	this	movie”	he	contends	summarily	halfway	into	the	film.	The	major	critique,	however,	comes	via	Hoffman,	when	responding	to	an	unheard	question:	“Say	we	had	this	film	made	in	the	middle	of	the	trial,	right?”	he	begins,	We	take	it	around	say	we	organize	demonstrations	at	the	end	of	the	trial.	We	take	this	film,	we	show	it	to	a	large	group	of	young	kids,	you	know,	I	don't	get	the	feeling	that	they	would	want	to	like	get	involved	in	like	a	TBA.	Or	if	we	showed	it	at	a	fund	raising	party	I	don’t	think	people	would	want	to	give	us	any	money.	I	mean	what	could	we	do	with	the	film?	Say	if	we	had	it	in	the	middle	of…		He	is	interrupted	by	the	figure	who	asked	the	question,	escalating	the	conversation	by	referring	to	what	was,	presumably,	an	unheard	accusation	from	Hoffman:	“That	doesn’t	make	him	a	C.I.A.	agent	just	because	his	films	don’t	move	anybody	to	do	anything.	You	gotta	have	a	little	better	connection	than	that	even	for	my	paranoia.”	After	a	bit	more	discussion,	the	topic	is	again	broached	when	Hoffman	continues,	“He	serves	the	interest	of	the	C.I.A.	with	this	move	definitely.”	He	is	interrupted	again,	“So	is	he	paid	or	unpaid?”	the	figure	asks.	“Yea,	I	would	say	paid”	Hoffman	responds.	“Paid?”	“Yea,	I	mean	there’s	rumors	of	that.”	
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That	Abbie	Hoffman	accuses	Jean-Luc	Godard	of	being	paid	by	the	C.I.A.	to	produce	a	film	so	ambiguous	that	it	undermines	the	political	potentials	of	this	trial	is	striking,	but	helpful	too	in	establishing	the	political	dynamics	of	ambiguity.	That	is,	this	accusation	from	Hoffman	reveals	(with	some	stress)	the	distrust	that	so	often	meets	ambiguity,	a	distrust	arising	from	the	possibility	for	an	ambiguous	object	to	carry	messages	and	meanings	that	are	difficult	to	gather	and	even	more	difficult	to	control.	This	problem	takes	on	particular	immediacy	in	moments	where	political	expediency	is	thought	to	be	necessary.	Indeed	what	Hoffman	and	Rubin’s	responses	present	are	exactly	the	tensions	that	ambiguous	cinema	produces	in	moments	that	seem	to	call	for	a	more	“engaged”	mode	of	politics,	which	is	the	major	theme	of	this	dissertation.			For	these	reasons,	I	will	address	here	the	political	potentials	of	ambiguity,	its	advantages	as	well	as	its	drawbacks,	by	examining	the	history	and	trajectory	of	the	cinematic	mode	that	has	taken	the	title	of	art	cinema.		I	will	then	explore	this	category	of	art	cinema	in	relation	to	Walter	Benjamin’s	ideas	on	weak	messianism.	Ultimately	I	will	strive	to	show	how	ambiguity	can	function	as	a	political	category,	a	topic	I	further	explore	in	the	coming	chapters.	I	undertake	this	study	in	the	hopes	of	examining	the	value	as	well	as	the	failings	of	the	turn	to	ambiguity	in	the	context	of	political	turmoil,	and	I	do	so	by	discussing	four	wildly	different	films	that	employ	tactics	similar	to	Godard	and	Gorin’s.	These	films	were	each	made	in	and	around	moments	of	intense	political	change	and	consist	of	Roberto	Rossellini’s	Germany	Year	Zero	(1948),	Béla	Tarr’s	Sátántangó	(1994),	Hong	Sang-soo’s	Woman	on	the	Beach	(2006),	and	Haskell	Wexler’s	Medium	Cool	(1969).	While	this	study	will	largely	focus	on	the	political	potentials	of	these	films,	it	is	important	to	also	keep	in	sight	the	critiques,	perhaps	those	less	conspiratorial	then	Hoffman’s,	but	critiques	
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that	nonetheless	contend	that	these	films	fail	to	meet	the	demands	of	certainty	and	direction	that	their	respective	contexts	seem	to	mandate.	But	first	the	virtues.	Each	of	the	four	films	addressed	here	was	made	after,	and	in	my	reading,	in	light	of	the	transition	from	authoritarianism	or	totalitarianism	to	democracy.2	Each	furthermore	turns	to	ambiguity	as	a	system	for	contending	with	this	transition.	These	films	in	fact	map	a	trend,	perhaps	a	tendency,	towards	ambiguity	in	these	contexts,	a	repeating	principle	that	interacts	both	with	the	history	of	art	cinema	and	the	unique	circumstances	of	each	of	these	films.	Ambiguity,	and	this	is	key,	in	each	of	these	examples	is	turned	to	in	order	to	both	digest	and	deflect	the	effects	of	a	wildly	unchecked	authority.	For	many	critics	contemporary	with	their	production	these	films	are	simply	“apolitical”.		I	contend,	however,	that	ambiguity	under	these	conditions	is	itself	a	form	of	politics,	as	it	serves	in	each	of	these	films	as	a	total	rejection	of	the	systems	of	authority	that	have	so	recently	in	each	of	these	cases	been	deposed,	a	gesture	that	ideally	likewise	bars	the	possibility	for	their	return.	But,	within	the	spectrum	of	authorities	here	rejected	falls	each	of	these	film’s	own	capacity	to	present	a	coherent	idea,	for	any	clearly	articulated	concept	must	be	built	upon	a	system	of	meaning	and	argumentation	derived	from	a	hierarchical	structure,	which	is	to	say	an	authority.	This	rejection	of	authority	takes	ambiguity	as	its	corollary,	and	it	is	this	recourse	to	ambiguity—so	central,	as	we	shall	see,	to	the	history	of	art	cinema—which	produces	an	anti-authoritarian	politics	despite	the	barriers	to	meaning	that	it	presents.	In	my	view,	this	ambiguity	is	essential	to	global	art	cinema	and,	as	this	study	will	prove,	furthermore	linked	to	an	anti-authoritarian	stance.																																																									2	The	distinction	between	authoritarianism	and	totalitarianism	is	important	here,	and	will	be	discussed	in	depth	in	the	first	chapter.	But	it	is	for	the	moment	sufficient	to	note	that	I	think	of	these	as	related	but	different	systems	of	governance,	and	that	these	differences	are	to	be	found	primarily	in	their	respective	relationships	to	authority.	
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The	specificity	of	this	project	is	derived	in	large	part	from	the	differences,	in	addition	to	the	obvious	similarities,	between	these	films.	This	is	to	say	that	the	four	films	examined	here	and	their	respective	contexts	allow	for	views	of	remarkably	different	manifestations	of	this	trend	in	post-authoritarian	art	cinema.	They	all	turn	to	ambiguity,	but	it	is	the	fact	that	each	represents	a	different	relationship	to	authority	and	democracy	that	makes	them	valuable.	The	chapters	here	have	been	arranged	to	showcase	the	respective	distances	from	the	core	of	a	straightforward	turn	to	democracy	after	a	period	of	authoritarian	or	totalitarian	politics.	The	case	of	Germany	Year	Zero	is	then	the	most	unified	example	of	post-authoritarian	cinema;	its	rejection	of	authoritarian	politics	and	hopes	for	democracy	are	more	straightforward	than	my	other	examples,	and	as	a	result	this	film	affords	the	space	to	speak	about	authority	and	democracy	more	broadly,	and	to	indeed	clarify	each	of	my	significant	terms	(authority	and	democracy	included).	Tarr’s	Sátántangó	troubles	Hungary’s	transition	from	totalitarianism	by	bringing	into	play	the	idealism	specific	to	Hungarian	communism	and	the	subsequent	disappointment	at	its	demise,	a	disappointment	that	was	enflamed	by	the	rise	of	democratic	capitalism	but	also	served	to	provide	an	avenue	to	consider	the	potentials	of	a	significant	economic	and	political	transition.	The	chapter	pertaining	to	Hong-sang	Soo	and	South	Korea	furthers	still	disappointment	by	directly	challenging	the	relationship	between	democracy	and	capitalism,	and	in	so	doing	recalls	some	nostalgia	for	South	Korean	authoritarianism	while	still	resisting	its	return.	Finally,	Medium	Cool	and	the	United	States	serves	as	a	kind	of	counterpoint	or	reversal	of	some	of	these	conditions,	and	is	the	far	afield	of	these	analyses;	made	under	democracy,	this	film	asks	what	it	might	look	like	for	a	nation	to	transition	to	authoritarianism,	and	how	cinema	might	serve	to	resist	such	a	change.	
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This	is	not	to	say	that	these	are	the	only	films	or	contexts	that	might	fit	this	study,	but	this	selection	of	films	is	uniquely	suited	to	map	the	contours	and	degrees	of	this	repeated	turn	to	ambiguity	in	light	of	the	deposition	of	an	unchecked	authority.	Other	examples—Chile,	Indian,	Poland,	to	name	a	few—are	likewise	available	and	certainly	no	less	valuable.	But	these	four	films	and	contexts	and	the	distances	between	them	help	to	focus	this	study,	allowing	it	to	address	intersections	between	authority,	democracy,	and	cinema	from	a	useful	set	of	perspectives.	What	these	films	together	constantly	push	against	is	the	insurmountable	boundary	between	the	political	project	of	anti-authoritarianism	and	the	means	by	which	a	particular	meaning	can	be	derived,	directed,	and	universalized.	The	exchange	between	Abbie	Hoffman	and	Jerry	Rubin	illuminates	some	of	the	tensions	I	am	describing.	Hoffman’s	concern	for	direction	and	intention	might	go	unmet	by	Godard	and	Gorin’s	film,	but	these	filmmakers’	insist	on	rejecting	the	very	systems	by	which	direction	and	deliberation	are	formed,	leaving	them	unwilling	or	unable	to	address	Hoffman’s	demands	without	violating	their	own	dedication	to	radical	anti-authoritarianism.	What	is	advantageous	about	the	approach	employed	in	Vladimir	et	Rosa	is	to	be	found	in	its	relationship	to	possibility.	Each	of	the	films	discussed	here	stands	on	the	precipice	of	a	new	kind	of	governance,	and	each	strives	to	allow	an	extension	of	the	time	before	this	new	formation	is	cemented.	What	these	films	offer	is	a	total	rejection	of	the	authoritarian	principles	that	in	each	case	resulted	in	some	form	of	devastation,	but	what	they	refuse	in	the	same	gesture	is	the	production	of	a	new	path	away	from	this	same	devastation.	Indeed,	as	Rubin	and	Hoffman	rightly	point	out,	
Vladimir	et	Rosa	presents	no	particular	rejoinder	to	the	wildly	anti-democratic	trial	that	it	represents;	it	is	in	this	refusal	to	respond	that	it	finds	its	unique	energy,	its	ability	to	point	
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towards	injustice.	But	to	never	have	this	gesturing	verified,	to	never	see	a	particular	point	made	or	position	taken	is	always	also	frustrating,	and	this	is	the	impossible	dynamic	that	political	ambiguity	provokes.	The	four	films	discussed	in	the	following	chapters	also	take	up	this	dynamic.	Rather	than	asking	us	to	see	anything	in	particular,	they	ask	us	to	look	and	to	look	again,	but	they	never	exactly	explain	how	or	why	we	should	look,	or	what	we	should	hope	to	find.	This	is	the	structure	of	ambiguity;	it	pulls	us	always	in	multiple	directions	at	once,	presenting	the	possibility	of	meaning	but	never	fully	producing	the	conditions	of	its	arrival.	But	what	this	ambiguity	provides	is	a	vantage	from	which	to	(re)view	the	devastated	world,	from	which	to	see	what	the	world	is	and,	perhaps,	how	to	move	forward	in	the	hopes	of	claiming	a	new	solution	to	the	misery	that	authoritarianism	can	yield.	Each	film	here	has	a	strong	relationship	to	some	avenue	of	cinematic	realism,	as	each	asks	the	viewer	to	witness	and	assist	in	ameliorating	what	they	have	seen,	assimilating	these	experiences	into	their	own	solution	to	the	problems	of	unchecked	authority.	It	is	fair	to	criticize	the	intense	atomization	that	this	process	causes.	These	films	offer	no	recourse	to	the	needs	of	agreement;	they	focus	instead	on	an	individual	spectator	and	their	capacity	to	see	in	these	images	new	and	different	things	by	themselves.	These	films	provide	no	system	whereby	these	visions	might	be	made	universal	or	might	produce	some	outlet	into	deliberation	or	unification,	which	is	at	least	in	part	Rubin	and	Hoffman’s	critique.	Furthermore,	since	the	early	post-war	period,	the	forces	of	global	capitalism	have	offered	up	exactly	these	kinds	of	claims	to	openness	and	possibility.	Indeed,	it	can	be	argued	that	these	forces	are	now	so	deeply	ingrained	within	our	systems	for	rendering	and	evaluating	meaning	that	the	forces	of	global	economics	will	inevitably	be	the	first	things	to	
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fill	these	kinds	of	openings,	and	will	regardless	benefit	from	the	disorder	and	difference	that	they	produce.3	These	critiques	will	factor	heavily	into	the	chapters	that	follow.	The	focus	of	this	introduction,	though,	is	to	bring	into	view	the	relationship	between	ambiguity,	cinema	in	the	art	house	tradition,	and	politics,	and	to	argue	that	the	turn	to	ambiguity	in	cinema	made	in	moments	of	political	transition,	moments	that	connect	all	of	the	films	here,	has	a	coherent	current:	it	serves	as	a	cogent	rejoinder	to	the	effects	of	unchecked	authority	by	undermining	its	own	capacity	to	create	a	singular	and	unified	meaning.	Where	this	capacity	lies	is	to	be	found	in	the	aesthetic	tradition	that	art	cinema	offers,	an	aesthetic	tradition	that	is	rooted	in	an	anti-authoritarian	wish.		Global	Art	Cinema		 Ambiguity	is	a	central	theme	in	the	tradition	of	art	cinema,	the	origin	of	which	is	often	linked	to	some	of	the	films	discussed	here.	As	early	as	1979,	David	Bordwell	argued	that	what	we	think	of	as	art	cinema	is	in	fact	a	relatively	stable	category,	what	he	calls	a	“distinct	branch	of	the	cinematic	institution,”	that	is	unified	by	a	particular	set	of	formal	qualities	and	viewing	habits.4	For	Bordwell	this	category	has	a	rich	and	diverse	history,	but	came	into	its	modern	form	after	World	War	II	and	in	light	of	the	expansion	of	Hollywood	and	its	dominance	over	film	culture,	beginning,	notably,	with	the	Italian	neorealists.5	It	is	in	fact	the	deviations	from	classical	cinema	that	began	to	mark	the	contours	of	the	art	film,	in	particular	the	loosening	of	causal	relationships.																																																									3	This	will	be	discussed	at	length	in	both	chapters	one	and	three,	but	I’m	thinking	here	of	Zygmunt	Bauman’s	argument	pertaining	to	liquidity	operating	as	the	new	form	of	authority:	Zygmunt	Bauman,	Liquid	Modernity	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2000).	4	David	Bordwell,	“The	Art	Cinema	as	a	Mode	of	Film	Practice,”	Film	Criticism	4,	no.	1	(1979):	56.	5	Ibid.	
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	 Along	with	these	loosenings	of	patterns	of	linear	causation,	the	art	cinema	is	defined	in	this	model	by	way	of	its	strong	relationship	to	realism,	what	Bordwell	calls	a	“commitment	to	both	objective	and	subjective	verisimilitude.”6	Bordwell	traces	this	category	of	realism	to	André	Bazin’s	emphasis	on	deep-focus,	long	takes,	and	camera	movements,	and	to	the	resultant	dedication	to	experiences	of	unbroken	time	and	space.	But	what	Bordwell	is	careful	to	note	is	that	the	interaction	between	photographic	realism	and	the	foregrounding	of	the	author	that	is	found	in	Bazin’s	work	creates	a	tension	that	largely	contributes	to	art	cinema’s	unique	qualities:	“The	author	is	the	textual	force	‘who’	communicates	(what	the	film	is	saying?)	and	‘who’	expresses	(what	is	the	artist’s	personal	
vision?).”7	According	to	this	formulation,	the	understanding	of	the	author	as	master	of	meaning	is	to	a	degree	illusory	(in	its	supposed	uniqueness)	and	also	industrial	(in	that	it	became	the	tool	to	sell	a	film	in	the	absence	of	genre	and	stars).8	The	subsequent	art	film	mode	is	largely	organized	around	realism	as	determined	by	the	expectations	brought	about	by	the	rhetoric	of	verisimilitude,	but	this	realism	must	also	always	be	ruptured,	and	it	is	these	ruptures	that	are	then	used	to	constitute	“authorial	commentary,”	which	can	then	be	unified	and	reproduced	to	present	an	oeuvre.9		 For	Bordwell	there	is	then	an	irreconcilable	tension	at	the	heart	of	art	cinema:	Verisimilitude,	objective	or	subjective,	is	inconsistent	with	an	intrusive	author.	The	surest	signs	of	authorial	intelligibility—the	flashforward,	the	doubled	scene	in	Persona,	the	color	filters	at	the	start	of	Le	Mépris—are	the	least	capable	of	realistic	justification.	Contrariwise,	to	push	the	realism	of	psychological	uncertainty	to	its	limit	is	to	invite	a	haphazard	text	in	which	the	author’s	shaping	hand	would	not	be	visible.10																																																									6	Ibid.,	59.	7	Ibid.	8	Ibid.	9	Ibid.	10	Ibid.,	60.	
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	To	summarize:	the	qualities	of	realism	and	intrusive	authorship	are	incommensurate,	presenting	an	irreparable	tension	at	the	heart	of	these	films.	The	solution	to	this	problem,	in	the	case	of	art	cinema,	is	therefore	ambiguity.	In	Bordwell’s	reading,	the	art	film	initiates	a	series	of	responses	that	first	demand	a	reliance	on	realism	and,	once	that	response	has	been	exhausted	or	interrupted,	a	reliance	on	authorship—particularly	via	style.	As	he	puts	it,	“Whatever	is	excessive	in	one	category	must	belong	to	another.”11	This	trait	is	best	exemplified	by	the	tendency	in	the	art	film	to	rely	on	an	open	and	ambiguous	ending:	“With	the	open	and	arbitrary	ending,	the	art	film	reasserts	that	ambiguity	is	the	dominant	principle	of	intelligibility,	that	we	are	to	watch	less	for	the	tale	than	the	telling,	that	life	lacks	the	neatness	of	art	and	this	art	knows	it.”12	These	endings,	in	other	words,	signify	a	direct	link	between	the	film	and	one’s	experience	outside	it:	“The	ambiguity,	the	play	of	thematic	interpretation,	must	not	be	halted	at	the	film’s	close.”13	Bordwell	notes,	however,	the	variations,	departures,	and	disruptions	at	the	heart	of	this	category,	and	likewise	discusses	the	way	that,	even	as	of	1979,	the	category	of	the	art	film	seemed	to	be	changing.14	More	recently,	scholars	have	returned	to	the	this	category,	now	more	likely	referred	to	as	global	art	cinema,	in	the	hopes	of	mapping	its	boundaries	and	discussing	its	now	seemingly	even	more	persistent	presence.																																																									11	Ibid.	12	Ibid.,	61.	13	Ibid.	14	Bordwell	contends	that	the	more	extreme	category	of	“modernist”	cinema	was	beginning	to	disrupt	the	otherwise	stable	category	of	art	cinema.	I	must	contend	that	this	is	where	I	depart	from	Bordwell	regarding	this	topic,	the	differences	between	these	categories	evades	me	and	I	think	of	it	as	much	more	useful	to	think	of	art	cinema	as	a	broader	category,	albeit	one	still	defined	by	a	tradition	of	ambiguity.	For	a	thorough	explanation	and	taxonomy	of	art	cinema	and	its	relationship	to	modernism	see:	András	Bálint	Kovács,	Screening	
Modernism:	European	Art	Cinema,	1950-1980	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2007).	
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Mark	Betz	has	notably	united	what	he	finds	to	be	the	dual	considerations	surrounding	art	cinema:	its	status	as	“formal-aesthetic”	category,	which	he	associates	with	Bordwell,	and	its	concurrent	status	as	a	national-institutional	category,	an	argument	that	he	locates	centrally	in	Steve	Neale’s	1981	essay,	“Art	Cinema	as	Institution.”15	For	Betz,	it	is	in	fact	the	connection	between	these	two	divergent	approaches	that	he	finds	significant:	Bordwell	and	Neale	present	two	different	approaches	to	art	cinema	as	a	distinct	category	of	film	style	and	production,	one	aesthetic	and	one	economical/institutional.	But	it	is	their	similarities	rather	than	their	differences	that	have	proven	most	abiding:	that	art	cinema	is	fundamentally	opposed	to	Hollywood	cinema;	that	it	constitutes	a	European	response	to	Hollywood;	and	that	its	richest	vein	appeared	in	the	postwar	era,	especially	in	the	1960s.16		The	history	of	global	art	cinema	is	closely	aligned	with	a	need	to	draw	a	distance	from	Hollywood,	particularly	in	the	postwar	period,	and	this	need	led	to	the	assumption	of	a	“national”	identity	drawn	along	the	lines	of	language	and	culture.17	But,	as	Betz	notes,	“At	the	same	time,	art	cinema	circulates	internationally	as	a	specialized	or	niche	sector;	it	functions	as	‘a	mechanism	of	discrimination’	for	a	particular	class	of	audience	existing	across	nations.”18	It	is	indeed	this	tension	that	constitutes	global	art	cinema	as	a	definitional	mode.	Its	realistic,	or	what	Bordwell	would	call	verisimilar,	qualities	arise	at	least	in	part	from	a	need	for	a	national	orientation.	When	combined	with	its	attempt	to	find	a	non-	or	counter-Hollywood	narrative	and	aesthetic	approach,	as	well	as	a	greater	emphasis	on	politics,	this	realism	provides	global	art	cinema	with	its	unique	set	of	principles	and	qualities.	For	Betz,	who	focuses	on	the	European	forms	of	global	art	cinema,																																																									15	Mark	Betz,	Beyond	the	Subtitle:	Remapping	European	Art	Cinema	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2009),	10.	16	Ibid.,	13.	Betz	focuses	on	the	legacy	of	the	1960s,	particularly	the	tumultuous	period	surrounding	1968.	17	Ibid.	18	Ibid.	
		
	 12	
One	of	the	striking	features	of	modern	European	cinema	is	precisely	the	circuit	it	sets	up	between	the	spaces	it	frames,	the	time	in	which	it	sequences	them,	the	places	of	its	characters	as	viewing	subjects,	and	the	spectator,	who	is	not	so	much	a	recipient	of	a	unified/temporal	text	as	a	participant	in	a	disunified	one.	These	spaces	are	not	generalized	but	very	specific—and,	by	the	time	of	European	art	cinemas	proper,	very	urban.	They	are	spaces	of	collision	between	the	old	and	the	new,	the	traditional	and	the	modern.	They	signify	a	burst	of	infrastructural	modernization	that	radically	reoriented	how	the	modern	subject	works,	lives,	and	perceives	her	positioning	in	the	metropole	of	the	new	Europe.19		Here	Betz	touches	on	the	political	potential	of	art	cinema.	By	virtue	of	its	emphasis	on	the	shifting	urban	landscape	and	particularly	those	effected	by	political	and	economic	change,	art	cinema	took	as	its	goal,	to	generalize,	examining	the	changes	underway	in	the	middle	of	the	20th	century	and	beyond.	Coupled	with	the	disunified	spectator	that	Betz	mentions—the	spectator	asked	to	participate	in	the	construction	of	meaning	but	provided	with	no	protocol	for	unifying	the	results	of	their	participation—global	art	cinema	took	and	continues	to	assume	a	form	that	is	oriented	towards	reenvisioning	the	path	forward	for	a	world	faced	with	oppression,	existential	malaise,	outright	annihilation,	and	change	at	every	turn.	 Rosalind	Galt	and	Karl	Schoonover,	in	their	collection	on	global	art	cinema,	broach	some	of	these	same	concepts,	providing	a	kind	of	summation	of	the	unique	structure	and	orientation	of	this	mode.	According	to	Galt	and	Schoonover,	global	art	cinema	is	at	its	core	a	“mongrel”	category,	an	“unreliable	label”	that	gathers	a	diverse	and	flexible	collection	of	ideas	and	objects.	For	Galt	and	Schoonover,	“Since	the	term	‘art	cinema’	has	always	simultaneously	invoked	industrial,	generic,	and	aesthetic	categories,	a	current	reckoning	of	
																																																								19	Ibid.,	38.	
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the	field	exposes	otherwise	unseen	geopolitical	fault	lines	of	world	cinema.”20	It	is,	in	fact,	this	mongrel	status,	this	unreliability,	that	allows	global	art	cinema	to	address	questions	of	globalization.	They	contend	that,		Art	cinema	has	from	its	beginnings	forced	a	relationship	between	the	aesthetic	and	the	geopolitical	or,	in	other	words,	between	cinema	and	the	world.	Thus	it	is	the	critical	category	best	placed	to	engage	pressing	contemporary	questions	of	globalization,	world	culture,	and	how	the	economics	of	cinema’s	transnational	flows	might	interact	with	trajectories	of	film	form.21		For	Galt	and	Schoonover,	then,	it	is	global	art	cinema’s	unique	construction	as	both	national	and	transnational,	both	domestic	and	global,	that	provides	it	the	vantage	from	which	to	reflect	on	globalization.	Of	central	importance	to	this	discussion,	however,	is	the	way	that	form	in	global	art	cinema	is	positioned	to	reflect	the	concerns	of	globalization	as	a	kind	of	aesthetic	response.	Giving	the	requirement	that	ambiguity	mutes	overt	meaning	by	virtue	of	its	refusal	to	take	a	clear	position,	it	must	be	form	that	carries	with	it	the	implied	critique	of	authoritarianism.	It	is	through	aesthetic	experience	where	this	common	lack	of	trajectory	is	so	often	registered,	where	slowness,	restraint,	and	extension	can	be	felt	and	subsequently	given	an	outline.	Qualities	central	to	the	history	of	global	art	cinema—the	long	take,	deep	focus,	extended	camera	movements,	qualities	that	have	in	fact	taken	on	new	degrees	and	extremes	in	recent	years—gain	new	significance	when	one	realizes,	as	I	contend	here,	that	they	are	rooted	in	a	history	of	anti-authoritarian	politics.22	This	can	be	seen	most	notably	in																																																									20	Rosalind	Galt	and	Karl	Schoonover,	“Introduction:	The	Impurity	of	Art	Cinema,”	in	Global	
Art	Cinema:	New	Theories	and	Histories,	ed.	Rosalind	Galt	and	Karl	Schoonover	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press),	3.	21	Ibid.	22	These	qualities	are	most	famously	outlined	in	André	Bazin’s	essay	“The	Evolution	of	the	Language	of	Cinema.”	
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the	approach	of	the	Neorealists,	where	aesthetic	ambiguity	and	a	rejection	of	authority	are	most	closely	paired,	and	it	is	from	this	point	where	this	tradition	can	be	traced.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	it	is	only	when	taken	in	context	that	this	ambiguity	can	be	located	and	evaluated.	This	project	therefore	heavily	relies	upon	a	methodological	approach	that	pairs	formal	analysis	and	contextualization,	as	it	is	only	through	the	combination	of	form	and	context	that	the	ambiguity	on	display	here	can	be	stabilized	and	read,	given	shape	and	used	to	find	a	particular	understanding	of	these	films.		 Galt	and	Schoonover	go	so	far	as	to	define	the	entire	category	of	global	art	cinema	by	virtue	of	its	uncategorizability,	contending	that,		The	lack	of	strict	parameters	for	art	cinema	is	not	just	an	ambiguity	of	its	critical	history,	but	a	central	part	of	its	specificity,	a	positive	way	of	delineating	its	discursive	space.	We	propose	as	a	principle	that	art	cinema	can	be	defined	by	its	impurity;	a	difficulty	of	categorization	that	is	as	productive	to	film	culture	as	it	is	frustrating	to	taxonomy.23		I	would	add	to	this	very	compelling	definition	that	this	frustration	arises	not	simply	from	the	difficulty	of	its	categorization—surely	Hollywood	cinema	as	a	category	presents	these	same	difficulties—but	from	the	fact	that	ambiguity	functions	as	its	major	structuring	principle.		 It	is	this	tradition	of	ambiguity	that	here	plays	a	central	role,	a	tradition	that	arose	during	neorealism	where	it	served	as	an	aesthetic	reflex,	responding	to	the	failures	and	destructions	of	fascism.	Indeed	if	global	art	cinema	takes	neorealism	as	one	of	its	major	historical	origins,	as	all	of	these	theorists	claims	that	it	does,	then	it	must	be	for	the	tradition	of	ambiguity—arising	of	course	from	the	tension	between	aesthetic	verisimilitude	and	authorship	as	Bordwell	would	insist—that	it	reinforced.	This	context	is	important	to																																																									23	Ibid.,	6.	
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understanding	the	thrust	of	global	art	cinema	as	a	whole,	because	it	helps	to	flesh	out	and	provide	insights	into	the	origin	and	course	of	this	category.	The	central	role	neorealism	played	in	its	development	imbued	art	cinema	with	an	anti-authoritarian	push,	albeit	one	that	only	occasionally	regains	contact	with	a	project	similar	to	that	of	the	neorealists.	Given	this	background,	ambiguity	serves	not	only	as	the	unifying	quality	of	global	art	cinema	but	also	the	center	of	its	political	project.	If,	as	Bordwell	claims,	global	art	cinema	is	necessarily	ambiguous,	it	therefore	always	holds	within	it	some	anti-authoritarian	promise	arriving	via	the	role	that	authoritarianism	played	in	its	development.	The	goal	of	this	study,	then,	is	to	find	again	the	moments	where	this	central	ambiguity	constitutive	of	global	art	cinema	reconnects	with	its	anti-authoritarian	grounds,	and	to	discuss	how	the	approaches	and	qualities	that	constitute	this	mode	of	cinema	have	grown	and	changed	over	time.		 It	must	be	noted	that	this	is	not,	indeed	cannot	be,	an	auteurist	project.	If,	as	I	contend,	the	dismantling	of	authority	is	at	the	core	of	art	cinema’s	style,	then	it	would	be	unacceptable	to	reinstitute	a	new	authority	to	override	the	old,	now	under	a	different	name.	Auteurism,	while	perhaps	a	significant	element	of	art	cinema’s	industrial	model,	nonetheless	troubles	the	political	project	of	anti-authoritarianism,	what	with	its	central	orientation	around	rejecting	authority.	Whether	this	authority	is	political	or	authorial	is	of	little	importance	here,	as	this	ambiguity	serves	to	at	once	equate	and	summarily	reject	all	forms	of	authority.24	This	study	will	not	claim	that	it	is	Rossellini’s	or	Tarr’s	goal	to	occupy	a	central	space	of	authority	in	order	to	make	these	films	valuable.	Instead,	it	argues	the																																																									24	It	is	notable	here	that	both	and	all	forms	of	authority	return	in	remarkable	ways.	Authorial	intention	returns	in	deviation	and,	as	per	Bordwell’s	dynamic,	actually	becomes	the	major	tool	of	analysis	for	these	films,	and	political	authority	returns	in	these	absences	of	meaning	as	a	kind	of	suspended	force	that	can	finally	put	an	end	to	all	this	seeming	indifference,	its	significance	kind	of	growing	in	its	absence.	
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opposite:	their	capacity	to	remove	themselves	from	a	central	position	is	what	makes	these	films	truly	and	finally	anti-authoritarian,	and,	in	light	of	their	contexts,	political.	Their	status	as	global	auteurs	is,	then,	a	bit	ironic,	as	they	must	forever	walk	a	line	between	asserting	themselves	and	disavowing	their	own	presence.	This	is	in	fact	the	structure	of	global	art	cinema.	In	the	chapters	that	follow,	this	project	will	consider	what	form	of	analysis	is	appropriate	for	films	that	resist	the	authority	of	authorship	and	politics,	asking	ultimately	whether	the	rejection	of	authority	and	the	turn	to	ambiguity	is	a	fruitful	path	for	achieving	the	anti-authoritarian	goals	of	each	of	these	films.25		Messianism		 In	order	to	discuss	the	political	underpinnings	and	potentials	of	this	history	of	anti-authoritarianism	in	global	art	cinema,	I	now	turn	to	mapping	some	of	its	available	outcomes.	As	Schoonover	and	Galt	note,	the	art	cinema	spectator	is	asked	to	withstand	and	occupy	a	series	of	contradictory	positions:	“Aesthetic	distance	is	called	for,	but	the	rigor	of	distanciation	is	constantly	crushed	with	an	emotive	bodily	response	and	a	virtual	engagement	with	the	other.”26	The	art	cinema	spectator	is	asked	both	to	assume	a	position	of	distance	and	thoughtful	analysis	while	simultaneously	being	compelled	to	witness	and	feel	for	the	imperiled	situations	of	people	and	locations	on	the	screen.27	This	follows	from	the	tension	between	verisimilitude	and	ambiguity	outlined	by	Bordwell,	but	it	also	places																																																									25	An	auteurist	discussion	of	the	anti-authoritarian	roots	of	global	art	cinema	would	be	an	interesting	and	valuable	project,	but	it	is	not	within	the	purview	of	this	study.	26	Rosalind	Galt	and	Karl	Schoonover,	“Introduction:	The	Impurity	of	Art	Cinema,”	in	Global	
Art	Cinema:	New	Theories	and	Histories,	ed.	Rosalind	Galt	and	Karl	Schoonover	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press),	8.	27	For	an	in	depth	of	this	process	of	“witnessing”	and	its	relationship	to	global	art	cinema,	see:	Karl	Schoonover,	Brutal	Vision:	The	Neorealist	Body	in	Postwar	Italian	Cinema	(Minneapolis:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2012).	
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this	audience	in	a	kind	of	impossible	bind:	unable	to	locate	a	coherent	trajectory	for	response	or	to	fully	rationalize	the	events	on	the	screen,	this	viewer	is	left	to	wait	and,	subsequently,	to	think.	This	is	the	position,	I	contend,	of	messianism.		 This	is	not	the	messianism	of	progress	and	perfection	that	might	come	down	and	alleviate	the	needs	of	the	faithful	in	a	kind	of	cleansing	blast	that	disintegrates	the	detritus	and	inadequacies	of	a	fallen	world,	but	the	“weak”	messianism—that	most	often	associated	with	Walter	Benjamin—that	disrupts	perfectionism	and	attempts	instead	to	find	value	in	brokenness	and	an	always	just	out	of	reach	outside.	Sociologist	Danielle	Celermajer	outlines	the	distinction	between	these	two	forms	of	messianism.	She	begins	by	first	discussing	the	former,	more	conservative	and	religious,	form:	“Teleological,	perfectionist,	potentially	violent	in	their	sacrificial	logic,	messianic	programs	seem	to	be	precisely	those	that	dissolve,	conceptually	or	literally,	everything	false	and	imperfect	into	the	path	towards	the	final	end.”28	This	vision	of	messianism	contends	that	a	judgmental	but	more	or	less	known	and	perceivable	force	is	waiting	with	rewards	for	the	good	and	destruction	for	those	who	did	not	obey	the	always-available	set	of	orders	it	had	established.	Celermajer,	however,	contrasts	this	form	of	messianism	with	that	of	Benjamin’s:	“In	contradistinction	to	a	messianic	trajectory	that	must	purge	the	imperfect	to	secure	its	end,	Benjamin	suggests	a	wistful	messianism	that	tenderly	attends	to	the	discarded	fragments	of	history	in	their	brokenness.	Indeed,	it	is	precisely	in	the	truth	of	brokenness	and	careful	attention	to	it,	that	authentic	hope	lies.”29	
																																																								28	Danielle	Celermajer,	“Unsettling	Memories	and	the	Irredeemable,”	Theory	&	Event	19,	no.	2	(2016),	https://muse.jhu.edu/article/614365.	29	Ibid.	
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	 For	Celermajer,	this	secular	messianism,	what	Benjamin	calls	weak	messianism,	provides	a	radically	different	approach	to	politics,	one	that	rejects	both	social	democracy	and	fascism	in	a	single	gesture	on	the	grounds	that	both	are	oriented	towards	perfectionism	and	progress	driven	teleologies,	particularly	in	relation	to	time.	As	Celermajer	notes,	“Like	fascism,	social	democracy	conceives	of	time	as	empty,	homogenous	and	progressive,	teleologically	drawn	to	a	perfect	end	and	thus,	implicitly,	harboring	a	type	of	violence.”30	Weak	messianism,	however,	focuses	on	the	interruptions	that	might	disrupt	this	teleological	trajectory,	fixing	its	gaze	not	on	a	progressive	future,	but	on	the	possibility	for	change	within	these	disruptions.	For	Celermajer,	this	different	relationship	to	time	and	history	is	best	found	in	Benjamin’s	description	of	the	angel	of	history,	a	figure	inspired	by	Paul	Klee’s	1920	print	“Angelus	Novus”	and	discussed	in	Benjamin’s	“Theses	on	the	Philosophy	of	History.”	In	this	essay	Benjamin	describes	the	figure	of	an	angel	pushed	backwards	through	history	by	the	winds	of	progress,	facing	always	away	from	the	path	it	is	traveling,	its	gaze	fixed	on	the	destruction	that	progress	leaves	in	its	wake.	According	to	Celermajer,		 For	this	angel,	messianic	power	lies	not	in	bringing	about	the	perfect	future—that	is	the	work	of	the	impersonal,	faceless	wind	of	historical	progress	or	the	eruption	of	the	transcendent	into	history	that	humans	might	passively	await	or	aggressively	accelerate.	His	weak	messianic	power	comprises	gazing	with	full	presence	on	the	broken	past.	Unlike	historicism,	where	all	moments	and	experiences	are	integrated	into	the	victorious	movement	forward,	or	metaphysics	that	leaps	out	of	the	fray,	the	angel	pauses	in	the	midst	of	ontic	being	and	brings	consciousness	to	the	moments	that	are	excluded	from	the	victor’s	narrative.31		All	this	looking	back	upon	wreckage	begs	the	question	of	the	productive	potentials	of	this	staring	at	and	suffering	with	destruction	itself.	Unable	to	stop,	how	can	this	angel	hope	to																																																									30	Ibid.	31	Ibid.	
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proceed	to	actually	address	what	it	sees?	Like	the	cinematic	spectator,	the	angel	is	bound	by	time	to	forever	see	and	then	be	pushed	forward,	never	freed	to	stop	and	attempt	to	ameliorate	the	damage	that	it	registers.	For	Celermajer,	the	potentials	of	this	process	are	to	be	found	in	the	ways	that	this	weak	messianism	asks	us	to	look	back	on	suffering	not	to	find	something	in	particular,	but	because	it	disjoins	the	gaze	from	progress	and	asks	us	to	find	something	different	altogether:	“We	exercise	our	weak	messianic	power	only	when	we	truly	separate	that	act	of	presence	from	any	instrumentalism—when	we	renounce	any	reason	for	being	present	to	the	reality	of	the	suffering	of	the	other	except	being	present	to	the	reality	of	suffering	of	the	other.”32	The	potentials	of	this	being	present	are	therefore	never	exactly	potentials	at	all,	only	attentiveness	and	hope;	hope	in	its	most	radical	form:	hope	that	only	searches	to	see	everything,	and	in	that	seeing	perhaps	glimpse	something	different	than	what	it	suspects	it	can	see,	something	new.	For	Celermajer,	“Precisely	insofar	as	it	is	useless,	suffering	is	capable	of	shattering	the	closure	of	the	subject	and	undoing	its	theory	of	history.”33		 The	process	outlined	by	weak	messianism	is	valuable	in	its	capacity	to	separate	us	from	progress	and	perfection	and	in	so	doing	to	allow	new	histories	and	paths	through	them	to	emerge.	For	Celermajer,	these	openings	provide	new	access	points	for	radical	reconfigurations	of	ethics.	In	my	view,	these	openings	are	also	useful	in	their	ability	to	allow	new	and	different	futures	for	political	arrangements	to	appear.	Indeed,	as	the	following	chapters	will	show	the	messianic	gaze	of	each	of	the	film’s	discussed	here	looks	back	at	a	particular	type	of	catastrophe	and	with	a	particular	type	of	wind	blowing	it	forward.	The	destruction	wrought	by	authoritarianism	is	on	literal	display	in	each	of	the																																																									32	Ibid.	33	Ibid.	
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films	I	analyze,	and	the	immediately	available,	ready-to-hand,	solution	in	each	case	is	always	a	form	of	market-oriented	democracy	dedicated	to	rebuilding	in	the	name	of	a	globally	oriented	market	driven	future.34	But	these	films	disrupt	this	process.	These	films	are	in	their	own	rights	angels,	angeli	novi,	four	angels,	each	looking	backward	as	it	is	swept	forward	through	time.	What	each	sees,	and	through	cinema	allows	us	to	see,	is	destruction,	always	wreckage	of	some	sort	or	another.	But	always	within	this	wreckage	there	lies	the	spark	of	something	new,	the	possibility	for	something	remarkably	different	than	this	path	that	seems	so	immovable.	These	angels	nonetheless	stare	and	in	so	doing	hold	out	for	the	hope	of	some	new	arrival,	for	this	is	always	the	hope	of	messianism:	That	something	new	might	come.	If,	according	to	the	approach	of	weak	messianism,	we	only	look	hard	enough	something	new	might	arrive,	some	new	vision,	something	else	altogether.		 In	recent	discussions	of	art	cinema,	“slow	cinema”	has	become	a	topic	of	some	emphasis,	and	each	of	these	films	fits	to	some	degree	into	this	category.35	What	this	slowness	produces	in	each	of	these	examples	is	the	space	for	thought,	the	aforementioned	gaze	that	constantly	retreats	even	as	it	produces	the	possibility	for	renewal.	This	dynamic	connects	the	films	discussed	here;	each	slowly	examines	a	post-authoritarian	world,	but	each	also	moves	away	before	this	examination	can	yield	anything	in	particular.	As	does	Benjamin’s	angel,	these	films	look	backwards	as	time	forces	them	forward,	never	quite	capable	or	willing	to	make	an	attempt	at	altering	the	direction	of	these	winds,	for	any	attempt	to	do	so	would	require	a	gesture	of	authority,	and	would	violate	the	dedication	to	openness	that	each	of	these	films	demands.	This	is,	then,	an	impossible	dynamic,	an																																																									34	The	chapter	on	Medium	Cool,	which	maps	a	possible	turn	towards	authoritarianism,	is	the	only	exception	here.	35	See	for	instance	the	edited	collection	Slow	Cinema:	Tiago	De	Luca	&	Nuno	Barradas	Jorge,	
Slow	Cinema	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	2016).	
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absolute	negativity	that	withdraws	from	any	meaning	that	is	other	from	dismissal—no	alternative	can	ever	be	offered	here	because	these	films	must	always	move	away	from	their	own	objects	of	discovery.	This	impossible	negativity	reorients	these	films,	placing	emphasis	on	aesthetics	at	the	fore	of	the	experiences	that	they	produce.	Indeed,	it	is	this	focus	on	aesthetics	that	orders	these	films’	politics;	the	capacity	of	aesthetics	to	ask	us	to	reorient	ourselves	to	difference,	to	encounter	and	evaluate	new	kinds	of	objects	and	impressions	is	in	essence	what	brings	these	films	most	closely	to	their	goals.	As	through	this	process	the	proposed	hierarchy	on	which	authoritarianism	is	predicated	is	denied	and	replaced	with	a	new	horizon	of	political	potentials,	one	in	which	difference	can	be	accounted	for	and	politics	renewed.		 There	is	a	danger	here	of	stumbling	into	the	argument	that	ambiguity	in	art	escapes	ethical	considerations,	a	path	that	might	lead	towards	the	kind	of	l'art	pour	l'art	claims	that	have	been	rejected	since	at	least	Walter	Benjamin.	Martin	Jay	maps	just	this	tradition,	evaluating	the	myriad	assertions	that	the	aestheticization	of	politics	has	been	used	to	justify	brutal	acts	of	violence	by	authoritarian	regimes.	He	ultimately	sums	up	these	critiques	by	positing	that,	“The	disinterestedness	that	is	normally	associated	with	the	aesthetic	seems	precisely	what	is	so	radically	inappropriate	in	the	case	of	that	most	basic	of	human	interests,	the	preservation	of	life.”36	I	will	not	go	through	each	of	the	critiques	outlined	by	Jay	here,	but	it	is	important	to	indicate	how	I	am	thinking	of	the	relationship	between	ambiguity,	aesthetics,	and	authoritarianism	so	as	to	at	least	avoid	critiques	of	my	work	for	lionizing	art	for	art’s	sake,	which	is	surely	not	my	goal.	The	ambiguous	art	in	this	study	does	not	aestheticize	politics,	it	does	not	work	to	justify	brutal	behavior	by																																																									36	Martin	Jay,	“’The	Aesthetic	Ideology’	as	Ideology;	Or,	What	Does	It	Mean	to	Aestheticize	Politics?”	Cultural	Critique,	no.	21	(1992),	44.	
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habituating	it,	nor	do	these	films	render	violence	beautiful	and	in	so	doing	justified	in	whatever	their	means	or	effects.	The	ambiguous	art	in	this	study	does	just	the	opposite;	it	dehabituates	seeing	and	asks	its	audience	to	think	with	and	about	what	is	being	displayed.		 Theodor	Adorno’s	views	on	aesthetics	and	its	relationship	to	society	are	likewise	important	to	any	discussion	of	ambiguous	art.	For	Adorno,	difficult,	ambiguous	art	is	valuable	in	its	capacity	to	spur	critical	thought.	According	to	Astradur	Eysteinsson,	Adorno’s	emphasis	on	the	reluctance	of	art	to	adequately	communicate,	its	noncommunication,	is	why	it	is	at	all	significant.	For	Eysteinsson,	the	key	to	Adorno’s	take	on	art	is	to	be	found	in	its	capacity	to	elide	rational	thought:	[Art’s]	social	context	is	that	of	an	ever-expanding,	monolithic	capitalist	society,	moving	toward	a	system	of	total	exchange	as	well	as	total	rationality,	which	is	equivalent	to	absolute	reification	in	matters	of	social	interaction.	It	is	a	system	in	which	the	very	notion	of	meaning	has	become	wholly	contaminated	with	the	capitalist	ideology	of	total	exchange.	In	the	face	of	this	human	debasement,	art’s	basic	mode	of	resistance	is	in	a	sense	that	of	opting	out	of	the	system’s	communicative	network	in	order	to	attack	it	head	on	from	the	“outside.”37		From	this	vantage,	art	that	refuses	communication	is	uniquely	capable	of	addressing	society	thanks	to	its	being	the	only	thing	removed	from	it.	In	regards	to	my	project	this	is	quite	a	compelling	set	of	claims,	but	it	is	also	troubling.	It	begs	the	question	of	how	art	is	to	be	taken	up,	how	noncommunicative,	what	I	call	ambiguous,	art	is	to	find	its	way	back	into	politics	without	becoming	rendered	useless	by	rational	forces	shot	through	by	fallen,	pernicious	logics.	For	Adorno,	“By	avoiding	contamination	from	what	simply	is,	art	expresses	it	all	the	more	inexorably.”38	What	Adorno	describes	is	how	art	can	get	at	reality	with	greater	precision	by	virtue	of	its	avoiding	the,	for	him,	detestable	rational	world,	but																																																									37	Astradur	Eysteinsson,	The	Concept	of	Modernism	(Ithaca	and	London:	Cornell	University	Press,	1990),	41.	38	Theodor	Adorno,	Aesthetic	Theory	(London	and	New	York:	Continuum,	2002),	19.	
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how	it	can	enter	back	into	that	world,	not	to	mention	change	it,	remains	unclear.	How	ambiguous	art	can	critique	society	is	a	significant	topic	here,	but	how	these	critiques	can	reenter	the	world	is	my	major	theme.		 Each	of	these	films	slows	down	cinematic	narrative	and	arrests	us	in	and	with	aesthetic	experience,	the	fixed	gaze	of	the	camera	striving	to	produce	slow	explosions	of	difference.	It	is	this	experience	of	aesthetic	difference	where	these	films	find	their	strength.	The	hope	of	these	films	is	that	encounters	with	unforeseen	arrangements	will	demand	that	we	see	something	new,	something	that	might	shock	us	and	in	so	doing	ask	that	we	think	about	what	it	is	that	we	are	seeing.	The	capacity	of	aesthetic	experience	to	shake	us	from	a	ready	to	hand	relationship	to	the	world	that	we	are	encountering	and	to	request	that	whatever	new	experience	is	presented	be	assimilated	into	what	we	already	know	is	the	heart	of	this	argument.	The	slowness	of	these	films	then	exacerbates	this	process,	allowing	aesthetic	differences	to	emerge	and	to	multiply.	As	we	stare,	unmoored	from	narrative	and	trapped	within	a	film	unwilling	to	say	anything	in	particular	to	us,	at	the	ruins—literal	and	otherwise—brought	about	by	unchecked	authority,	we	are	asked	only	to	occupy	and	support	this	gaze,	to	take	it	and	to	use	it,	to	see	anew	and	to	be	ourselves	slowed,	to	be	examined	by	it	and	to	examine	along	with	it.	These	films	are	the	eye	of	the	storm	of	political	transition,	the	vantage	from	which	we	can	see	the	events	that	otherwise	seem	to	happen	with	such	speed	and	rage.	This	is	the	task	that	finally	renders	art	cinema	aesthetically	coherent:	it	asks	us	to	wait	and	see	but	never	provides	any	order	or	operation	for	what	is	experienced.	This	tradition	finds	its	origin	and	its	most	valuable	form	in	these	moments	of	transition,	where	things	are	on	the	precipice	of	change	and	where,	finally,	cinema	can	offer	
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a	rejoinder	to	the	tumult	of	the	world	outside	the	theater.	These	films	and	the	aesthetic	approaches	that	they	employ	slow	things	down	and	ask	their	audiences	to	think	anew	about	the	path	by	which	the	winds	of	history	carry	them,	and	ultimately	whether	the	ready-to-hand	solutions	that	appear	are	indeed	the	ways	that	are	best	to	take.	They	do	this,	though,	while	adamantly	refusing	their	own	capacity	to	tell	us	what	they	think	of	what	is	happening.	This	is	their	gift	and	their	curse,	forever	asking	us	to	watch	and	to	wait.		 My	first	chapter	focuses	on	Roberto	Rossellini’s	Germany	Year	Zero	in	order	to	more	specifically	address	issues	of	authority,	authoritarianism,	and	ambiguity	as	it	pertains	to	the	conditions	of	Post-World	War	II	Berlin,	all	as	borne	out	by	the	aesthetic	approach	of	this	film.	What	makes	Germany	Year	Zero	unique	in	regards	to	other	neorealist	films	is	the	difficulty	of	its	national	origin,	that	is,	its	having	been	shot	in	part	in	a	rubble	reduced	Berlin	and	in	part	in	Rome	(where	its	interiors	were	largely	filmed).	This	confused	spatial	arrangement	likewise	confuses	the	national	identity	of	this	film,	and	allows	it	to	move	from	a	form	of	nation	building—the	task	that	is	often	taken,	by	many	accounts,	in	other	neorealist	films—to	a	larger	discussion	of	the	ways	that	cinema	is	capable	of	responding	to	authoritarianism;	the	ways	that	the	vacuum	left	in	the	gap	found	in	the	center	of	the	transition	from	authoritarianism	to	democracy	can	be	extended	and,	perhaps,	used	to	produce	the	space	for	new	and	novel	political	arrangements.		 The	second	chapter	builds	on	the	first	but	focuses	in	particular	on	the	developing	aesthetic	qualities	of	anti-authoritarian	cinema.	Here,	I	focus	on	post-Soviet	Hungary,	and	in	particular	on	Béla	Tarr’s	Sátántangó,	an	over	seven-hour	film	that	was	produced	during	the	transition	from	communism	to	capitalism	in	Hungary.	This	film	directly	addresses	the	effects,	hopes,	and	difficulties	of	this	transition	but,	for	the	purposes	of	this	study,	it	is	the	
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aesthetic	approach	of	this	film	that	is	of	particular	value.	Consisting	of	extremely	long	tracking	and	still	shots,	this	film,	famously,	extends	the	time	of	each	event	to	drastic	and	demanding	proportions.	Fitting	clearly,	and	quite	notably,	into	the	slow	cinema	moment	that	has	developed	throughout	the	tradition	of	art	cinema	and	has	taken	on	new	emphasis	starting	in	the	late	1980s,	Sátántangó	extends	each	moment	and	demands	that	its	audience	endure	its	extreme	slowness.	Given	the	context	of	a	post-totalitarian	tradition,	this	aesthetic	approach	takes	on	new	qualities.	The	endless	watching	and	waiting	here	serves	to	extend	the	moment	of	transition,	slowing	its	pace	so	as	to	allow—as	with	Germany	Year	
Zero—new	formations	to	take	shape.	Where	this	chapter	differs	from	the	first,	however,	is	in	the	extreme	demands	it	makes	on	its	audience;	indeed	it	asks	them	to	suffer	with	and	against	boredom,	a	quality	that	it	uses	to	disrupt	the	coherent	divide	between	audience	and	film.		 If	Sátántangó	and	Germany	Year	Zero	provide	something	of	a	relatively	unified	vision	of	post-authoritarian	or	-totalitarian	cinema,	the	topic	of	my	third	chapter,	the	South	Korean	film	Woman	on	the	Beach,	presents	a	significant	departure.	Made	well	after	South	Korea’s	authoritarian	government	was	deposed	and	replaced	with	a	democracy,	and	indeed	made	in	relation	to—if	not	the	spotlight	of—the	immense	rise	in	popularity	of	the	South	Korean	“Hallyu”	(the	popular	media	explosion	also	known	as	the	“Korean	Wave”),	Woman	
on	the	Beach	deploys	some	of	the	qualities	of	post-authoritarian	cinema	outlined	in	the	first	two	chapters,	but	it	does	so	in	such	a	way	that	greatly	broadens	the	spectrum	of	what	these	qualities	are	capable	of	challenging.	Through	its	restrained	style,	extended	conversations,	and	deplorable-yet-reflective	major	characters,	Woman	on	the	Beach	expands	the	degree	of	critique	wide	enough	to	reject	democracy	as	readily	as	the	other	films	reject	authority.	This	
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film	disavows	its	own	authority	and	introduces	ambiguity	in	such	a	way	as	to	reject	meaning,	but	it	also	is	careful	to	show	the	damages	wrought	by	democracy	when	paired	with	capitalism,	particularly	as	it	regards	the	way	that	this	combination	incentivizes	brutality	and	self-obsession.	Democracy	and	capitalism,	this	chapter	contends,	greatly	rewards	people	willing	to	invest	in	their	own	genius	particularly	if	they	are	simultaneously	willing	to	take	advantage	of	the	gaps	in	meaning	and	authority	inherent	to	democracy.	In	this	way,	the	film	provides	the	position	from	which	to	evaluate	how	capitalism	relies	upon	the	same	evacuation	of	meaning	that	both	Germany	Year	Zero	and	Sátántangó	celebrate.	However,	Woman	on	the	Beach	renders	this	critique	from	the	position	of	having	relatively	recently	experienced	the	damages	of	authoritarianism.	Woman	on	the	Beach	is	perhaps	the	most	radical	of	the	films	discussed	so	far,	as	it	dismisses	both	authoritarianism	and	democracy	in	a	single	gesture,	and	yet,	like	Germany	Year	Zero	and	Sátántangó,	provides	no	alternative—producing	the	most	extreme	emptying	of	meanings,	and	perhaps	subsequently	the	most	hope	of	any	of	the	films	addressed	here.		 Finally,	the	fourth	chapter	rearranges	these	conditions	so	as	to	discuss	anti-authoritarian	cinema	made	in	a	different	context	altogether.	Medium	Cool,	directed	by	notable	American	cinematographer	Haskell	Wexler,	was	shot	at	and	around	the	political	actions	surrounding	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	in	Chicago.	Consisting	of	both	fictional	and	documentary	footage,	the	film	mingles	a	narrative	familiar	in	contemporary	global	art	cinema	(particularly	to	those	acquainted	with	La	Dolce	Vita)	with	footage	shot	at	the	convention.	Taken	inside	and,	more	significantly,	outside	the	convention	venue,	this	footage	clearly	shows	the	intense	police	response	and	police	violence	that	met	the	protestors.	This	chapter	uses	this	film	to	discuss	the	potentials	of	anti-authoritarian	
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cinema	in	a	moment	of	a	perceived	transition	from	democracy	to	authoritarianism.	That	is,	this	chapter	reverses	the	trajectory	of	the	earlier	films	I	discussed	and	evaluates	Medium	
Cool	in	the	hopes	of	understanding	the	role	anti-authoritarian	cinema—and	global	art	cinema	more	broadly—can	play	in	combating	the	rise	of	oppressive	centralized	power.	
Medium	Cool	is	unique	amongst	these	films	in	that	it	shows	an	authoritarianism	taking	shape	within	a	democracy,	and	therefore	provides	a	wealth	of	insights	into	how	cinema	is	suited	to	respond	to	these	conditions.		 Throughout	this	dissertation,	I	strive	to	both	articulate	and	evaluate	a	longstanding	trend	in	global	art	cinema—a	trend	that	has	largely	shaped	post-war	filmmaking.	Furthermore,	this	study	shows	how	the	elusive	qualities	that	are	so	central	to	global	art	cinema	in	fact	constitute	something	of	a	coherent	political	project.	These	qualities	circulate	around	both	narrative	and,	particularly,	aesthetic	ambiguity,	which	are	bound	up	with	multiple	approaches	to	anti-authoritarianism.	Ultimately,	the	political	potential	of	these	films	is	to	be	found	in	their	hope	that	in	and	through	their	ambiguity	something	new	might	be	discovered,	some	new	way	of	thinking	about	the	changes	that	are	taking	place.	This	is	the	political	potential	of	ambiguity.		 	
		
	 28	
CHAPTER	1		 Authority	Year	Zero			 Chief	Nazi	propagandist	Joseph	Goebbels	put	heavy	emphasis	on	the	relationship	between	art	and	politics,	in	fact	equating	the	two	and	furthermore	fixating	on	the	central	role	of	art	in	constructing	his	idealized	vision	of	a	public	unified	around	the	Nazi	party.	According	to	Goebbels,	“Politics,	too,	is	an	art,	perhaps	the	highest	and	most	far-reaching	one	of	all,	and	we	who	shape	modern	German	politics	feel	ourselves	to	be	artistic	people,	entrusted	with	the	great	responsibility	of	forging	out	of	the	raw	material	of	the	masses	a	solid,	well-wrought	structure	of	a	volk”.1	The	key	to	Goebbels’	claims	here	is	the	relationship	between	raw	materials	and	the	solidity	of	a	unified	body	or	“volk.”	For	Goebbels,	and	indeed	the	totalitarian	enterprise	that	he	represents,	the	function	of	art	(and	for	him	its	compatriot:	politics)	is	to	bring	into	being	a	cohesive	and	singular	formation	that	can	function	and	move	with	unified	purpose.	Indeed,	as	Rainer	Stollmann	observed,	one	of	the	primary	functions	of	Nazi	art	seemed	to	be	the	unification	of	the	inchoate	actions	and	events	of	a	national	social	life	into	a	coherent	and	singular	body.2		 Given	this	context	of	an	attempt	at	constituting	an	art	dedicated	to	a	unified	front,	the	post-war	cinema	of	Roberto	Rossellini—and	in	particular	his	Germany	Year	Zero	(1948)—takes	on	a	very	particular	series	of	significations.	It	was	Rossellini’s	goal,	this	chapter	contends,	to	undermine	the	centralized,	unified	and	ordered	totalizing	principle	that	Goebbels’	vision	relied	upon,	and	to	replace	it	with	a	return	to	the	inchoate	raw	material	that	the	Nazi’s	so	wished	to	tame	and	direct.																																																									1	Quoted	in	Rainer	Stollmann,	“Fascist	Politics	as	a	Total	Work	of	Art:	Tendencies	of	the	Aesthetization	of	Political	Life	in	National	Socialism,”	New	German	Critique	14	(1978):		47.	2	Rainer	Stollmann,	“Fascist	Politics	as	a	Total	Work	of	Art:	Tendencies	of	the	Aesthetization	of	Political	Life	in	National	Socialism,”	New	German	Critique	14	(1978):		47.	
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	 Susan	Buck-Morss	too	touches	upon	this	thrust	to	make	a	coherent	and	legible	whole	in	Nazi	art.	Speaking	of	Leni	Riefenstahl’s	seminal	Nazi	propaganda	film	Triumph	of	
the	Will	(1935),	Buck-Morss	proposes	the	following:	“The	mobilized	masses	fill	the	ground	of	the	Nuremberg	Stadium	and	the	cinema	screen,	so	that	the	surface	patterns	provide	a	pleasing	design	of	the	whole,	letting	the	viewer	forget	the	purpose	of	the	display,	the	militarization	of	society	for	the	teleology	of	making	war.”3	Again,	a	body	is	built	around	a	coherent,	and	in	this	case	pleasing,	series	of	images	that	unify	a	group	of	subjects	and	direct	them	to	action.	In	opposition	to	this	reading	of	Riefenstahl’s	cinema,	Germany	Year	Zero	proposes	no	pleasing	pattern;	it	pushes	the	audience	to	pay	attention	to	the	circumstances	on	display	but	without	the	ordering	function	upon	which	Nazi	cinema	so	heavily	relied.		 This	chapter	proceeds	by	introducing	the	film	and	exploring	the	openings	to	contingency	and	chance	that	Germany	Year	Zero	proposes.	I	will	then	move	to	an	analysis	of	the	specific	status	of	the	ruin	in	Rossellini’s	film	and	the	way	it	orients	audiences	toward	a	particular	(and	perhaps	productive)	relationship	to	time	and	rebuilding.	I	will	follow	this	discussion	of	the	ruin	with	an	examination	of	Karl	Marx’s	own	figuration	of	the	inchoate	masses	and	their	historical	formation	into	a	public.	Finally,	this	chapter	will	end	with	an	investigation	of	the	failures	and	drawbacks	of	Rossellini’s	dedication	to	openness—focusing	in	particular	on	the	way	that	the	intense	marketization	that	has	come	to	be	called	neoliberalism	began	to	take	advantage	of	just	these	claims	to	openness	and	change.			 Ultimately,	this	chapter	is	the	most	clear	and	direct	example	of	a	post-authoritarian	response	of	any	of	the	objects	discussed	here,	but	it	is	in	the	nuance	of	this	particular	film	and	the	way	that	it	navigates	the	circumstances	that	contributed	to	its	stance	against																																																									3	Susan	Buck-Morss,	“Aesthetics	and	Inaesthetics:	Walter	Benjamin’s	Artwork	Essay	Reconsidered,”	October	62	(1992):	38	
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authority	that	the	ways	that	post-authoritarian	cinemas	produce	unique	systems	for	encountering	and	subsequently	countering	authority	are	revealed.		Germany	Year	Zero		
Germany	Year	Zero	is	the	third	entry	in	what	is	commonly	referred	to	as	Roberto	Rossellini’s	war	trilogy.	Shot	in	Berlin	and	Rome,	the	film	fits	squarely	into	(what	might	be	called	the	later	portion	of)	the	post-war	Italian	film	movement	known	as	“neo-realism.”	At	once	an	exemplary	figure	(in	terms	of	the	deep-focus,	location	based	aesthetic	principles	of	the	movement)	and	an	outlier	(in	terms	of	its	concern	with	coherent	nation	building)	of	neo-realism,	Germany	Year	Zero	provides	a	glimpse	of	rubble	strewn	post-war	Berlin	that	fulfills	much	of	the	documentary/narrative	promise	that	this	movement	hoped	to	provide.	But	what	is	truly	valuable	about	this	film,	I	propose,	is	its	reluctance	to	present	a	particular	answer	to	the	problems	that	it	poses.	It	is	this	reluctance	that	allows	this	film	to	question	after	not	only	what	is	to	be	done	with	rubble	reduced	Berlin	(and	the	post-war	world	more	broadly),	but	also	what	might	be	valuable	about	occupying	a	space	that	is	yet	to	be	rebuilt,	and	occupying	a	politics	that	is	yet	to	take	form.	Marsha	Landy	defines	the	“major	project”	of	neo-realism	as	“the	demystification	of	the	ideology	and	practices	of	fascism.”4	She	posits	of	this	relatively	loose	grouping	of	post-war	Italian	films,	“In	their	content,	they	explored	authoritarianism;	bureaucracy	and	power;	violence;	consensus	and	conformity;	the	oppression	of	works,	and	passive	obedience	to	tradition,	the	law,	and	the	state.”5	Similarly,	Angelo	Restivo,	borrowing	from																																																									4	Marsha	Landy,	Fascism	in	Film:	The	Italian	Commercial	Cinema,	1931-1943	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	1986),	3.	5	Ibid.	
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Benedict	Anderson,	argues	that	“neo-realism	can	be	looked	at	as…	an	attempt	to	create	an	imagined	community	to	replace	the	(equally	media-constructed)	imagined	community	of	the	fascist	period,”6	and	he	further	traces	the	origin	of	this	moment	to	“the	collapse	of	a	coherent	national	narrative	that	could	be	taken	as	meaningful	by	Italians.”7	Indeed	Restivo	argues	that	Rome,	Open	City—the	first	of	Rossellini’s	war	trilogy—“allegorizes	the	birth	of	the	aesthetic	of	reality	out	of	the	bankruptcy	of	the	fascist	aesthetic,”8	and	that,	“It	is	with	
Paisa	[the	second	of	this	trilogy]	that	the	new	aesthetic	seems	to	have	achieved	its	full	realization.”9		 Of	course,	after	Paisa	and	at	the	end	of	this	lauded	triptych	lies	Germany	Year	Zero.	Whereas,	for	Restivo,	the	first	two	films	of	this	trilogy	serve	as	“a	picture	of	the	nation	in	the	radical	process	of	becoming,”10	Germany	Year	Zero	relocates	this	process	to	a	new	locale,	Berlin.	Because	of	this	move	this	film,	rather	than	presenting	a	new	imagined	community,	produces	the	moment	before	this	imaginary,	and	questions	after	the	damage	that	the	process	of	imagining	might	entail.	Its	demystification,	to	return	to	Landy,	surely	concerns	fascism	(and	authoritarianism	more	broadly),	but	it	levels	its	critique	not	merely	on	the	basis	of	the	particular	brutality	of	fascism,	but	on	the	unavoidable	damage	caused	by	the	exclusions	inherent	in	any	political	arrangement.	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	the	differences	of	particular	political	configurations	are	flattened,	nor	that	democracy	and	fascism	are	equated	here,	but	this	argument	does	contend	that	the	particular	vision	of	the	world	presented	in	Germany	Year	Zero	shifts	the	elsewhere	defined	neo-realist	project	from																																																									6	Angelo	Restivo,	The	Cinema	of	Economic	Miracles:	Visuality	and	Modernization	in	the	
Italian	Art	Film	(Durham	and	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2002),	24-25.	7	Ibid.,	25.	8	Ibid.,	27.	9	Ibid.	10	Ibid.,	32.	
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the	reevaluation	of	the	Italian	national	identity	to	a	more	abstract	politics	that	accounts	for	authority	more	broadly.	The	vantage	of	Germany	Year	Zero—looking	backwards	as	it	does	from	a	recently	enacted	democratic	moment	to	an	authoritarian	one—provides	a	unique	opportunity	to	envision	the	potentials	of	a	moment	after	an	authoritarian	regime	but	before	democracy.		 Whereas	Rome,	Open	City	and	Paisa	are	clearly	located	within	the	borders	of	Italy	and,	as	notes	Restivo,	concentrate	on	a	particular	reimagining	of	that	nation,	the	locale	of	
Germany	Year	Zero,	Berlin,	helps	in	expanding	the	purview	commonly	associated	with	neo-realism	(Italy)	and	the	forging	of	a	new	national	identity	that	it	so	commonly	connotes.	The	unusual	production	process	of	this	film—its	interiors	being	shot	in	Rome	and	its	exteriors	in	Berlin—serves	to	elide	national	specificity,	and	in	so	doing	it	envisions	a	world	after	authoritarianism,	allegorizing	the	rubble	of	Berlin	and	broadening	its	perspective.	This	is	a	film,	then,	that	allows	for	the	thinking	of	political	claims	and	political	difference	at	the	moment	before	it	can	concretize	into	something	new,	before	a	coherent	narrative	has	taken	hold.	Its	confused	national	allegiances	help	to	extend	the	moment	of	contemplation	by	holding	the	ordering	functions	of	narrative	at	bay	and	in	so	doing	disrupting	the	possibility	for	a	clear	and	singular	reading.	The	asking	of	the	question	of	whether	this	film	is	about	Italy	or	Germany,	then,	guarantees	a	pause	that	the	film	strives	to	occupy,	and	the	reluctance	to	produce	an	answer	or	a	closure	to	this	pause	is	one	of	the	many	systems	whereby	Germany	Year	Zero	refuses	to	render	a	particular	political	project	or	solution.		 But	this	reluctance	to	render	a	coherent	answer	to	its	political	concerns	also	leads	many	to	posit	that	Rossellini’s	work	(broadly)	is	better	thought	of	as	apolitical.	Indeed,	Geoffrey	Nowell-Smith	notes	that	much	of	the	praise	for	Rossellini,	particularly	that	of	the	
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critics	of	the	Cahiers	du	Cinema,	lionized	the	director	on	the	basis	of	“aesthetic	grounds”	and,	as	Nowell-Smith	states,	“His	neo-realist	trilogy	stands	aloof	from	the	politics	of	the	resistance	and	postwar	reconstruction.”11	Nowell-Smith	posits	that,	for	those	who	find	Rossellini	to	be	lacking	in	terms	of	a	politically	or	ideologically	clear	stance,	“Rossellini’s	great	misfortune…	was	to	be	born	into	a	world	that	was	too	political.”12	Much	of	the	grounds	for	this	apolitical	understanding	of	Rossellini’s	cinema	are	based	on	Andre	Bazin’s	positioning	of	him	as	a	“spiritual”	filmmaker.13	But	Nowell-Smith	contends	that	it	is	in	fact	Rossellini’s	political	identity	that	unifies	much	of	his	work.		 For	Nowell-Smith,	Rossellini’s	politics	are	derived	from	a	kind	of	intuition	that	does	not	map	cleanly	to	the	guideline	of	a	postwar	neo-realist	and	anti-fascist	left.	For	Nowell-Smith,	“In	a	world	marked	by	non-communication,	suddenly	something	would	be	communicated,	a	flash	of	insight	enabling	the	audience	to	see	what	these	characters	themselves	saw	or	maybe	were	too	blind	to	see,	or	enabling	the	characters	themselves	to	go	forward	from	an	impasse.”14	It	is	this	idea	of	non-communication	that	is	punctuated	by	sudden	clarity	that,	for	Nowell-Smith,	serves	to	guide	Rossellini’s	project.		 But	this	discussion	posits	that	Rossellini’s	cinema,	at	least	as	it	pertains	to	Germany	
Year	Zero,	is	concerned	not	with	the	spirit	or	power	of	communication,	nor	with	the	overcoming	of	its	difficulties.	What	is	invaluable	about	Germany	Year	Zero	is	its																																																									11	Geoffrey	Nowell-Smith,	“North	and	South,	East	and	West:	Rossellini	and	Politics,”	in	
Roberto	Rossellini:	Magician	of	the	Real,	ed.	David	Forgacs,	Sarah	Lutton	and	Geoffrey	Nowell-Smith	(London:	BFI	Publishing,	2000),	8.	12	Ibid.	13	See,	for	instance,	Andre	Bazin,	“In	Defense	of	Rossellini,”	in	What	is	Cinema?	Volume	2	(Berkeley,	Los	Angeles	&	London:	University	of	California	Press,	1971),	93-101.	14	Geoffrey	Nowell-Smith,	“North	and	South,	East	and	West:	Rossellini	and	Politics,”	in	
Roberto	Rossellini:	Magician	of	the	Real,	ed.	David	Forgacs,	Sarah	Lutton	and	Geoffrey	Nowell-Smith	(London:	BFI	Publishing,	2000),	11.	
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presentation	of	a	damaged	world	that	finds	the	very	prospect	of	communication	troubling.	As	Sandro	Bernardi	argues	of	the	landscapes	in	Germany	Year	Zero,	“The	picture	that	Rossellini	tries	to	give	us	is	that	of	a	world	destroyed,	whose	shattered	monuments	are	no	more	than	the	ruins	of	a	culture	swept	away	by	an	infernal	ambition.”15	The	world	on	display	in	this	film	is	one	destroyed	by	what	Bernardi	calls	“the	catastrophe	of	ideology”,	a	world	ruined	by	dark	attempts	to	orient	meaning	in	a	particular	way.		 Karl	Schoonover	argues	that	Rossellini’s	war	trilogy—Rome,	Open	City	and	Paisa	in	particular—facilitate	a	politics	by	engaging	its	characters,	and	indeed	its	audiences,	in	a	certain	style	of	looking.	For	Schoonover,	“By	placing	ocular	witnessing	at	the	center	of	their	narratives,	these	films	seem	to	transform	seeing	from	a	passive	state	of	consumption	into	a	powerful	means	of	moral	reckoning.”16	For	Schoonover,	this	positioning	engenders	a	specific	global	view	and	in	so	doing	“these	films	promote	a	universalist	conception	of	human	compassion	by	reifying	a	particular	response	to	violence	as	the	exclusively	moral	one.”17	Ultimately,	according	to	Schoonover,	this	system	solidified	a	particular	response	to	fascism	that	unified	divergent	critiques	and	addressed	them	outward	in	the	hopes	of	supporting	the	Marshall	Plan	and	other	forms	of	international	aid.18	Schoonover	is	speaking,	though,	primarily	of	Rome,	Open	City	and	Paisa,	whereas	Germany	Year	Zero	defies	this	reification	of	a	particular	violence	and	instead	leaves	unarticulated	the	“appropriate”	moral	response	to	the	violence	that	guides	this	film.	What	differentiates																																																									15	Sandro	Bernardi,	“Rossellini’s	Landscapes:	Nature,	Myth,	History,”	in	Roberto	Rossellini:	
Magician	of	the	Real,	ed.	David	Forgacs,	Sarah	Lutton	and	Geoffrey	Nowell-Smith	(London:	BFI	Publishing,	2000),	55.	16	Karl	Schoonover,	Brutal	Vision:	The	Neorealist	Body	in	Postwar	Italian	Cinema	(Minneapolis	and	London:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	2012),	111.	17	Ibid.,	112.	18	Ibid.,	147-8.	
		
	 35	
Germany	Year	Zero	from	its	predecessors,	then,	is	that,	through	its	spatial	and	narrative	ambiguity,	it	refuses	the	figuration	of	a	particular	plea	and	instead	questions	after	how	to	proceed	at	all;	providing	and	attempting	to	expand	an	opening,	an	indeterminate	moment,	whereby	actions	(and	responses)	are	left	in	stasis.	It	is	this	stunted	moment,	this	pause,	that	this	chapter	will	focus	upon.	I	argue	that	this	reluctance	to	forge	a	particular,	this	open-endedness	and	“apolitical”	moment	of	non-communication,	serves	as	a	politics	all	its	own.	Indeed,	that	the	film	refuses	to	render	a	particular	future	and	insists	instead	on	decay	is	exactly	what	makes	it	a	political	film,	for	through	these	pauses	and	disruptions	Germany	Year	Zero	throws	into	doubt	those	who	might	present	a	solution.	It	questions	after,	that	is,	the	authority	that	might	propose	to	solve	its	problems,	and	in	so	doing	brings	into	light	its	own	relationship	to	authority	and	the	possibility	(always	fleeting)	of	democratic	art.	Authority	is	of	particular	historical	significance	to	this	film	by	virtue	of	its	having	been	made	in	two	countries,	Germany	and	Italy,	who	were	in	the	throws	of	a	change	from,	respectively,	totalitarian	and	authoritarian	systems	to	democratic	governments.	This	argument	is	complicated,	though,	by	the	relationship	that	art	(and	the	meanings	that	it	at	times	enfolds)	has	to	authority	itself.	What	this	film	can	be	said	to	ask	after,	then,	is	not	only	what	to	do	when	authority	fails,	but	how	a	film	can	be	made	without	reinstituting	authoritarian	logics.		Authority	In	the	final	shots	of	Germany	Year	Zero,	Edmund,	the	thirteen-year-old	protagonist	of	the	film,	looks	out	of	what	was	formerly	a	window	(and	is	now	simply	an	opening)	of	the	demolished	building	that	he	currently	occupies.	Across	the	street	he	sees	the	apartment	
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where	his	family—along	with	a	number	of	other	families—currently	resides.	He	watches	as	a	small	truck	pulls	up	and	quickly	learns	what	it	carries:	a	well-stacked	collection	of	coffins.	Edmund	continues	to	look	as	the	truck’s	drivers	enter	the	building	and	then	exit	carrying	another	coffin;	they	place	it	with	the	others	and	then	leave.	After	staring	again	briefly	at	his	destroyed	home,	Edmund	carefully	hangs	his	jacket	from	an	errant	metal	pillar.	Disillusioned	as	he	is,	and	as	he	has	carefully	been	shown	to	become,	by	the	prospect	of	existence	in	post	World	War	II	Berlin,	Edmund	slides	down	the	stanchion	to	a	lower	level	of	the	building.	He	then	takes	a	final	brief	look	again	at	his	family’s	apartment;	framed	against	the	rubble,	he	is	shown	gazing	out	on	a	world	that	has	been	reduced	to	amorphous	gray	masses	of	concrete.	
	He	then	closes	his	eyes	and	jumps	from	the	building.	The	artificial	speed	of	his	fall—created	by	the	lowered	frame	rate	of	his	descent—lends	the	jump	a	kind	of	oneiric	quality	that	only	aids	in	fostering	the	understanding	of	war	torn	Berlin	as	a	rubble	strewn	alien	world.	The	film	ends	with	his	body	being	found	a	few	seconds	later	by	a	woman	walking	by.	What	Edmund	had	just	witnessed,	and	what	indeed	caused	him	to	make	this	jump,	was	his	elderly	father’s	body	being	removed	from	his	apartment.	Earlier	in	the	film,	Edmund,	under	the	advice	of	a	previous	teacher,	had	poisoned	his	bedridden	father	in	the	
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hopes	of	allowing	his	remaining	family—himself	and	his	two	much	older	siblings—to	more	easily	survive.	“Stop	this	now,	you	can’t	change	things,”	was	the	advice	he	was	given	by	Henning,	the	aforementioned	former	teacher,	“Everything	isn’t	about	you	and	your	selfishness.	Afraid	that	daddy	will	die!	Look	at	nature.	The	weak	are	destroyed	so	that	the	strong	survive.	One	must	have	the	courage	to	let	the	weak	die.”	The	manipulative	Henning,	one	of	the	few	characters	of	the	film	who	is	directly	associated	with	the	Nazis,	has	presented	the	destructive	rationale	that	this	film	strives	to	critique,	but	what	here	is	emphasized	are	the	parricidal	and	survivalist	strains	of	his	Nazi	values.	His	status	as	Edmund’s	former	teacher	and	his	allegiance	to	the	Nazis—he	had,	according	to	some	earlier	dialogue,	wished	he	had	been	more	critical	of	Edmund’s	parents	when	they	avoided	entering	him	into	the	Hitler	Youth—make	clear	his	role	as	surrogate	for	the	doctrines	of	the	Nazi	party.	But	Henning,	in	addition	to	being	a	Nazi,	is	also	presented	as	the	only	figure	that	provides	Edmund	with	any	system	by	which	to	survive	in	this	world.	Henning’s	reliance	on	black	market	profiteering	and,	disturbingly,	what	seems	to	be	the	collecting	of	young	boys	for	the	pleasure	of	the	strange	mansion	owner	off	of	whom	he	lives	escapes	Edmund’s	youthful	appraisal	of	this	teacher,	and	so	he	heeds	his	advice	and	engages	in	a	very	deliberate	plot	to	kill	his	own	father.	The	value	system	that	Henning	represents,	though,	comes	unbound	as	the	film	progresses.	Indeed	when	Edmund	returns	to	him	after	committing	the	murder	in	order	to	confess	(or	perhaps	report	back),	Henning	immediately	becomes	furious.	“I	didn’t	tell	you	to	do	anything	you	little	monster!”	he	yells	as	he	slaps	Edmund.	“People	will	find	out	you’ve	been	coming	alone	here.	I	never	told	you	to	do	such	a	thing!	Never!”	At	this	Edmund	snaps	and	runs	off,	beginning	the	journey	that	will	culminate	in	his	suicide.	
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To	proceed	with	my	analysis	of	this	exchange	it	is	perhaps	best	to	discuss	theories	of	authoritarianism.	Writing	in	1959	and	concerned	in	many	ways	with	the	same	historical	moment	as	Rossellini,	Hannah	Arendt	delineates	the	idea	of	authoritarianism,	and	in	so	doing	brings	to	light	her	concerns	for	living	in	a	world	free	of	the	hierarchical	structures	and	calls	to	an	abstract	source	of	power	that	this	governmental	system	entails.	In	arguing	its	structure,	Arendt	is	careful	to	differentiate	authoritarian	systems	of	power	from	totalitarian	ones.	For	Arendt,	The	source	of	authority	in	authoritarian	government	is	always	a	force	external	and	superior	to	its	own	power;	it	is	always	this	source,	this	external	force	which	transcends	the	political	realm,	from	which	the	authorities	derive	their	‘authority,’	that	is,	their	legitimacy,	and	against	which	their	power	can	be	checked.19		For	Arendt,	then,	it	is	always	the	call	to	some	kind	of	outside	and	unquestionably	correct	vision	of	the	world,	be	it	supported	by	religion	or,	as	in	the	case	of	the	Italian	fascists,	tradition,	which	accounts	for	the	authoritarian	government’s	ability	to	render	particular	judgments.	Given	that	we	are	talking	about	a	precise	moment,	it	should	be	noted	that	Arendt	differentiates	Mussolini’s	Fascism	from	Hitler’s	totalitarianism.	Arendt	notes	of	Mussolini	that,	 His	one-party	rule	was,	in	a	sense	the	only	one	[amongst	Mussolini,	Hitler	and	Stalin]	still	intimately	connected	with	the	multiparty	system.	He	carried	out	what	the	imperialist-minded	leagues,	societies,	and	“parties	above	parties”	had	aimed	at,	so	that	it	is	particularly	Italian	Fascism	that	has	become	the	only	example	of	a	modern	mass	movement	organized	within	the	framework	of	an	existing	state,	inspired	solely	by	extreme	nationalism.20																																																										19	Hannah	Arendt,	“What	is	Authority?”	in	The	Portable	Hannah	Arendt,	ed.	Peter	Baehr	(London:	Penguin	Books,	2003),	467.	20	Hannah	Arendt,	The	Origins	of	Totalitarianism	(San	Diego:	Harcourt,	1973),	259.	
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The	distinction,	then,	is	that	Mussolini’s	Italy	worked	within	the	boundaries	of	a	previously	established	state,	pulling	it	towards	its	extremes	but	still	relying	on	its	formerly	negotiated	and	relatively	coherent	outline.	By	contrast,	Arendt	defines	totalitarianism,	which	is,	to	her,	exclusively	a	more	recent	occurrence	and	is	better	exemplified	by	the	nations	governed	by	Hitler	and	Stalin,	as	cutting	itself	off	from	national	traditions	and	providing	a	novel	governmental	form	that	is	much	less	coherent.	To	Arendt,	Wherever	it	rose	to	power,	it	developed	entirely	new	political	institutions	and	destroyed	all	social,	legal	and	political	traditions	of	the	country.	No	matter	what	the	specifically	national	tradition	or	the	particular	spiritual	source	of	its	ideology,	totalitarian	government	always	transformed	classes	into	masses,	supplanted	the	party	system,	not	by	one-party	dictatorships,	but	by	a	mass	movement,	shifted	the	center	of	power	from	the	army	to	the	police,	and	established	a	foreign	policy	openly	directed	toward	world	domination.21		This	difference	amounts	to	a	distinction	between	a	call	to	tradition	and	the	efficacy	of	one-party	rule	(for	the	authoritarian	state)	versus	the	creation	of	a	new	(and	terrifying)	ideological	unity	(that	of	totalitarianism).		 Likewise,	there	is	a	difference	in	structure	for	these	two	systems.	Whereas	totalitarianism	is	structured	like	an	onion—with	a	leader	at	the	center	that	is	insolated	by	layers	that,	to	the	outsider,	seem	to	decrease	both	in	power	and	extremism—authoritarianism	is	better	described	as	a	pyramid.	For	Arendt,	this	structure	of	authoritarianism	is	as	follows:	The	pyramid	is	indeed	a	particularly	fitting	image	for	governmental	structure	whose	source	of	authority	lies	outside	itself,	but	whose	seat	of	power	is	located	at	the	top,	from	which	authority	and	power	is	filtered	down	to	the	base	in	such	a	way	that	each	successive	layer	possess	some	authority,	but	less	than	the	one	above	it,	and	where	precisely	because	of	this	careful	filtering	process,	all	layers	from	top	to	bottom	are	not	only	firmly	integrated																																																									21	Ibid.,	460.	
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into	the	whole	but	are	interrelated	like	converging	rays	whose	common	focal	point	is	the	top	of	the	pyramid	as	well	as	the	transcending	source	of	authority	above	it.22				 Arendt’s	distinctions	between	totalitarianism	and	authoritarianism	are	helpful	in	revealing	how	Rossellini’s	film	presents	its	Nazi	characters	in	such	a	way	as	to	critique	Italian	authoritarianism	more	than	the	German	totalitarianism.	Henning,	rather	than	presented	as	a	monstrous	ideologue	with	an	unflinching	certainty	in	his	beliefs,	is	presented	here	as	wavering,	weak	and	primarily	concerned	with	maintaining	his	bureaucratic	position.	This	point	is	proved	by	the	way	that	Rossellini	presents	the	relationship	between	Henning	and	Edmund.		 Henning	is	situated	as	a	point	of	authority	above	Edmund,	but	through	this	diffusive	structure	Edmund	still	feels	empowered	to	take	the	admittedly	extreme	action	of	killing	his	father.	His	is	not	the	ideological	certainty	of	a	denouncement	obsessed	Nazi	youth,	but	a	de-individualized	fascist	in	search	of	an	authoritative	system	through	which	to	reproduce	a	hierarchical	structure.	But	Henning	too	is	only	located	as	a	piece	in	a	greater	power	hierarchy,	as	the	mysterious	wealthy	pedophile	for	whom	he	works	and	whose	presence	is	only	ever	seen	in	the	periphery	is	constantly	deferred	to	as	the	seat	of	authority	for	Henning’s	economic,	moral,	and	even	pleasurable	concerns	(Henning	is,	after	all,	hinted	to	be	a	pedophile	himself,	although	his	desires	are	never	consummated).	There	is,	then,	a	deferral	of	authority	in	play	here	that	signals	upwards,	towards	some	greater	source;	rather	than	presenting	Henning	to	be	a	totalitarian,	self-justifying	layer,	he	is	only	a	transmitter	of	authority,	and	his	cowardly	reaction	to	Edmund’s	following	his	advice	reveals	that	the	seat	of	power	that	he	at	first	appears	to	occupy	is	in	fact	centered																																																									22	Hannah	Arendt,	“What	is	Authority?”	in	The	Portable	Hannah	Arendt,	ed.	Peter	Baehr	(London:	Penguin	Books,	2003),	468.	
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elsewhere.	This	is	not	to	say	that	Rossellini’s	film	serves	to	draw	the	same	distinction	between	totalitarianism	and	authoritarianism	as	Arendt,	but	that	his	understanding	of	this	moment	anticipates	Arendt’s	claims.	Whether	a	critique	of	Germany	or	Italy	(or	whether,	for	this	film,	these	distinctions	are	even	available)	is	not	at	issue	here—and	indeed	the	disassociation	of	these	two	countries	from	each	other	is	complicated	by	the	film’s	confused	and	confusing	relationship	to	the	national.	Instead,	the	value	of	Arendt’s	conception	of	authoritarianism	is	helpful	because	the	film’s	depiction	of	power	seems	to	match	this	arrangement	in	certain	ways,	and	deviate	from	it	in	others	(as	we	shall	see).		 Henning’s	failure	to	defend	his	advice	is	further	caused	by	the	general	failure	of	authoritarianism	in	this	context.	For	Arendt,	religion,	tradition	and	authority	are	the	central	triumvirate	that	holds	together	power	structures—be	they	authoritarian,	monarchical,	or	democratic—and	in	the	absence	of	any	of	these	three	factors	the	other	two	inevitably	crumble	as	well.23	The	failure	of	this	interconnected	structure	for	power	leads	to	Henning’s	disavowal	of	his	own	views,	as	his	ability	to	justify	the	power	structures	that	he	attempts	to	reproduce	fails	him	totally.	His	supposed	authority	is	immediately	revealed	to	be	merely	hollow	claims	to	a	higher	power	that	cannot	call	to	any	system	of	justification	other	than	force.		 For	Arendt,	though,	a	world	without	authority	too	creates	a	variety	of	problems:	If	I	am	right	in	suspecting	that	the	crisis	of	the	present	world	is	primarily	political,	and	that	the	famous	“decline	of	the	West”	consists	primarily	in	the	decline	of	the	Roman	trinity	of	religion,	tradition,	and	authority,	with	the	concomitant	undermining	of	the	specifically	Roman	foundations	of	the	political	realm,	then	the	revolutions	of	the	modern	age	appear	like	gigantic	attempts	to	repair	these	foundations,	to	renew	the	broken	thread	of	tradition,	and	to	restore,	through	founding	new	political	bodies,	what	for	so																																																									23	Ibid.,	492.	
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many	centuries	had	endowed	the	affairs	of	men	with	some	measure	of	dignity	and	greatness.24		For	Arendt,	this	triumvirate	grants	politics	a	unified	and,	more	importantly,	externally	justified	body	whereby	meanings	can	take	shape	and	decisions	subsequently	made.	But	it	must	also	be	noted	that	this	is	one	of	the	few	moments	in	this	essay	where	Arendt	divorces	the	terms	“authority”	from	“authoritarianism,”	as	here	“authority”	seems	to	describe	a	process	whereby	decisions	and	actions	are	deferred	to	a	higher	figure	in	the	hierarchical	arrangement,	and	ultimately	to	a	greater	external	authority	with	some	(illusory)	capacity	to	render	meaning,	but	this	arrangement	alone,	for	Arendt,	does	not	constitute	authoritarianism.	The	crisis	of	the	post-war	world,	for	Arendt,	is	derived	from	the	failure	of	these	three	factors	to	maintain	a	hold	on	the	world	and	negotiate	a	transcendent	value	system.25	The	revolutions	that	she	speaks	of	fail	to	take	hold,	then,	because	they	fail	to	establish	anything	other	than	an	unmoored	authority	and	are	therefore	always	left	open	to	the	possibilities	inherent	in	disagreement	and	difference.26	For	Arendt,	without	access	to	a	stable	claim	as	to	a	general	truth	authority	can	never	find	purchase.	These	fascist	and	totalitarian	movements	are	attempts	to	create	and	centralize	their	own	authority	in	response	to	these	conditions,	but	their	failures	are	revealed	in	the	aggression	with	which	they	figure	their	claims	to	authority.	They	know,	that	is,	that	their	truth	claims	are	unstable	and	as	a	result	they	overcompensate	and,	what’s	much	worse,	lash	outward	in	attempts	to	reaffirm	their	authority	through	violence	and	control.																																																										24	Ibid.,	501.	25	Ibid.,	496.	26	Ibid.,	502.	
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Ruins		 Germany	Year	Zero,	however,	deviates	from	Arendt’s	pessimism	towards	the	post-authoritarian	world	and	instead	presents	the	crisis	at	the	end	of	authority	as	one	valuable	to	the	reformation	of	these	countries.	The	failures	of	authoritarianism—and	the	horrors	that	have	been	unleashed	by	the	ascension	and	subsequent	destruction	of	this	mode—are	displayed	here,	and	the	potential	effectiveness	that	this	kind	of	authoritarianism	had	promised	has	been	reduced	here	literally	to	rubble.	In	effect,	Germany	Year	Zero	argues	the	necessity	of	the	crisis	that	comes	at	the	end	of	the	authority	by	focusing	squarely	on	the	horrors	that	authoritarianism	has	wrought.	One	of	the	primary	ways	that	it	establishes	this	unique	orientation	to	the	absence	of	authority	is	through	its	emphasis—indeed	its	insistence	upon—ruins.	In	order	to	address	the	ways	that	ruins	function	here	to	create	a	particular	temporal	relationship	to	the	origins	and	effects	of	the	war,	it	is	necessary	to	begin	by	exploring	how	ruins	were	defined	by	two	significant	thinkers	of	the	topic:	Walter	Benjamin	and	Georg	Simmel.	Benjamin	discusses	ruins	in	a	number	of	ways;	one	of	the	less	examined	occurs	in	his	essay	“The	Storyteller.”	In	a	moment	where	he	addresses	and	describes	the	perhaps	lost	artisanal	qualities	of	storytelling	Benjamin	proposes:	“One	can	go	on	and	ask	oneself	whether	the	relationship	of	the	storyteller	to	his	material,	human	life,	is	not	in	itself	a	craftsman’s	relationship,	whether	it	is	not	his	very	task	to	fashion	the	raw	material	of	experience,	his	own	and	that	of	others,	in	a	solid,	useful,	and	unique	way.”27	This	is	to	say	that	storytellers	are	craftsmen	of	sorts	due	to	their	undertaking	the	basic	task	of	forming	from	human	experience	something	like	a	particular—Benjamin	says	“unique”—																																																								27	Walter	Benjamin,	“The	Storyteller,”	in	Illuminations,	ed.	Hannah	Arendt	(New	York:	Shocken	Books,	1968),	108.	
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arrangement	from	the	unorganized	mass	of	unmolded	experience.	There	are	then	two	states	at	play	in	Benjamin’s	model	for	storytelling:	first,	the	state	of	raw	experience	and,	second,	the	story	drawn	from	that	raw	experience	and	which	arranges	it	into	a	coherent	model.	We	can	think	of	the	quote	from	Goebbels	that	began	this	discussion,	I	think,	as	a	kind	of	dark	variation	on	this	same	process	of	forging	particularities	from	an	unmolded	mass.	 Benjamin	continues	by	introducing	a	third	state	of	experience	so	as	to	provide	a	useful	extension	for	this	model	for	storytelling.	He	says	of	this	task	of	organizing	experience	into	story:	“It	is	a	kind	of	procedure	which	may	perhaps	most	adequately	be	exemplified	by	the	proverb	if	one	thinks	of	it	as	an	ideogram	of	a	story.”28	Benjamin	brings	in	the	figure	of	the	proverb	to	further	concretize	the	task	of	the	storyteller,	and	it	is	this	third	model	that	produces	the	most	clearly	delineated	explanation	of	experience.	The	story	becoming	proverb	exaggerates	the	storyteller’s	capacity	to	distill	experience	down	to	a	coherent	singular	concept,	and	Benjamin	indeed	goes	so	far	as	to	connect	these	storytellers	to	teachers	and	sages	for	their	shared	capacity	to	present	and	communicate	concepts.		 But	it	is	in	the	figure	of	the	proverb	that	we	find	the	point	of	interest	for	this	discussion.	Benjamin	continues:	“A	proverb,	one	might	say,	is	a	ruin	which	stands	on	the	site	of	an	old	story	and	in	which	a	moral	twines	about	a	happening	like	ivory	around	a	wall.”29	Benjamin	proposes	this	metaphor	so	as	to	account	for	the	ways	that	a	proverb,	as	an	extreme	distillation	of	a	story,	brings	coherence	to	experience.	But	it	is	the	figure	of	the	ruin	that	complicates	this	passage.	It	is	worth	noting	here	that	in	German	Benjamin	uses	the	word	“Trümmer,”	which,	in	addition	to	“ruins”	(in	the	German	it	is	plural),	can	translate																																																									28	Ibid.	29	Ibid.	
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to	“fragments”	or	“broken	pieces.”	These	alternative	translations	heighten	the	metaphor	in	use	here	as	they	parallel	and	in	fact	amplify	the	relationship	that	proverb	has	to	story.	The	translation	of	“fragment”	emphasizes	the	fact	that	the	proverb	is	itself	ruinous,	its	presence	indicating	that	the	story—and	furthermore	the	experience	that	the	story	has	filtered—has	broken	apart	and	what	remains	is	a	simplification	that	holds	only	a	shattered	section	of	the	original.	This	distinction	in	fact	tells	us	a	lot	about	what,	according	to	this	logic,	a	ruin	is:	a	fragment	of	a	whole	that	holds	within	it	some	semblance	of	a	former	state	but	that	fails,	due	to	its	highlighting	only	a	single	part,	to	account	for	the	entirety.	A	proverb,	according	to	this	passage,	is	not	simply	a	distillation,	but	a	distillation	that	occurs	only	at	the	site	of	disintegration	of	a	former	structure,	a	ruin.	The	errand	of	this	discussion	is	to	reverse	this	analogy.	The	task	at	hand	is	not	to	ask	“how	is	a	proverb	like	a	ruin?”—as	indeed	Benjamin	proposes	an	answer	to	this	question—but	“how	is	a	ruin	like	a	proverb?”,	and,	furthermore,	what	it	means	for	a	ruin,	or	an	image	thereof,	to	take	this	status	as	proverb.	Rossellini’s	
Germany	Year	Zero,	this	project	contends,	too	takes	up	this	task.	In	Germany	Year	Zero	there	are	many	ruins—one	might	even	say	that	there	is	nothing	but	ruins—but	in	one	particular	sequence	the	status	of	the	ruin	as	fragment	is	emphasized,	and	indeed	complicated.	When	early	in	the	film	Edmund,	acting	under	orders	from	Henning,	is	enlisted	to	sell	a	record	to	some	allied	troops,	the	damages	caused	by	authoritarianism,	and	the	necessity	of	never	turning	back,	are	made	totally	clear.	In	this	scene	Edmund	demonstrates	the	qualities	of	the	record	by	playing	it	aloud	on	a	small	player.	The	sounds	of	the	record	begin	to	echo	through	the	ruined	building	that	the	group	occupies.	The	speech	by	Hitler	that	the	record	contains	confuse,	at	first,	the	small	boy	and	his	elderly	guardian	strolling	nearby,	who	look	up,	surprised.	
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	The	image	quickly	leaves	the	particularity	of	this	ruined	building	and	a	wide,	high	angle	shot	of	the	demolished	city	is	presented.	A	slow	pan	reveals	more	and	more	demolished	structures,	before	finally	panning	up	towards	the	sky.	
	The	speech,	arguing	at	this	point	the	need	for	the	German	people	to	“raise	up,”	ends	again	with	the	elderly	man	and	child	slowly	walking	off	screen	as	Hitler	concludes	by	yelling	about	the	victories	that	await.	This	moment	serves	to	concretize	the	film’s	pessimism	towards	the	post-authoritarian	world	while	simultaneously	presenting	the	crisis	at	the	end	of	authority	as	one	valuable	to	the	reformation	of	these	countries.	The	failures	of	authoritarianism—and	the	horrors	that	have	been	unleashed	by	the	ascension	and	subsequent	destruction	of	this	
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mode—are	displayed	here,	and	the	potential	effectiveness	that	this	kind	of	governmental	approach	had	promised	has	been	reduced	here	literally	to	rubble.	To	return	to	Benjamin,	then,	what	is	distilled	in	these	images	and	calcified	into	proverb	is	the	terror	that	Hitler	has	unleashed.	But	not	only	the	damage	that	has	been	done	to	Germany	survives	in	these	images.	These	ruins	too	point	towards	the	similar	ruins	produced	elsewhere	by	this	same	conflict.	These	downed	buildings	and	the	hateful	speech	that	here	accompanies	them	point	backwards	to	the	war	to	produce	a	relatively	straightforward	denunciation,	and	Edmund’s	later	actions—particularly	his	poisoning	his	ailing	father	at	the	behest	of	Henning	in	the	name	of	securing	more	rations	for	his	family—are	also	condemned	in	this	gesture.	The	juxtaposition	of	Hitler’s	speech	with	the	wrecked	buildings	serves	as	an	effective	if	obvious	criticism	of	his	monstrous	actions,	but	too	haunting	this	scene	is	the	question	of	how	to	rebuild.	Arendt	ends	her	discussion	of	authority	with	a	flourish:	To	live	in	a	political	realm	with	neither	authority	nor	the	concomitant	awareness	that	the	source	of	authority	transcends	power	and	those	who	are	in	power,	means	to	be	confronted	anew,	without	the	religious	trust	in	a	sacred	beginning	and	without	the	protection	of	traditional	and	therefore	self-evident	standards	of	behavior,	by	the	elementary	problems	of	human	living-together.30		This	film	asks	what	is	to	be	done	with	and	without	authority,	but	it	asks	it	from	the	perspective	of	the	damage	that	efforts	to	reinscribe	authority	have	wrought.	That	is,	this	film	functions	to	force	the	confrontation	that	Arendt	predicts;	it	asks	how	is	one	to	see	and	understand	the	problems	of	living-together,	but	it	asks	these	questions	from	the	literal	view	that	Edmund	occupies	just	before	he	jumps.	His	is	the	high	angle	view	that	looks	down	upon	rubble,	the	very	rubble	caused	by	others’	attempts	to	answer	these	same	questions																																																									30	Hannah	Arendt,	“What	is	Authority?”	in	The	Portable	Hannah	Arendt,	ed.	Peter	Baehr	(London:	Penguin	Books,	2003),	502.	
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through	a	reclaiming	of	authority,	attempts	that	have	led	to	levels	of	destruction	never	before	seen.	The	title	of	the	film	asks	where	to	go	from	here,	but	the	“here”	is	a	zero	point,	a	point	where	the	triumvirate	of	authority,	religion	and	tradition	has	been	broken	apart	from	every	side	and	has	been	reduced	to	the	worthless	waste	of	a	misguided	attempt	to	render	the	world	coherent.	In	light	of	Benjamin’s	metaphor,	then,	it	becomes	clear	that	something	like	ambiguity	has	crept	into	the	easily	read	proverb	that	these	ruins	provide.	The	distillation	and	renunciation	of	Nazi	ideas	and	practices	is	clear,	but	another	quality	of	ruins	and	their	coherence	is	that	their	relationship	to	a	no	longer	available	former	glory	necessarily	stands	them	apart	from	the	past.	In	light	of	this	record	and	these	wrecked	buildings,	Edmund’s	approach	to	reconciling	his	family’s	needs	through	a	single	brutal	decision	appears	simply	outmoded,	a	ruin	as	repellent	as	the	views	reproduced	on	the	record	that	he	attempts	to	sell.	But	what	arises	in	these	moments	is	the	questions	of	humans	living	together,	how	to	account	for	others	and	how	to	produce	meaning	without	re-erecting	the	hierarchies	of	authority	that	have	here	so	recently	been	deposed.	This	is	all	to	say	that	these	ruins	also	point	forward,	albeit	to	an	unfigured	future.	These	bombed	out	landscapes	indicate	how	ruins,	like	proverbs,	can	point	towards	their	own	boundaries,	in	this	case	how	they	can	motion	towards	some	other	way	of	living-together	that	can	produce	different	kinds	of	structures	and	different	forms	of	logic.	As	Svetlana	Boym	notes,	ruins	tend	to	propose	particular	visions	of	both	the	future	and	the	past.	According	to	Boym,	“Ruins	make	us	think	of	the	past	that	could	have	been	and	the	future	that	never	took	place,	tantalizing	us	with	utopian	dreams	of	escaping	the	
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irreversibility	of	time.”31	In	the	case	of	Germany	Year	Zero,	where	asking	what	could	have	been	is	a	dark	question,	it	might	be	better	to	think	of	these	ruins	as	signifying	a	dystopia	avoided.	The	terrifying	path	so	narrowly	escaped	figures	the	ruins	here	as	a	kind	of	relief;	rather	than	cement	the	loss	of	a	positive	future,	these	ruins	provide	a	devastating	but	in	a	way	triumphant	background.	These	are	after	all	in	a	sense	the	ruins	of	fascism,	so	the	future	that	could	have	been	functions	here	as	a	kind	of	dark	specter.	This	is	to	say	that	the	ruins	of	Germany	Year	Zero	never	haunt	us	with	former	glories,	and	the	only	future	they	signal	towards	is	one	we	are	glad	to	have	avoided.	But	with	these	collapsed	spaces	there	persists	human	misery,	and	this	film	suggests	that	it	is	within	these	miserable	circumstances	that	something	like	the	ruinous	potential	of	fascism	can	rise	again—as	best	evidenced	through	Edmund’s	actions.	This	is	effectively	the	dynamic	of	the	film:	a	renouncement	of	the	fascists	and	a	kind	of	sad	relief	at	the	depths	of	destruction	here	in	the	heart	of	fascism.	But	accompanying	this	there	is	a	profound	sadness	for	those	occupying	what	is	no	longer	a	hospitable	space.	The	question	that	arises	in	light	of	this	intolerable	dynamic	increases	in	line	with	the	acceleration	of	Edmund’s	demise:	what	new	structure	can	arise	to	account	for	what	we	have	seen	here?	What	kind	of	building	can	be	built	to	house	these	characters,	and	how	might	it	dissuade	future	returns	to	violence?	This	film	is,	of	course,	either	unwilling	to	or	incapable	of	answering	these	questions.	It	instead	suspends	them,	creating	a	gap	that	seems	to	interrupt	the	inevitable	project	of	rebuilding	by	proposing	and	dwelling	upon	the	question	of	how	to	proceed.	
																																																								31	Svetlana	Boym,	“Ruinophilia:	Appreciation	of	Ruins,”	Atlas	of	Transformation,	http://monumenttotransformation.org/atlas-of-transformation/html/r/ruinophilia/ruinophilia-appreciation-of-ruins-svetlana-boym.html.	
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In	a	different	examination	of	the	subject,	Benjamin	touches	upon	the	ruin’s	capacity	to	disrupt	the	apparent	unity	and	coherence	of	historical	progress.	According	to	Benjamin,	“In	the	ruin	history	has	physically	merged	into	the	setting.	And	in	this	guise	history	does	not	assume	the	form	of	the	progress	of	an	eternal	life	so	much	as	that	of	irresistible	decay.”32	Given	the	context	of	Mussolini’s	obsession	with	the	glory	of	Italy	embodied	by	the	splendor	of	the	Roman	past,	the	location	of	Berlin	functions	here	as	a	deliberate	riposte.	There	is	no	irresistible	historical	victory	to	Rossellini’s	Berlin,	only	misery,	failure	and	death.	 It	is	precisely	this	gap	between	the	question	of	how	to	proceed	after	such	destruction	and	the	subsequent	production	of	an	answer	that	this	film	attempts	to	extend.	If	the	ruin	serves	here	to	provide	a	vision	of	history	predicated	on	destruction	rather	than	progress,	then	it	also	highlights	the	possibility	of	differing	directions	for	renewal.	For	Benjamin,	the	ruin	also	serves	as	a	reminder	of	the	constructedness	of	history,	of	its	failures	and	its	missteps.33	It	is	within	this	dismissal	of	inevitability	and	the	potential	turn	to	something	radically	different	where	optimism	and	opportunity	persist.	Georg	Simmel	discusses	ruins	at	length,	and	in	particular	highlights	their	capacity	to	produce	a	relationship	to	time	that	draws	attention	to	the	array	of	options	available	in	the	present.	While	Simmel	distinguishes	the	ruins	generated	by	human	destruction	from	those	that	result	from	time	and	what	he	calls	nature,	elements	of	his	ideas	on	ruins	are	nonetheless	useful	in	the	case	of	Germany	Year	Zero.	According	to	Simmel,	“Between	the	not-yet	and	the	no-longer	lies	an	affirmation	of	the	spirit	whose	path,	it	is	true,	now	no																																																									32	Walter	Benjamin,	The	Origin	of	German	Tragic	Drama,	trans.	John	Osborne	(London	&	New	York:	Verso,	1998),	177-178.	33	Ibid.,	178.	
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longer	ascends	to	its	peak	but,	satiated	by	the	peak’s	riches,	descends	to	his	home.”34	For	Simmel,	the	ruin	has	the	capacity	to	place	those	who	encounter	it	in	a	position	focused	on	a	present	defined	by	a	fallen	past	and	a	failed	future.		By	virtue	of	their	serving	as	an	emblem	of	a	given	course	that	has	crumbled	away—its	goals	exhausted	or,	as	in	this	case,	thwarted—ruins	renew	the	possibilities	for	seeing	and	exploring	different	paths	and	methods	for	existence.	Simmel	puts	the	moment	of	the	ruin	in	opposition	to	what	he	calls	the	“fruitful	moment”—the	time	when	the	riches	that	predate	the	ruin	are	still	in	sight.35	This	presentation	of	ruined	spaces	from	Germany	Year	Zero	exemplifies	just	this	dynamic.	The	ruinous	moment	has	arrived	in	full	force,	and	here	it	is	presented	as	direct	counterpoint	to	the	“fruitful	moment”	perceived—and	indeed	reproduced	in	the	form	of	the	record—by	Hitler	and	his	cronies.	What	takes	shape,	thanks	to	this	juxtaposition,	is	a	widening	of	possibilities.	The	vacuum	created	by	such	spectacular	hatred	and	its	resounding	defeat	creates	a	ghostly	figure	that	gestures	outward	towards	reconfiguration,	but	Rossellini	refuses	to	give	this	figure	form,	to	configure	a	path	forward.	What	he	produces	in	this	absence	of	clarity	and	figuration	is	an	abstract	form	of	hope,	the	possibility	for	difference	and	change	but	a	refusal	of	its	direct	representation.	Simmel	continues	with	a	final	summation	of	his	views	on	the	ruin:	“The	past	with	its	destinies	and	transformations	has	been	gathered	into	this	instant	of	an	aesthetically	perceptible	present.”36	Rossellini	strives	to	present	his	ruins	as	all	present;	they	reject	the	past,	its	failures	as	well	as	its	legacy,	and	refuse	a	future.	This	endeavor	finds	its	full	force	in																																																									34	Georg	Simmel,	“The	Ruin”	Essays	on	Sociology,	Philosophy	and	Aesthetics,	ed.	Kurt	H.	Wolff	(New	York:	Harper	and	Row,	1965),	262.		35	Ibid.	36	Ibid.,	266.	
		
	 52	
this	sequence’s	juxtaposition	of	the	mad	grasp	for	glory	(the	speech	on	the	record)	and	the	destruction	that	it	has	produced	(the	ruins).	In	this	moment	past	and	future	are	simultaneously	negated.	For	Simmel,	in	the	ruin	“such	profound	and	comprehensive	energies	of	our	soul	are	brought	into	play	that	there	is	no	longer	any	sharp	division	between	perception	and	thought.”37	And	it	is	this	capacity	to	crystallize	the	present	while	simultaneously	severing	its	relationship	to	the	past	and	denying	its	future	that	is	key	for	Rossellini’s	film.	Here	is	a	film	in	which	all	elements,	including	the	very	spaces	that	the	characters	occupy,	transform	experience	into	a	unified	question:	how	is	one	to	proceed	in	light	of	this	destruction?	This	is	the	proverb	that	has	been	produced,	the	experience	that	has	been	distilled.	But	it	provides	no	easily	assimilable	message.	Germany	Year	Zero’s	quandary	stands	as	unanswered	and	perhaps	unanswerable,	a	coherent	point	that	proposes	no	particular	rejoinder.	What	Rossellini	is	trying	to	do	is	make	seeing	political,	and	it	is	his	refusal	of	a	cogent	and	particular	approach	that	produces	this	condition.	Hence	the	meaning	of	the	title;	this	is	year	zero,	where	perception	and	thought	collide.		After	Authority		 But	this	film	does	more	than	thematize	these	concerns;	instead,	it	asks	after	them	on	the	level	of	its	very	grounds	for	constructing	meaning.	That	is,	this	film	refuses	to	render	any	particular	solution,	it	neglects	to	signal	towards	how	“Germany	Year	One”	might	look,	and	it	instead	ends	only	with	a	further	counter	to	the	resurfacing	of	any	authoritarian	rule.	Rossellini,	the	“author”	to	whom	we	might	ascribe	credit,	recognizes	his	own	status	as	authority	and	outwardly	works	to	undermine	this	position.																																																									37	Ibid.	
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This	can	be	seen,	for	instance,	in	the	long	sequence	where	Edmund	is	seen	at	play	in	the	rubble.	After	he	admits	his	murder	to	Henning,	Edmund,	dejected,	wonders	the	streets.	During	this	extended	sequence	he	is	shown	in	a	long	take	playing	near	what	appears	to	be	a	destroyed	statue,	the	skeletons	of	buildings	loom	(as	always)	in	the	background.	This	image	fades	fully	to	black	and	another	fades	slowly	in.	This	second	image	presents	Edmund	in	a	silhouette,	perhaps	shown	against	a	body	of	water,	a	dark	railing	separating	him	from	the	background.	
	This	grainy	shot,	combined	with	his	playing	in	the	rubble,	presents	a	moment	that	gestures	towards	an	interiority	but	refuses	to	provide	it,	it	stands	on	the	edge	of	meaning	but	keeps	it	at	bay.	This	image	serves	to	undermine	its	own	meaning,	negating	any	coherent	understanding	of	Edmund’s	subjectivity	by	abstracting	his	understanding	of	the	world—and	even	his	own	surroundings.	This	is	to	say	that	the	answer	to	Edmund’s	turmoil,	the	coherent	moral	that	will	provide	him	with	a	way	to	understand	the	world	and	to	again	take	part	in	it,	is	refused.	Instead,	what	is	presented	are	images	that	tend	towards	the	impossibility	of	meaning,	for	meaning	here	would	inevitably	come	from	an	authority,	and	it	is	just	this	authority	that	this	film	so	vehemently	denies.	Rossellini’s	film,	then,	strives	to	connect	the	authoritarianism	of	Mussolini’s	Italy	with	the	authority	rendered	in	any	act	of	
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authorship,	and	it	is	through	this	process	whereby	this	film	begins	to	critique	the	very	systems	of	judgment	that	render	art	coherent	and	capable	of	presenting	meaning.		 The	restraint	in	Germany	Year	Zero	on	display	here	is	indicative	of	the	film’s	greater	attitude	towards	resolution,	for	the	presentation	of	a	particular	meaning	would	also	serve	to	assert	a	new	master	of	meaning,	and	therefore	a	figure	of	authority.	Given	that	his	is	a	film	about	the	damages	authority	can	inflict,	to	present	a	solution	(a	positive	future	or	even	a	dystopic	hellscape)	would	be	to	seize	a	role	that	would	undermine	the	film’s	central	concerns.	This	presents,	of	course,	an	impossible	conundrum:	how	can	one	speak	without	presenting	a	masking	that	disrupts	other	avenues	of	thought?	How	can	one	live,	to	return	to	Arendt,	in	a	political	realm	without	any	universalizing,	self-evident	truths?		 Karl	Marx	rubs	against	this	same	problem	in	his	Capital:	A	Critique	of	Political	
Economy.	In	a	striking	chain	of	declarations,	Marx	digs	into	the	systems	through	which	capitalism	serves	to	normalize	and	subsequently	perpetuate	itself.	By	outlining	a	series	of	increasingly	brutal	laws	that,	in	essence,	illegalized	“vagabondage”	in	England	and	France—a	process	through	which	labor	became	instituted	as	morally	as	well	as	economically	productive—Marx	broaches	a	discussion	of	minimum	and	maximum	wages.	Imbricated	throughout	this	discussion,	though,	are	some	of	Marx’s	more	significance	thoughts	of	the	linkage	between	productive	labor	and	the	will.	Marx	begins	these	thoughts	by	excoriating	the	historical	developments	that	led	to	some	of	capitalism’s	now	invisible	disciplinary	maneuverings:	“Thus	were	the	agricultural	folk	first	forcibly	expropriated	from	the	soil,	driven	from	their	homes,	turned	into	vagabonds,	and	then	whipped,	branded	and	tortured	by	grotesquely	terroristic	laws	into	
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accepting	the	discipline	necessary	for	the	system	of	wage-labour.”38	Here	Marx	sums	up,	in	rather	fiery	terms,	the	process	that	the	laws	he	has	just	described	delineate.	That	there	is	a	historical	trajectory	that	has	culminated	in	the	workers	being	forced	into	this	position	is	no	surprise,	but	the	system	by	which	this	was	accomplished—the	process	whereby	the	workers	were	forced	to	“accept	the	discipline”—is	of	particular	import.	Marx	continues	shortly	thereafter,	“The	advance	of	capitalist	production	develops	a	working	class	which	by	education,	tradition	and	habit	looks	upon	the	requirements	of	that	mode	of	production	as	self-evident	natural	laws.”39	Herein	lies	a	fragment	of	a	discussion	of	how	capitalism	comes	to	constitute	a	particular	subject.	That	capitalism	is	a	system	that	reinforces	itself,	first,	through	laws	and,	second,	through	the	trace	of	these	laws—now	forgotten—into	an	arrangement	of	tradition	and	habit	is	what	allows	this	system	to	perpetuate	itself	without	need	for	force.	As	Marx	contends,	“The	organization	of	the	capitalist	process	of	production,	once	it	is	fully	developed,	breaks	down	all	resistance.”40	Thanks	to	this	process,	“Direct	extra-economic	force	is	still	of	course	used,	but	only	in	exceptional	cases.”41	The	rest	of	the	time,	the	self-evident	codes	of	conduct	that	this	schema	has	produced	in	effect	keep	everything	in	check,	and	they	minimize	the	need	for	force	or,	really,	any	strenuous	intervention.	However,	during	earlier	stages	of	capitalism,	Marx	is	careful	to	note,	this	self-evidence	is	not	yet	set	and	it	is	up	to	the	state	to	use	force	
																																																								38	Karl	Marx,	Capital:	A	Critique	of	Political	Economy	Volume	1	(London:	Penguin	Books	1990),	899.	39	Ibid.	40	Ibid.	41	Ibid.	
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to	institute	these	future	norms	(as	in	the	case	of	the	laws	against	vagabondage	mentioned	above).42	Of	particular	importance	to	this	discussion,	though,	is	Marx’s	use	of	the	term	“free	and	rightless”	(vogelfrei)	to	describe	those	who	initially	provided	the	conditions	that	these	laws	correct.	The	free	and	rightless	proletariat	are	those	who,	having	been	recently	forced	from	their	agrarian	practices	but	not	been	absorbed	into	the	urban	workforce,	are	free	insofar	as	they	are	“outside	the	human	community	and	therefore	entirely	unprotected	and	without	legal	rights.”43	The	task	of	these	laws,	then,	was	to	quantify	these	new	editions	to	the	urban	setting	and	to	provide	them	with	a	directive	that	yielded	increased	production.	
Germany	Year	Zero	explores	this	same	moment;	what	is	to	be	done,	it	asks,	with	a	subject	who	occupies	a	space	outside	the	strictures	of	this	forgotten	code,	and	how	can	a	society	rebuild	from	a	zero	point	where	these	restrictive	systems	no	longer	hold	sway.	What	Marx’s	vision	of	the	free	and	rightless	affords	this	discussion	is	a	system	whereby	the	political	concerns	that	I	located	in	Rossellini’s	work	can	take	form.	For	Marx,	of	course,	the	free	and	rightless	are	a	grouping	that	exists	before	the	assimilation	of	these	people	into	the	capitalist	system.	This	assimilation	takes	the	form,	in	Marx’s	account,	of	a	set	of	arbitrary	and	forgotten	laws	that	call	to	an	a	priori	and	stable	set	of	external	values,	that	is	to	say	that	Marx’s	absorption	of	this	group	into	capitalism	assumes	the	hierarchical	logics	that	Arendt’s	account	of	authoritarianism	supplies.	For	Arendt,	the	absence	of	authority	brings	about	a	range	of	problems	for	modern	society,	but	for	Marx	the	absence	of	authoritarian	logics	brings	about	a	very	different	set	of	concerns.	
																																																								42	Ibid.	43	Ibid.,	896.	(In	Footnote)	
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The	free	and	rightless	are	free	in	the	sense	that	they	provide	an	outside	to	not	only	capital,	but	also	society	in	general.	The	agrarian	societies	that	the	free	and	rightless	arose	from	were	not	the	privileged	holders	of	an	otherwise	impossible	freedom;	instead,	the	“freedom”	that	this	state	entails	arose	only	as	a	result	of	being	forced	halfway	into	a	new	relationship	to	governance	and	economics.	That	is,	the	“freedom”	of	this	state	serves	as	readily	as	a	restriction	as	it	does	an	advantage.	The	other	half	of	this	term,	the	rightlessness,	clarifies	this	dynamic.	The	free	and	rightless	are	free	in	the	sense	that	society	has	no	system	to	account	for	these	individuals	and	their	actions,	and	this	freedom	means	that	they	are	also	restricted	from	engaging	in	the	social	contracts	that	might	allow	these	people	to	subsist.	Marx	is	positing,	then,	that	the	outside	of	capital,	the	position	of	the	free	and	rightless,	is	no	viable	system	of	escape,	for	any	freedoms	that	it	affords	are	always	tempered	by	the	inability	to	guarantee	any	consistent	social	arrangements.		To	be	free	and	rightless	is	to	potentially	occupy	a	transitional	state.	That	moment	between,	where	a	figuration	is	yet	to	take	place	and	where	the	people	that	occupy	this	state	are	not	yet	absorbed	into	the	capitalist	(or	any	other)	apparatus.	What	the	free	and	rightless	represents	is	a	kind	of	indeterminate	grouping	that	can	recombine	in	any	of	a	variety	of	formations.	For	Marx,	of	course,	the	assimilation	of	the	free	and	rightless	into	capitalism	was	a	brutal	and	deleterious	process,	but	the	persistence	of	this	transitional	moment	also	implies	the	potential	for	a	return,	a	new	transition	where	a	new	configuration	is	available.	The	term	free	and	rightless	then	serves	a	double	purpose	here.	On	one	register	it	reveals	how	the	brutal	and	destructive	effects	of	capitalism	directly	and	deliberately,	in	Marx’s	account,	operate	to	generate	a	subject	position	conducive	to	capitalism.	But	it	also	
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grants	a	vision	of	an	indeterminate	moment	where	any	of	a	number	of	potentials	are	available.	In	this	moment,	though,	the	advantages	that	the	ability	to	organize	and	decide	provides—perhaps	the	advantages	granted	by	hierarchy	and	authority—are	erased,	and	the	rights	that	the	social	order	might	produce	are	hollowed	out	and	rendered	ineffective.	This	state	between	is	exactly	the	zone	that	Rossellini’s	film,	I	propose,	strives	to	occupy.	Where	the	ideas	that	Germany	Year	Zero	presents	deviate	from	those	of	Arendt	and	Marx,	then,	are	in	its	attempt	to	extend	this	moment,	to	think	through	the	indeterminate	stage	and	try	to	sustain	the	very	space	of	transition.	Before	a	space	can	be	rendered	knowable,	before,	perhaps,	foreign	aid	can	arrive	to	help	in	determining	how	Italy	is	to	be	reconstructed,	before	the	logics	of	authority	can	take	hold,	there	is	that	moment	where	no	course	has	yet	been	taken.	This	time,	this	pausing	and	taking	a	breath,	is	what	Rossellini’s	film	attempts	to	figure,	and	this	attempt	to	extend	this	pause	comes	via	Edmund’s	consistent	failure	to	constitute	an	understanding	of	the	world.	To	be	clear,	this	in-between	moment	coincides	with	the	postwar	world	at	its	most	desolate	(the	time,	in	very	real	terms,	before	aid	has	arrived),	but	it	is	also	the	moment	brimming	with	the	most	potential.	When	Edmund	carefully	hangs	up	his	coat,	slides	down	the	stanchion,	and	jumps	to	his	death,	this	delay	is	ended.	A	decision	has	been	rendered,	and	his	course	for	figuring	the	world	has	been	(rather	pessimistically)	determined.	But	death	here	is	not	simply	one	of	a	number	of	outcomes:	it	is	the	only	option	that	seems	to	persist	in	resisting.	After	Edmund	killed	his	father	he	asked,	“Is	he	free	now?”	What	he	was	asking	after,	it	now	seems,	was	whether	the	course	that	Edmund	himself	had	tried—and	failed—to	navigate	had	finally	been	negated;	whether	the	authority	that	Edmund	had	attempted	to	muster	had	really	
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finally	been	disproven;	whether	the	Nazi	logics	that	Henning	and	his	actions	represented	had	indeed	finally	been	separated	from	the	authority	they	claimed	to	hold.	The	starts	and	stops	that	the	film	presents,	its	criminal	logics	and	cowardly	missteps,	seem	to	signal	towards	an	attempt	to	find	(or	re-find)	some	way	to	shape	the	world,	but	its	refusal	to	figure	a	positive	future	(there	is	no	heroic	martyr	here)	stands	as	a	direct	attempt	to	think	through	the	democratization	process	that	awaits.	The	pessimism	that	concludes	this	film	signals	the	degree	of	destruction	that	must	come	before	any	extensive	rebuilding,	as	well	as	the	agony	it	is	to	live	as	free	and	rightless.	To	assimilate	into	an	arbitrary	arrangement	that	will,	far	in	the	future,	come	to	account	for	meaning	or	to	die	and,	hopefully,	persist	in	a	freedom	outside	of	the	social	is	the	decision	that	Edmund	is	forced	to	make,	and	it	is	this	decision,	at	a	moment	when	it	is	more	than	ever	available,	that	is	too	what	concerns	this	film.	The	difficulties	that	a	forthcoming	democracy	holds—where	and	how	decisions	are	to	be	made	and	actions	are	to	be	taken—haunts	this	film.	The	discovery	as	to	whether	the	world	can	persist	without	authoritarian	logics	and	how	one	is	to	find	meaning	in	this	landscape	is	the	task	that	occupies	Edmund.	But	to	make	meaning	on	film	too	implies	some	knowledge	that	is	otherwise	unavailable,	some	authority	to	which	the	film’s	makers	have	some	kind	of	access.	For	Germany	Year	Zero,	the	question	posed	is	not	only	how	to	proceed	in	a	world	without	authority	(and	whether	such	a	task	is	possible),	but	also	how	to	make	art	that	can	attend	to	and	extend	the	tenets	of	democracy,	a	difference	that	distinguishes	Rossellini’s	project	from	that	of	Arendt	and	Marx.	The	solution,	here,	seems	to	come	via	a	return	to	ambiguity,	an	unwillingness	to	take	a	stance	or	to	render	a	solution.	This	film,	I	contend,	participates	in	an	active	engagement	with	just	these	questions.	What	it	means	to	
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stop	at	the	moment	before	decision	and	whether	one	can	proceed	in	this	stoppage	is	the	question	at	hand,	and	the	answer	as	to	how	meaning	is	to	come	and	fill	these	empty	streets	again	is	what	this	film	is	so	generously	unwilling	to	provide.		The	End	of	Openness	But	what	becomes	visible	thanks	to	our	remove	from	the	world	of	1948?	If	we	take	the	goals	of	this	film	to	be	radical	change	and	an	opening	for	the	constitution	of	something	remarkably	different,	then	it	is	difficult	to	call	this	film	a	success.	The	opening	that	Rossellini	here	strives	to	provide	and	the	refusal	of	figuration	that	he	heroically	produces	never	did	generate	radical	difference.	Instead,	what	came	to	fill	in	the	openings	and	gaps	of	Rossellini’s	year	zero	was	a	new	a	very	different	form	of	authority,	one	defined	not	by	its	unified	solidity	and	ease	of	identification,	but	characterized	instead	by	fluidity	and	an	ability	to	escape	opposition.		 While	Rossellini’s	approach	as	outlined	in	this	chapter	might	well	serve	as	a	coherent	and	perhaps	effective	response	to	a	calcified	and	crushing	authority,	it	might	likewise	be	called	shortsighted	in	regards	to	the	potential	formations	of	capitalism	that	could,	and	indeed	did,	begin	to	form	in	the	years	following	the	war.	What	Rossellini	did	not	foresee,	that	is,	is	the	possibility	of	a	kind	of	capitalism	that	counters—or	indeed	thrives	upon—the	openness	and	uncertainty	that	his	film	proposes.		 In	Liquid	Modernity	sociologist	Zygmunt	Bauman	outlines	the	ways	that	dedication	to	openness	and	contingency	has	been	reabsorbed	into	the	logic	of	capitalism.	For	Bauman,	many	of	the	oppositional	thinkers	of	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century,	in	particular	those	unified	under	the	loosely	arranged	banner	of	“critical	theory,”	were	writing	against	the	
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overwhelming	terror	of	totalitarianism	and	authoritarianism.	These	governmental	and	institutional	arrangements	were	constituted	by	solid	controlling	systems	of	thought	set	upon	shattering	individuality	and	difference.	They	included	a	range	of	foes	that	extended	from	the	Fascists	to	the	Fordists,	forces	that	sought	to	establish	control	of	society	in	the	name	of	efficiency	and	profit.44		 Rossellini’s	film,	as	this	chapter	has	shown,	is	exactly	in	line	with	this	mode	of	critique.	Germany	Year	Zero	strives	to	cede	control,	and	in	so	doing	to	withstand	the	onslaught	of	hierarchical	order	and	authority	that	the	Nazis	and	Fascists	sought	to	impose.	Rossellini’s	cinema	stands	in	clear	opposition	to	the	climate	that	culminated	with	World	War	II,	what	Bauman	calls	a	modernity	defined	as	“a	sworn	enemy	of	contingency,	variety,	ambiguity,	waywardness	and	idiosyncrasy,	having	declared	on	all	such	‘anomalies’	a	holy	war	of	attrition;	and	it	was	individual	freedom	and	autonomy	that	were	commonly	expected	to	be	the	prime	casualties	of	the	crusade.”45		 But	the	authority	that	developed	in	response	to	attacks	like	those	of	Rossellini’s	harnessed	for	its	own	advantages	just	the	kinds	of	relationships	to	contingency	that	Rossellini	lionized.	Bauman’s	description	of	this	new	modernity,	which,	for	him,	is	indeed	the	modernity	that	persists	today,	consist	of	two	primary	qualities:	The	first	is	the	gradual	collapse	and	swift	decline	of	the	early	modern	illusion:	of	the	belief	that	there	is	an	end	to	the	road	along	which	we	proceed,	an	attainable	telos	of	historical	change,	a	state	of	perfection	to	be	reached	tomorrow,	next	year	or	next	millennium.46		Far	from	the	old	logic	of	ceasing	and	building	a	moment	and	a	movement,	Bauman’s	postwar	modernity	is	that	of	the	ruin,	the	fresh	beginning	that	promises	no	particular																																																									44	Bauman,	25	45	Ibid.	46	Ibid.,	29.	
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outcome	other	than	potential	and	contingency.	Bauman’s	modernity	is	that	of	the	“collapse…	of	complete	mastery	over	the	future—so	complete	that	it	puts	paid	to	all	contingency,	contention,	ambivalent	and	unanticipated	consequences	of	human	undertakings.”47	And	it	is	in	this	denial	that	this	new	modernity	and	Germany	Year	Zero	collide;	these	are	both	oriented	towards	freedom,	contingency,	towards	an	inchoate	becoming	that	holds	within	it	the	possibility	for	something	new.		 Bauman’s	modernity,	however,	uses	these	openings	to	produce	something	entirely	counter	to	Rossellini’s	hopes,	and	indeed	critical	theory’s	championing	of	justice	and	equality.	According	to	Bauman	the	second	significant	characteristic	of	this	new	modernity	is:	 The	deregulation	and	privatization	of	the	modernizing	tasks	and	duties.	What	used	to	be	considered	a	job	to	be	performed	by	human	reason	seen	as	the	collective	endowment	and	property	of	the	human	species	has	been	fragmented	(“individualized”),	assigned	to	individual	guts	and	stamina,	and	left	to	individuals’	management	and	individually	administered	resources.48			 The	second	of	Bauman’s	characteristics	of	contemporary	modernity—what	is	elsewhere	called	neoliberalism	and	is	qualified	as	the	thrust	for	total	privatization	of	the	economy	and	the	subsequent	capacity	of	the	logic	of	rationalization	and	privatization	to	come	to	account	for	human	decisions	in	every	aspect	of	life—preys	upon,	and	is	indeed	uniquely	suited	to	consume,	just	the	kinds	of	hopes	that	Germany	Year	Zero	encapsulates.	The	openness	and	freedom	to	choose	and	reconfigure	that	serves	as	the	heart	of	Rossellini’s	film	is	built	on	the	unsteady	trellis	of	chance	and	difference,	and	the	neoliberal	logics	of	privatization,	individualization	and	uncertainty	transform	this	openness	into	an	
																																																								47	Ibid.	48	Ibid.	
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opportunity	to	produce	a	lifestyle	of	individualistic,	flexible	labor	under	the	destructive	rhetoric	of	freedom.		 As	Bauman	notes,	it	is	indeed	this	rhetoric	of	freedom	that	has	in	fact	come	to	constitute	the	available	set	of	outcomes	for	political	discourse.	For	Bauman,	this	change	in	contemporary	society	“has	been	reflected	in	the	relocation	of	ethical/political	discourse	from	the	frame	of	the	’just	society’	to	that	of	‘human	rights,’	that	is	refocusing	that	discourse	on	the	right	of	individuals	to	stay	different	and	to	pick	and	choose	at	will	their	own	models	of	happiness	and	fitting	life-style.”49	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	projects	of	human	rights	are	not	worthwhile,	but	that	they	are	consistently	being	sectioned	off	from	projects	that	pertain	to	society’s	capacity	to	change	things	for	the	good,	a	process	that	has	been	deliberately	developed	to	counter	political	approaches	predicated	on	contingency	and	change—ostensibly,	and	by	many	accounts	minimally,	appeasing	them	without	radically	altering	the	grounds	of	society.	This	creates	a	system	whereby	the	responsibility	of	government	is	restricted	to	acknowledging	and,	at	its	most	aggressive,	helping	society	at	large	to	recognize	the	rights	and	values	of	previously	alienated	or	unrecognized	individuals.	What	is	lost	in	this—at	times	very	noble	and	valuable—process	is	the	hope	that	there	is	something	other	than	marketplace	unity	as	the	endpoint	for	any	and	all	identities.	Human	rights,	as	the	term	suggest,	signifies	a	world	where	every	human	is	free	to	take	part,	but	it	here	loses	hold	of	the	idea	that	the	grounds	of	society	are	contestable.	The	openings	that	Rossellini	provides,	then,	are	in	the	contemporary	moment	reabsorbed	into	a	capitalist	system	through	acknowledgement,	and	in	this	process	stripped	of	their	revolutionary	wish.	
																																																								49	Ibid.	
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	 The	freedom	to	choose	that	Germany	Year	Zero	offers—the	ending	of	authority	signifying	the	opportunity	to	rebuild	society	in	any	of	a	number	of	new	ways—with	its	adamant	insistence	about	freezing	this	moment	of	choice	and	projecting	it	back	to	an	audience	strived	to	produce	a	cogent	and	valuable	instant	of	freedom,	but	it	is	freedom	itself	that	has	since	become	problematic.	In	the	eyes	of	the	statistics-based	society	that	has	developed	after	this	moment	of	unbound	authority	that	culminated	in	postwar	cinema,	“The	loose,	‘associative’	status	of	identity,	the	opportunity	to	‘shop	around,’	to	pick	and	shed	one’s	‘true	self,’	to	‘be	on	the	move,’	has	come	in	present-day	consumer	society	to	signify	freedom.”50	The	freedoms	that	flowered	in	the	wake	of	Hitler	and	Mussolini,	these	freedoms	that	accompanied	such	misery,	which	haunted	Edmund	to	his	death	and	which	through	the	image	of	the	ruin	proposed	an	infinite	range	of	possibly,	are	maintained	and	in	fact	encouraged	under	neoliberal	capitalism.	In	this	new	world	Edmund’s	choices	remain	his	own,	he	can	be	a	Nazi	or	a	progressive	or	something	else	entirely.	He	can	be	all	of	these	things	and	none	of	them,	as	long	he	does	not	demand	any	sort	of	rethinking	of	the	grounds	of	the	market.	What	is	particularly	pernicious	about	this	new	arrangement	is	that	this	capacity	to	radically	reshape	the	structure	of	one’s	identity	at	any	moment	reinforces	the	freedoms	of	individual	expression,	but	it	is	just	these	freedoms	that	have	been	coopted	by	the	logic	of	the	market.	Ultimately,	in	any	of	Rossellini’s	fissures	and	openings	the	first	thing	to	come	in	and	fill	the	gap	must,	in	the	contemporary	moment,	always	already	be	individualized,	market	oriented	freedom,	for	it	is	just	the	ideas	of	“freedom”	and	“individuality”—indeed	the	central	ideas	of	Rossellini’s	quest—that	have	already	been	corrupted.																																																									50	Ibid.,	87.	
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	 The	world	that	has	overtaken	the	ruins	so	prominently	figured	in	Rossellini’s	film	has	built	no	monuments	to	itself,	for	it	must	slip	away	from	any	calcified	formations.	This	is	a	world	where	the	figures	of	authority	have	ceded	control,	as	Rossellini	foresaw	and	indeed	tried	to	facilitate.	But	what	has	taken	the	position	of	the	traditional	authority	is	no	less	pernicious,	and	many	times	more	elusive.	What	has	filled	in	the	openings	that	Rossellini	sought	is	a	market	based	logic	unmoored	to	tradition	and	immune,	thanks	to	its	liquidity,	to	contestation.	Bauman	places	the	roots	of	this	liquidation	as	far	back	as	Marx,	but	Rossellini’s	approach	and	context	crystallize	the	problem	of	fighting	this	new	modernity.	Rossellini’s	film	sought,	to	use	Bauman’s	terms,	to	“melt	the	solids”	of	concretized	hierarchical	order	in	the	hopes	of	allowing	other	formations	to	emerge,	but,	as	Bauman	notes,	“The	melting	of	solids	led	to	the	progressive	untying	of	economy	from	its	traditional	political,	ethical	and	cultural	entanglements.	It	sedimented	a	new	order,	defined	primarily	in	economic	terms.”51		 It	is	this	logic	of	pure	economy	that	haunts,	as	I	will	return	to	in	chapter	three,	the	style	and	narrative	of	Hong	Sang-soo’s	films,	but	its	origin	is	here	made	visible	in	Rossellini’s	cinema.	If	it	is	a	response	to	authoritarianism	that	generated	these	circumstances,	then	indeed	the	rejection	of	authority	present	in	Rossellini’s	film	created	exactly	the	conditions	upon	which	neoliberalism	preys.	The	economic	logic	that	fills	the	gaps	of	freedom	and	the	potential	for	change	is	furthermore	nearly	impossible	to	locate.	Rather	than	the	monumental	structures	of	authoritarianism,	the	neoliberal	logics	that	came	to	respond	to	its	collapse	functioned	as	an	“absentee-landlord,”	looming	just	around	every	
																																																								51	Ibid.,	4.	
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corner	but	always	just	out	of	sight,	unconcerned	with	the	conditions	of	its	property	except	in	so	far	as	it	effects	the	bottom	line.52		 This	new	modernity	is	reliant	on	the	perpetual	disappearance	of	its	own	authority,	it	refuses	a	structured	position	but	always	lurks	at	the	bottom	of	any	arrangement,	consistently	undercutting	the	possibility	for	organized	critique	by	constantly	obscuring	the	object	that	would	be	opposed.	If	Germany	Year	Zero	refused	to	figure	its	oppositional	stances	in	the	name	of	contingency,	it	neglects	to	account	for	the	possibility	that	the	inchoate	unfigured	void	that	it	champions	could	come	to	reinscribe	the	misery	and	oppression	that	had	previously	been	the	domain	of	unbridled	authority.	But	the	question	of	how	to	oppose	this	unfigured	mess	remains	very	difficult	to	ascertain.	Rossellini’s	heroic	resistance,	his	refusal	to	name	a	way	forward	or	to	figure	an	opposition	to	be	dispatched,	tragically	finds	itself	complicit	with	the	wishes	of	the	new	modernity:	openness	and	indecision	have	become	a	tool	for	a	new	kind	of	oppression.		 Given	the	hindsight	of	some	70	years,	Rossellini’s	bind	feels	nearly	impossible	to	overcome.	On	the	one	hand	his	project—melting	the	rigidity	of	authoritarianism	in	the	name	of	the	possible—is	a	valuable	one,	and	his	insistence	on	refusing	to	figure	the	path	towards	a	more	just	society	is	a	cogent	and	valuable	decision	that	makes	sense	given	the	then	contemporary	conditions.	The	downside	of	this	approach,	and	what	time	has	revealed	to	us,	is	that	the	forces	of	consolidated	capital	and	inequality	are	all	too	capable	of	reorganizing	and	taking	hold	of	these	openings—a	process	that	seems	to	have	taken	place,	and	indeed	continues	to	accelerate,	in	the	time	since	Rossellini’s	film.	
																																																								52	Ibid.,	13	
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	 Indeed	moving	forward	just	some	45	years,	to	just	after	1989	and	the	end	of	a	clear	alternative	to	capitalist	democracy,	provides	a	striking	example	of	a	filmmaker	attempting	to	produce	a	similar	set	of	themes.	The	post-Soviet	world—and	the	particularities	of	Béla	Tarr’s	disjointed	and	unidentifiable	representation	of	Hungary—provides	a	valuable	vantage	from	which	to	probe	problems	similar	to	those	examined	by	Rossellini,	now	with	an	eye	turned	to	the	aesthetic	response	made	available	by	the	failure	and	failing	of	a	new,	but	not	altogether	unrecognizable,	form	of	authority.	This	is	the	subject	of	my	next	chapter.	
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CHAPTER	2		 The	Image	That	Waits		45	years	after	Rossellini’s	neorealist	trilogy	concluded,	a	45	years	that	spanned	a	heated	period	of	conflict	between	economic	policies	and	their	often	brutal	representatives,	Hungarian	filmmaker	Béla	Tarr	returned	to	the	central	themes	of	Germany	Year	Zero.	The	cinema	of	Tarr,	who	was	equally	concerned	with	the	project	of	resisting	authority,	produces	two	important	expansions	to	Rossellini’s	project:	first,	Tarr’s	cinema—and	in	particular	Sátántangó,	which	will	be	discussed	here—extends,	in	a	quite	literal	sense,	the	aesthetic	qualities	that	support	my	claims	about	anti-authoritarian	art	cinema.	The	takes	in	
Sátántangó	provide	unbroken	and	extended	swaths	of	time	that	generate	a	kind	of	waiting	that	pushes	forward	the	political	approach—or	apolitical	approach	or	perhaps	political	inapproach?—that	I	located	in	Rossellini’s	film.	That	is,	Tarr’s	long	takes	serve	to	extend	the	refusal	at	figuration	that	Rossellini	demanded.	These	takes	crystalize	the	aesthetic	dimension	of	these	two	director’s	relationship	to	possibility,	and	indeed	possibility’s	failures.	The	second	of	Tarr’s	additions	to	the	topic	of	cinema	and	its	capacity	to	reject	authority	arises	from	the	time	that	has	passed	between	these	two	films.	If	Germany	Year	
Zero—somewhere	in	its	unfigured	cone	of	potentiality—still	proposed	as	a	possibility	the	capacity	for	communism	to	aid	in	the	rebuilding	that	might	lessen	misery,	Sátántangó	has	jettisoned	this	possibility	entirely.	Having	survived	it	and	its	seeming	conclusion,	Tarr’s	cinema	rejects	communism.	This	difference	is	responsible	for	the	hopelessness	and	confusion	that	underwrite	Sátántangó,	but	as	the	strength	and	scale	of	its	hopelessness	
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increases,	this	chapter	contends,	so	too	does	the	luminosity	of	hope—its	light	seeming	to	intensify	as	its	possibility	recedes.	This	chapter	will	begin	by	outlining	the	film	and	some	responses	to	it.	It	will	then	briefly	explore	a	connection	between	the	functions	of	the	long	take	proposed	by	seminal	film	theorist	André	Bazin	and	Tarr’s	own	views	on	habituated	vision.	This	chapter	will	then	proceed	by	discussing	the	specific	significance	of	this	film	in	regards	to	the	historical	circumstances	of	post-authoritarian	Hungary.	Next,	I	will	discuss	the	concepts	of	waiting	and	boredom,	their	political	potential	and	their	specific	relationship	to	this	film.	This	chapter	will	then	transition	into	a	discussion	of	two	recent	books	on	Tarr’s	cinema	and	how	these	provide	different	directions	for	analysis,	ultimately	exploring	how	politics	interacts	with	waiting	and	proposes	possible	paths	for	and	barriers	to	political	change.	Finally,	this	chapter	concludes	with	an	examination	of	the	ways	that	hope	and	waiting	interact,	and	the	forms	of	action	that	this	film	both	produces	and	denies.		Ambiguity	and	the	Long	Take	In	the	forward	to	A	Companion	to	Eastern	European	Cinemas,	an	edited	collection	on	film	in	post-Soviet	Europe,	Dina	Iordanova	outlines	the	two	common	understandings	of	the	paths	taken	by	post-Soviet	countries	in	the	wake	of	the	revolutions	of	1989.	According	to	Iordanova:	 Some	of	us,	mainly	based	in	the	social	science	disciplines,	maintain	that,	once	emancipated	form	Soviet	tyranny,	the	countries	of	the	former	Soviet	bloc	promptly	readjusted	their	political	and	economic	course	and	soon	caught	up	with	the	democracies	of	old	Europe,	joining	a	position	where	they	always	belonged,	historically	and	culturally.	Others,	mainly	from	the	humanities	
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camp,	focus	their	attention	on	the	hiccups,	the	failed	enthusiasm,	and	the	disillusionment.1		The	function	of	this	chapter	will	be	to	forge	a	gap	between	these	binary	appraisals	of	post	1989—or	better	yet,	to	explore	how	these	two	understandings	are	functioning	in	relation	to	each	other.	Indeed,	this	chapter	argues	that	these	hiccups	in	what	would	be	an	otherwise	continuous	transition	serve	not	only	as	a	symptom	of	the	reentry	of	post-Soviet	nations—and,	for	my	purposes	here,	Hungary	in	particular—but	actually	allow	for	a	space	for	thinking	through	the	function	and	formation	of	the	democracies	in	question.	The	key	to	these	hiccups	and	failed	enthusiasms	is	their	relationship	to	waiting,	the	moment	just	before	figuration	when	the	particularities	of	action	are	yet	to	fully	take	form.		 In	order	to	achieve	this	goal,	I	focus	on	Hungary	in	the	early	moments	of	post-Soviet	transition.	Tarr’s	Sátántangó,	released	in	1994	but	produced	throughout	the	early	1990s,	allows	the	kinds	of	waiting	that	generate	the	disillusionments	that	Iordanova	describes;	it	produces	these	moments,	though,	not	in	the	hope	of	generating	a	nostalgia	for	a	lost	Soviet	past,	but	in	an	attempt	to	slow	the	transition	at	hand,	in	arresting	its	momentum,	asking	the	film’s	audience	to	contemplate	one	last	time	the	coming	democracy	in	this	moment	just	before	it	enters	into	view.		 According	to	Iordanova:	“The	more	effectively	one	deals	with	change,	the	more	likely	one	is	to	thrive,	management	wisdom	has	it.	Just	like	the	natural	world,	societies	and	individuals	encounter	changing	conditions	that	are	beyond	their	control;	successful	adaptation	to	change	is	crucial	for	the	success	of	the	enterprise.”2	Iordanova	labels	this	attitude	to	change	“change	management,”	and	argues	that	it	describes	an	“approach	to																																																									1	Dina	Iordanova,	forward	to	A	Companion	to	Eastern	European	Cinemas,	ed	Anikó	Imre	(Chichester,	U.K.:	Wiley-Blackwell,	2012),	XV.	2	Ibid.	
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shifting	individuals	and	groups	from	a	current	to	a	desired	state,	empowering	stakeholders	to	accept	and	thrive	in	an	environment	that	has	not	settled	quite	yet.”3	Sátántangó	produces	a	disruption	in	this	process	of	“change	management.”	Without	any	return	to	its	totalitarian	past,	this	film	critiques	the	adaptation	process	that	looms	in	Hungary’s	future.	The	“desired	state”	that	here	is	being	acquired	is,	throughout	this	film,	being	put	into	question,	but	in	such	a	way	that	figures	no	particular	alternative.		 Throughout	its	over	seven	hour	unfolding	Sátántangó	follows,	amongst	other	things,	the	progression	of	a	group	of	roughly	a	dozen	occupants	of	a	rural	Hungarian	town.	These	people,	members	of	something	like	a	community	farm,	pool	their	money	and	give	it	to	the	mysterious	Irimiás	(Mihály	Vig)	in	the	hope	that	he	will	find	them	a	new	place	to	live	and	work.	The	film	is	often	thought	to	serve	as	a	thinly	veiled	allegory	for	the	collapse	of	communism	and	the	failed	(or	failing)	promise	of	capitalism,4	and	Irimiás	best	embodies	this	reading:	he	disappears	and	reappears	throughout	the	film,	propelling	the	actions	of	(some	of)	the	townspeople	with	what	turn	out	to	be	false	promises	and	corrupt	negotiations.	There	are,	of	course,	various	asides—the	all	too	authentic	torturing	of	a	cat	at	the	hands	of	the	child	Estike	(Erika	Bók)	serving	as	the	most	notorious—but	the	plot	of	the	film	moves	in	such	delayed	sputters	that	it	very	quickly	becomes	difficult	to	map	any	particular	reading	to	the	character’s	actions.	
																																																								3	Ibid.	4	Manohla	Dargis,	“Finding	Beauty	in	the	Miserable	and	the	Mundane,”	The	New	York	Times,	last	modified	January	11,	2006,	http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/11/movies/11sata.html?_r=1&.	
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	 What	is	perhaps	most	often	noted	about	Sátántangó,	though,	is	the	length	of	its	takes.	Varying	in	length	but	averaging	about	two	and	half	minutes,5	Sátántangó	has	become	famous	not	only	for	its	celebrated	status	as	a	major	figure	in	the	history	of	the	festival	circuit,	but	as	something	of	an	initiation	or	legitimization	piece	for	cinephiles—surviving	its	length	and	difficulty	signaling	a	dedication	to	art	cinema	and	serving	as	a	kind	of	shorthand	for	a	truly	dedicated	cineaste.	These	long-takes	vary	in	their	accompanying	movements,	some	remaining	absolutely	still,	others	having	elaborate	crane	and	or	tracking	shots	that	move	the	viewer	through	various	spaces.	When	asked	about	the	reason	behind	the	length	of	these	takes,	Tarr	highlights	their	status	as	different	from	the	images	to	which	viewers	are	habituated.	To	Tarr,	“The	people	of	this	generation	know	information-cut,	information-cut,	information-cut.	They	can	follow	the	logic	of	it,	the	logic	of	the	story,	but	they	don’t	follow	the	logic	of	life.”6	For	Tarr,	then,	the	habituated	structures	of	film	style	have	come	to	interfere	with	something	that	he	calls	“life.”	What	constitutes	“life”	for	Tarr	is	never	made	totally	clear,	but	what	is	valuable	about	these	takes,	for	Tarr,	is	their	relationship	to	a	kind	of	seeing	less	dominated	by	film	tradition,	a	looking	that	allows	for	something	other	than	what	is	generally	made	available.		 Bazin	was	too	rather	fond	of	long-takes	shot	in	deep	focus,	and	he	spoke	at	times	in	terms	similar	to	Tarr’s	about	them.	Putting	them	in	opposition	to	the	“tricks”	and	“cheats”	used	by	practitioners	of	montage,	Bazin,	in	his	“The	Evolution	of	the	Language	of	Cinema,”	takes	Erich	von	Stroheim	as	the	ultimate	filmmaker	in	terms	of	the	unbroken,	long-take.	What	these	takes	allow,	for	Bazin,	is	a	“laying	bare.”	To	Bazin,	“In	these	films	reality	lays																																																									5	David	Bordwell,	“TANGO	marathon,”	Observations	on	Film	Art,	last	modified	October	22,	2006,	http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2006/10/22/tango-marathon/.	6	Phil	Ballard,	“In	Search	of	Truth:	Béla	Tarr	Interviewed,”	Kinoeye	4,	no.	2	(2004),	http://www.kinoeye.org/04/02/ballard02.php.	
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itself	bare	like	a	suspect	confessing	under	the	relentless	examination	of	the	commissioner	of	police.”7	The	“close	look”	that	the	unbroken	take	affords,	then,	allows	a	situation	where	the	film	offers	up	“reality”	to	the	viewer,	a	system	through	which	the	film	sacrifices	its	narrative	hopes	in	the	goal	of	letting	the	audience	see.	8	But	what	is	it	that	can	be	seen	differently	in	the	image	for	these	two	thinkers?		 According	to	Bazin,	shooting	in	depth	and	without	cuts,	“Brings	the	spectator	into	a	relation	with	the	image	closer	to	that	which	he	enjoys	with	reality.	Therefore	it	is	correct	to	say	that,	independently	of	the	contents	of	the	image,	its	structure	is	more	realistic.”9	Reality	is,	according	to	Bazin’s	purview,	purely	achieved	through	aesthetic	means.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	narrative	contained	in	the	image	is	irrelevant,	but	that	the	audience’s	relationship	to	the	image—their	belief	in	it,	so	to	speak—is	derived	through	aesthetics;	the	actions	of	the	characters	are	available	for	contemplation,	but	only	as	content,	a	set	of	qualities	unattached	to	the	presentation	of	reality.		 Bazin	addresses	the	value	of	this	particular	set	of	aesthetic	characteristics	by	explaining	the	role	that	the	viewer	is	encouraged	to	play	in	light	of	the	persistence	of	the	unbroken	take:	While	analytical	montage	only	calls	for	him	[sic]	to	follow	his	guide,	to	let	his	attention	follow	along	smoothly	with	that	of	the	director	who	will	choose	what	he	should	see,	here	he	is	called	upon	to	exercise	at	least	a	minimum	of	personal	choice.	It	is	from	his	attention	and	his	will	that	the	meaning	of	the	image	in	part	derives.10		
																																																								7	André	Bazin,	“The	Evolution	of	the	Language	of	Cinema,”	in	What	is	Cinema?	Volume	1,	trans.	Hugh	Gray	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1967),	27.	8	Ibid.,	29.	9	Ibid.,	35.	10	Ibid.,	36.	
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Herein	lies	the	key	to	Bazin’s	supposed	“ontology”	(which	is	never	quite	that):	the	viewer	of	these	films	that	he	so	treasures	is	called	upon	to	make	some	amount	of	choice	in	these	moments,	asked	to	participate	in	what	is	to	come.	But	this	process	is	realized	not	through	effecting	the	unspooling	of	the	film,	but	through	deciding	one’s	own	relation	to	the	images;	examining	them	and	writing,	so	to	speak,	an	understanding	of	these	moments.	As	Tarr	puts	it	in	response	to	being	asked	about	the	reason	for	his	extend	takes:	“Because	I	see	the	story	as	only	just	a	dimension	of	life,	because	we	have	a	lot	of	other	things.	We	have	time,	we	have	landscapes,	we	have	meta-communications,	all	of	which	are	not	verbal	information.”11	For	Tarr	too	these	shots	open	up	a	new	space	of	some	sort,	a	space	for	choice	or	change,	a	space	that	is	unadorned	with	ready-to-hand	knowledge,	and	that	the	audience	must	therefore	assimilate	into	their	understanding	of	these	images	and	events	on	their	own.		 Of	course,	this	is	nothing	new.	That	Bazin	and	Tarr	unite	in	something	like	an	understanding	of	the	long-take	is	no	surprise.	What	is	valuable,	though,	is	the	political	ramifications	of	these	images	given	their	particular	historical	moment.	What	these	figures	describe	is	an	image	of,	or	that	generates,	a	viewer	free	of	the	governing	boundaries	of	habituation,	a	kind	of	ideal	mode	of	total	democracy—a	freedom	to	choose	that	allows	more	choice	even	than	the	world	itself,	a	democratic	image	alleviating	the	need	for	the	authoritative	figure	(even	that	of	the	artist)	to	come	forth	and	orient	one’s	vision.	But,	of	course,	this	ideal	always	vanishes.	It	does	so	with	every	cut,	or	with	the	raising	of	the	lights,	or	when	action	occurs	and	a	course	is	taken—either	in	us	or	in	the	film.	To	return	to	Iordanova,	the	disillusionments	of	the	careful	transition	to	democracy	are,	thanks	to	Tarr,	becoming	visible;	indeed,	the	easy,	habituated	choice	that	looms	as	inevitable	is	never	here																																																									11	Phil	Ballard,	“In	Search	of	Truth:	Béla	Tarr	Interviewed,”	Kinoeye	4,	no.	2	(2004),	http://www.kinoeye.org/04/02/ballard02.php.	
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contradicted	nor	even	exactly	critiqued,	but	the	time	before	it	is	extended.	The	return	to	the	past	of	old	Europe	is	pushed	aside	for	just	a	second	(or	maybe	a	little	over	seven	hours),	and	the	viewing	audience	is	left	to	linger,	however	briefly,	with	these	images	but	without	authority	or	habit	to	guide	them.		 A	particular	moment	in	Sátántangó	helps	to	articulate	this	process.	In	the	often	discussed	opening	shot	the	credits	relent	to	a	slow	fade	from	black	revealing	an	incredibly	muddy	yard	in	front	of	a	barn	that	looks	very	much	like	a	run-down	factory.	
	The	only	movement,	at	first,	is	the	rain	failing	into	the	muddy	puddle	in	the	foreground.	Slowly,	cows	emerge	from	the	building	and	meander	around	the	yard.	The	camera	tilts	slightly,	keeping	the	cows	centered	as	they	move.	Suddenly,	from	inside	the	pack	one	cow	mounts	another,	the	two	struggle	and	charge	around	the	yard	and	then	the	cow	dismounts,	blending	instantly	back	into	the	crowd.	A	single	cow	then	reemerges,	walks	towards	the	camera	and	pauses	at	the	side	of	the	frame.	The	camera	tilts	slightly	again	as	two	more	cows	come	forward,	one	stops	and	looks	at	the	camera,	and	then	rejoins	the	herd	as	the	pack	heads	to	the	left	of	the	frame.	
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	That	camera	tilts	again	and	then	begins	to	track	with	the	herd,	revealing	that,	rather	than	a	fenced	area,	this	seems	to	be	the	town	square.	The	camera	continues	to	track,	following	the	cows,	but	buildings	slowly	begin	to	separate	the	cows	and	the	camera.	At	one	point	in	its	journey	the	camera	displays	nothing	but	a	solid	wall	consisting	of	a	mixture	of	brick	and	cracked	concrete.	But	it	continues,	and	the	cows	return.	The	camera	seems	to	totally	lose	track	of	the	herd,	though,	as	the	number	of	buildings	in	the	foreground	increases,	visiting	with	the	cows	only	briefly	in	the	spaces	between	structures.	On	the	sides	of	two	buildings	a	pair	of	seemingly	arbitrary	grey	numbers	appears—sixty-three,	seven—referencing	some	process	or	count	the	significance	of	which	the	audience	is	never	alerted	to.	The	camera	finally	finds	some	open	space	again,	and	too	refinds	its	herd,	now	accompanied	by	some	chickens.	
	This	position	holds	as	the	cows	slowly	exit	through	an	opening	between	two	buildings	in	the	far	background.	One	chicken	is	all	that	remains	when	the	image	finally	fades	back	to	
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black.	This	blackness	holds	and	a	narration	begins	that	again	explains	the	layout	of	the	town,	now	over	the	black	screen.		 This	establishing	shot	of	the	town	is	presented	in	a	seven	and	a	half	minute	unbroken	take.	Given	its	position	at	the	start	and	its	depiction	of	the	town	that	occupies	much	of	the	film,	it	has	come	to	serve	for	many	critics	as	something	of	a	primer	for	what	is	to	come.	According	to	David	Bordwell:	The	first	shot,	now	famous,	was	a	stunner.	Cows	wander	through	the	churned	mud	of	a	village	square,	amble	slowly	to	the	camera	and	then	drift	to	the	left,	the	camera	sliding	along	with	them.	Eventually	they	shamble	into	the	distance.	All	the	while,	hollow,	bell-like	chords	throb	on.	Great	cow	ensemble	performance	and	a	dawdling,	slightly	ominous	introduction	to	a	strange	world:	I	was	ready.12		For	Bordwell,	then,	this	is	an	introduction	to	the	style	and	the	world	of	the	film.	For	Peter	Hames,	however,	there	is	also	something	like	an	authorial	purpose	to	this	opening.	To	Hames:	 The	film	begins	with	a	much-quoted	opening	scene	in	which	cows	move	from	a	shed	towards	the	right	of	screen.	The	camera	moves	with	them,	tracking	alongside	to	take	in	walls,	outhouses	and	hens.	The	whole	sequence	is	accompanied	by	haunting	and	reverberating	sound.	A	narrative	title	informs	us	that	the	whole	town	has	been	cut	off	by	the	bog,	mud	and	the	incessant	rain.	"The	news	is	that	they	are	coming,"	announces	a	title.	The	narrative	voice	is	that	of	the	doctor,	who	watches	events	and	records	them	from	his	desk	at	the	window,	the	film	returning	to	him	at	the	end	as	the	narrative	begins	again.13		For	Hames	there	is	an	implied	connection	between	the	doctor’s	gaze	and	this	shot.	Furthermore,	there	is	some	conflation	of	the	doctor	with	the	director—his	watching	and	recording	of	events	coming	to	account	for	our	view—and,	given	that	this	opening	narration																																																									12	David	Bordwell,	“TANGO	marathon,”	Observations	on	Film	Art,	last	modified	October	22,	2006,	http://www.davidbordwell.net/blog/2006/10/22/tango-marathon/.	13	Peter	Hames,	“The	Melancholy	of	Resistance:	The	Films	of	Béla	Tarr,”	Kinoeye	1,	no.	1	(2001),	http://www.kinoeye.org/01/01/hames01.php.	
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is	directly	from	the	novel	on	which	the	film	is	based,	between	the	story’s	respective	authors.	For	Manhola	Dargis,	finally,	there	is	a	connection	between	this	opening	and	a	sardonic	comment	about	the	film’s	characters	that	comes	to	inform	a	reading	of	the	narrative	events.	Dargis	writes:	The	opening	scene,	which	seems	calculated	to	weed	out	fainthearted	viewers,	tracks	a	herd	of	cows	as	they	meanderingly	exit	a	barn	and	enter	the	muddy	yard	of	the	near-desolate	village,	with	its	cracked	building	walls	and	prodigiously	strewn	trash.	As	he	does	throughout	the	film,	Mr.	Tarr	shoots	this	luxuriantly	paced	scene	in	long	shot,	using	his	beautiful	framing	and	richly	gradated	black-and-white	tones	to	find	beauty	in	every	miserable	and	mundane	corner.	In	time,	we	meet	the	town's	other	slow-moving	inhabitants—men,	women	and,	notoriously,	a	young	girl—none	of	whom	appear	more	evolved	than	the	wandering	cows.14		To	Dargis,	then,	this	opening	serves	both	as	an	establishment	of	directorial	style	and	as	a	system	to	orient	the	audience	to	the	forthcoming	actions	of	the	characters,	not	to	mention	their	seeming	resemblance	to	this	group	of	cattle.		 As	this	short	sampling	shows,	the	coherence	of	this	scene	in	regard	to	any	set	of	particular	meanings	is	difficult	to	map	across	different	viewers.	Whether	establishing	a	world	to	be	occupied,	declaring	an	authorial	imprint,	or	orienting	the	viewer	to	the	forthcoming	narrative	(or	all,	none	or	something	other	than	these	things)	this	film	is,	from	its	very	beginning,	establishing	some	degree	of	ambiguity,	as	evidenced	by	these	divergent	readings.	Ambiguity	is,	for	Bazin,	the	major	and	most	valuable	result	of	the	long-take,	deep	focus	style	on	display	here.	For	Bazin,	ambiguity	is	of	importance	because,	“The	uncertainty	in	which	we	find	ourselves	as	to	the	spiritual	key	or	the	interpretation	we	should	put	on	the	
																																																								14	Manohla	Dargis,	“Finding	Beauty	in	the	Miserable	and	the	Mundane,”	The	New	York	
Times,	last	modified	January	11,	2006,	http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/11/movies/11sata.html?_r=1&.	
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film	is	built	into	the	very	design	of	the	image”.15		It	is	this	design	that	gives	the	viewer	the	aforementioned	ability	to	interpret,	and	subsequently	some	access	to	a	democratic	process,	at	least	as	it	pertains	to	meaning.		Hungary	Year	Zero		 But	the	case	of	Sátántangó	and	its	relationship	to	democracy	far	outstrips	simply	the	discovery	of	the	intended	meanings	of	these	images.	It	is	the	relationship	to	a	particular	moment	in	Hungarian	politics	that	makes	this	film	of	particular	value.	As	John	Cunningham	notes	in	regards	to	the	climate	of	post-Soviet	Hungary:	“Politically,	Hungarians	may	have	hoped	for	a	period	of	steady	acclimation	to	the	process	and	practices	of	representative	democracy.	What	they	got	instead,	with	the	first	decisions	of	1990,	was	a	right-wing	government	composed	of	an	unstable	coalition…	which	lurched	from	crisis	to	crisis.”16	This	political	turmoil	is	represented	in	the	narrative	of	this	film	primarily	through	Irimiás’	series	of	promises,	lies	and	persistent	returns,	but	it	is	more	significant	in	regards	to	the	film’s	aesthetic	approach.	The	lack	of	a	clear	purpose	or	governing	principle	paired	with	the	extension	of	sight	into	an	unfigured	and	nearly	but	never	quite	visible	future	positions	the	viewer	in	a	unique	mode	of	waiting.	Indeed,	the	plethora	of	responses	that	Sátántangó	offers	but	never	endorses	and	its	outright	refusal	to	integrate	its	extended	moments	into	a	narrative	produce	a	system	that	posits	waiting	as	a	coherent	stance	in	relation	to	the	peaks	and	valleys	of	the	political	transition	that	this	film	seems	so	intent	on	discussing	without	
ever	discussing.	And	by	virtue	of	this	waiting	being	structured	into	the	film	the	audience	is																																																									15	André	Bazin,	“The	Evolution	of	the	Language	of	Cinema,”	in	What	is	Cinema?	Volume	1,	trans.	Hugh	Gray	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press,	1967),	36.	16	John	Cunninghamm,	Hungarian	Cinema:	From	Coffee	House	to	Mutliplex	(New	York:	Wallflower	Press,	2004),	143.	
		
	 80	
asked	to	sit	and	wait	with	it—free	to	interpret	but	with	ideas	never	verified,	wait	never	summarily	ended.		 As	Cunningham	makes	clear,	the	period	of	Hungarian	film	beginning	in	the	1960s	and	culminating	in	1989	was	far	and	away	the	most	fertile	period	for	Hungarian	cinema,	but	it	was	not	altogether	undone	by	the	change	in	economic	systems.17	Much	of	the	state	apparatus	responsible	for	funding	filmmaking	actually	persisted	into	the	late	1990s,	and	there	was	surprising	continuity	between	the	available	forms	of	funding	under	both	systems	of	governance.18	There	was,	however,	in	the	late	1980s	serious	anxiety	about	the	availability	of	centralized	film	financing,	as	the	deeply	challenging	cinema	of	figures	like	Tarr	would	now	be	forced	to	compete	in	the	world	of	popular	cinema.		 Accompanying	these	anxieties	was	the	much	more	widespread	disillusionment	with	the	transition	to	capitalism.	Hungary	had	entered	a	recession	that	straddled	the	transition	and	the	lack	of	immediate	economic	renewal	under	capitalism	led	to	a	serious	reduction	in	enthusiasm	for	a	new	market	economy.	This	recession	included	“inflation	standing	at	23	per	cent,	about	three	million	people	living	at	or	below	the	poverty	line,	the	highest	foreign	debt	of	any	Eastern	European	country	and	unemployment	just	below	400,000	and	rising.”19	In	addition,	the	newly	held	election,	which	people	had	hoped	would	help	the	nation	transition	into	a	stable	market	based	economy,	resulted	in	a	right-wing	coalition	of	unstable	allegiances.20	Hungary,	then,	shifted	from	one	unstable	economic	arrangement	to	another,	gaining	in	the	process	deep	debts,	a	very	high	rate	of	unemployment,	and	an	increasing	rate	of	inflation.	The	source	of	this	economic	downturn	is,	of	course,	difficult	to																																																									17	Ibid.,	195.	18	Ibid.,	151.	19	Ibid.,	143.	20	Ibid.	
		
	 81	
pin	to	a	tidy	source,	but	the	steady	decrease	in	quality	of	life	that	bridged	communism	and	capitalism	nonetheless	helps	to	situate	Sátántangó’s	brutal	pessimism,	and	its	distrust	of	both	economic	systems.		 This	film’s	melancholy	and	general	distrust,	evidenced	best	perhaps	by	Irimiás’	actions,	demonstrate	a	particularly	insightful	example	of	what	Alexei	Yurchak,	in	his	
Everything	Was	Forever,	Until	It	Was	No	More,	describes	as	the	unique	blend	of	idealism	and	failure	that	carried	the	late	Soviet	moment	into	the	transition	to	capitalism.	For	Yurchak,	the	moments	before	and	during	the	transition	carried	with	them	what	he	calls	a	“curious	paradox,”	which	he	says	is	characterized	by	the	fact	that	“the	system	[communism]	was	always	felt	to	be	both	stagnating	and	immutable,	fragile	and	vigorous,	bleak	and	full	of	promise.”21	It	is	this	paradox	that	brings	light	to	Irimiás’	actions,	and	furthermore	to	his	readability	as	an	allegory	for	disillusionment	with	both	capitalism	and	communism.	Irimiás’	promise	of	a	return	to	a	community	farm	proposes	exactly	what	the	residents	of	the	town	know	to	be	already	failed,	but	it	also	provides	the	possibility	for	a	return	to	a	past	that,	if	miserable,	at	least	held	with	it	the	perhaps	imaginary	ideals	of	community	and	equality.	But	his	capitalist	leanings,	his	taking	their	money	and	promising	positive	returns	on	their	investments,	proposes	exactly	the	opposite:	if	capitalism	here	might	produce	a	positive	future	of	another	sort—that	of	prosperity	and	abundance—it	does	so	at	the	cost	of	any	claim	to	community	and	collectivity.		 Irimiás,	then,	stands	at	the	crossroad	between	communism	and	capitalism,	his	is	the	vantage	from	which	both	systems	become	finally	legible,	their	promises	apparent	their	failures	palpable.	It	is	this	impasse	that	Tarr	hopes	to	extend,	and	his	system	for	completing																																																									21	Alexei	Yurchak,	Everything	Was	Forever	Until,	It	Was	No	More	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005),	4.	
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this	task	is	the	extended	take.	The	moment	of	decision	is	here	extended	to	its	limit.	But,	unlike	in	the	case	of	Germany	Year	Zero,	the	availability	of	a	positive	future	through	a	coherent	path	has	all	but	vanished	in	the	case	of	Sátántangó;	Rossellini	found	a	future	predicated	on	a	radical	break	from	authority	and	Tarr	here	agrees,	but	where	Tarr	departs	is	in	the	limits	of	this	break.	Whereas,	for	Rossellini,	communism	was	within	the	range	of	available	futures,	for	Tarr	it	has	been	rejected,	at	least	in	any	recognizable	form.	The	horizon	has	shrunk,	and	with	it	the	strange	optimism	that	Rossellini	produced.	Tarr’s	openness,	his	spaces	of	contingency	and	attempts	to	make	available	what	is	radically	new,	are	then	both	more	devastating	and	more	desperate	than	Rossellini’s,	for	his	wish	seems	all	but	unattainable.	Under	this	unflinching	and	all-encompassing	pessimism	Tarr’s	
Sátántangó	finds	itself	in	an	inescapable	bind	and	it	is	left	only	to	wait,	to	wait	for	something	to	appear	in	the	spaces	of	possibility	it	creates,	to	wait	for	something,	finally,	to	arrive	and	produce	some	structure	to	carry	us	forth.		Waiting	(With	Boredom)	Siegfried	Kracauer	explored	the	value	of	waiting	by	putting	this	concept	in	relation	to	his	views	on	spirituality.	For	Kracauer	the	modern	world	is	arranged	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	waiting	an	afterthought,	a	non-productive	and	therefore	obsolete	state	out	of	line	with	the	world’s	emphasis	on	labor	and	productivity.	Kracauer’s	essay	“Those	Who	Wait”	thinks	of	the	problems	that	a	lack	of	waiting	can	cause	in	specifically	religious	terms.	To	Kracauer,	for	the	modern	urban	subject—the	subject	doomed	to	“linger	in	the	void”22	of	
																																																								22	Siegfried	Kracauer,	“Those	Who	Wait,”	in	The	Mass	Ornament:	Weimar	Essays,	trans.	Thomas	Y.	Levin	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1995),	135.	
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urban	anomie	and	metaphorical	suffering23—there	are	three	available	responses	when	faced	with	the	possibility	of	religion.	First,	there	is	skepticism	“as	a	matter	of	principle,”	represented	by	the	subject	who	turns	his	back	almost	arbitrarily	from	the	matter	at	hand,	taking	as	eternal	truth	their	own	status	as	skeptic.24	Second	is	the	subject	Kracauer	dubs	“the	short-circuit	people,”	those	who	dive	headlong	into	the	decisions	that	they	face,	short	circuiting	what	Kracauer	finds	to	be	the	potential	value	of	their	choices	by	arriving	too	quickly	and	too	easily	at	their	spiritual	conclusions.25	For	Kracauer,	it	is	these	short-circuit	people	who	are	prone	to	zealotry.	To	Kracauer	both	halves	of	this	pair	of	opposed	responses	produce	extremism.	However,	the	third	response	to	the	problem	of	the	spiritual	in	the	modern	world,	and	the	one	that	Kracauer	finds	to	be	of	particular	value,	is	that	of	waiting.	For	Kracauer	waiting	presents	something	of	a	state	of	productive	indecision.	As	Kracauer	argues,	"One	waits,	and	one’s	waiting	is	a	hesitant	openness,	albeit	of	a	sort	that	is	difficult	to	explain.”26	It	is	this	“hesitant	openness”	that	is	of	political	value	to	the	cinema	of	Tarr,	and	its	accompanying	status	as	being	“difficult	to	explain”	that	accounts	for	the	kind	of	deliberate	ambiguity	that	is	essential	to	Bazin.	This	difficulty	of	explanation	is	derived	from	the	fact	the	wait	is	always	also	a	moment	of	indecision,	a	space	where	decision	is	halted	allowing	potential	to	spread	out	in	every	direction.		 This	waiting	is	also	necessarily	durational.	As	Kracauer	explains,	when	thinking	of	this	waiting	“one	ought	to	think	primarily	of	those	people	who	have	tarried	and	still	do	tarry	in	front	of	closed	doors,	and	who	thus,	when	they	take	it	upon	themselves	to	wait,	are	
																																																								23	Ibid.,	129.	24	Ibid.,	135.	25	Ibid.,	137.	26	Ibid.,	138	(emphasis	in	original).	
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people	who	are	waiting	here	and	now.”27	This	is	to	say	that	once	a	decision	is	rendered	the	waiting	is	ended,	and	its	productive	value	becomes	lost	as	it	is	placed	in	the	past,	figured,	in	retrospect,	as	just	an	intermediate	state—an	irrelevant	interval.	But	it	is	when	one	is	in	the	waiting	that	it	is	of	value,	when	it	pushes	at	the	possible	and	before	it	is	rendered	knowable.	Temporally,	then,	this	waiting	is	never	in	the	future	or	past,	we	never	did	wait	and	we	never	will,	we	only	wait	while	and	with	waiting,	and	forget	this	waiting	when	it	has	passed.		 Kracauer	continues,	“The	actual	metaphysical	meaning	of	his	[the	one	who	waits’]	attitude	rests	upon	the	fact	that	the	irruption	of	the	absolute	can	occur	only	once	an	individual	has	committed	himself	with	his	entire	being	to	this	relationship.	Those	who	wait	will	thus	be	as	hard	as	possible	on	themselves,	so	as	not	to	be	taken	in	by	religious	need.”28	This	waiting,	for	Kracauer,	is	also	then	an	avoidance,	those	who	wait	must	continue	to	wait	until	they	can	suffer	no	more,	until	the	need	to	not	wait	has	passed	and	something	other	than	waiting	finally	arrives.		 Indeed,	Kracauer	cautions	against	the	ending	of	the	wait	too	soon:	“Maintaining	the	furthest	possible	distance,	they	[those	who	wait]	almost	make	it	their	ambition	to	be	pedantic	and	somehow	cool,	as	a	means	of	protecting	themselves	against	flying	embers.”29	It	is	these	flying	embers	that	Béla	Tarr	so	carefully	encourages	his	audience	to	avoid.	The	tangential	and	immediate	turn	to	a	decision	too	soon,	the	disruption	of	the	wait	that	might	prematurely	end	it	before	its	advantages	can	arrive.	The	questions	as	to	whether	any	of	the	three	readings	of	Tarr’s	cows	can	be	settled	upon	or	whether	a	return	to	old	Europe	or																																																									27	Ibid.	28	Ibid.,	139.	29	Ibid.	
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nostalgia	for	old	communism	can	be	found	in	these	images,	these	are	the	burning	embers	that	become	available	in	this	film’s	unfolding.	But	none	of	these	burning	embers	ever	fully	arrive	in	Sátántangó,	and	their	audience	is	left	only	to	wait.	During	this	waiting,	for	Kracauer,	the	one	who	waits	can	never	relax,	the	one	who	waits	must	maintain	a	“tense	activity	and	engaged	self-perception.”30	Hence	the	absolute	reduction	of	habitual	ease	in	Tarr’s	takes.	Tarr’s	cinema	is	never	quite	that	of	Andrei	Tarkovsky,	to	whom	he	is	so	often	compared,31	because	the	beauty	never	exactly	carries	the	viewer	away,	instead	they	are	always	left	waiting,	waiting	for	the	next	cut—an	event	which,	despite	all	the	waiting,	so	often	arrives	abruptly—or	the	next	action.		 But	Kracauer	ends	his	essay	on	a	strange	note,	and	in	a	way	that	addresses	the	difficult	decisions	as	to	when	it	is	appropriate	to	stop	the	wait.	Kracauer’s	conclusion	is	presented	as	follows:	Must	it	be	added	that	getting	oneself	ready	is	only	a	preparation	for	that	which	cannot	be	obtained	by	force,	a	preparation	for	transformation	and	for	giving	oneself	over	to	it?	Exactly	when	this	transformation	will	come	to	pass	and	whether	or	not	it	will	happen	at	all	is	not	at	issue	here,	and	at	any	rate	should	not	worry	those	who	are	exerting	themselves.32		For	Kracauer,	finally,	the	waiting	is	a	preparation	for	something	that	is	to	come,	but	also	an	awareness	that	it	might	never	arrive.	The	nature	of	the	transformation	offered	always	treats	waiting	as	unfigured,	and	its	point	of	arrival	must	always	remain	vague	exactly	until	it	arrives,	for	once	it	takes	form	the	wait	is	finished.	
																																																								30	Ibid.	31	See,	for	instance,	András	Bálint	Kovács’	discussion	of	Tarr’s	long	takes	in:	András	Bálint	Kovács,	The	Cinema	of	Béla	Tarr:	The	Circle	Closes	(New	York:	Wallflower	Press,	2013),	56-59.	32	Siegfried	Kracauer,	“Those	Who	Wait,”	in	The	Mass	Ornament:	Weimar	Essays,	trans.	Thomas	Y.	Levin	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	1995),	140.	
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	 In	Sátántangó	there	are,	of	course,	disruptions	that	interrupt	the	wait,	but	they	are	always	met	with	more	waiting.	Never	does	the	transformation	quite	arrive—and	never	does	it	offer	its	audience	a	course	of	action.	What	Sátántangó	aspires	to	do	is	maintain	a	state	of	waiting,	a	perpetual	asking	of	its	audience	to	pause	and	think	before	the	coming	democracy	can	arrive.	What	separates	Tarr’s	film	from	the	art	house	tradition	that	it	so	clearly	claims	is	its	unique	position	as	an	artifact	of	a	transitional	moment,	a	moment	when	waiting	was	of	such	great	importance	to	Hungary’s	transformations.	This	film	asks	its	viewers	to	think	through	this	change,	it	signals	towards	it	but	never	clearly	articulates	its	concerns.	But	its	length	also	asks	that	the	audience	suffer,	that	they	stare	and	wait	as	the	cows	meander,	or	worst	still,	as	a	cat	is	tortured	in	the	name	of	nothing	but	a	misguided	claim	to	authority.33		 But	a	film	that	deliberately	demands	to	open	up	an	expanse	of	waiting	suggests	a	striking	orientation	of	viewer	to	object.	The	viewer,	suffering	the	demands	of	the	wait,	is	left	with	a	relatively	slim	scope	of	direct	responses,	leaving—or	perhaps	disregard	or	rejection—being	of	course	the	most	available,	and	indeed	it	is	this	response	that	perhaps	accounts	for	the	relative	disinterest	from	Tarr’s	domestic	audience.34	But	the	important	question	here	is	what	does	it	mean	to	stay?	To	endure	all	seven	plus	hours	of	Tarr’s	film	and	indeed	to	enjoy	it,	as	many	audiences	claim	to	do?	This	sustained	wait	is	best	qualified	under	the	term	boredom.	That	is,	in	order	to	wait,	to	truly	wait	in	the	sense	that	Kracauer	and,	for	me,	Tarr	demand	is	to	be	bored.	To	disjoin	the	positive	outcome	from	the																																																									33	The	character,	Estike,	echoes	throughout	the	torture	sequence	the	words	that,	presumably,	her	father	speaks	as	he	beats	her.	34	The	domestic	disinterest	in	Tarr	is	relatively	well	documented,	see	for	instance:	András	Bálint	Kovács,	The	Cinema	of	Béla	Tarr:	The	Circle	Closes	(New	York:	Wallflower	Press,	2013),	172.		
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experience	of	stillness	and	to	dwell	in	a	state	of	total	indirection,	this	is	what	it	means	to	wait	and	its	only	coherent	response	must	be	boredom.		 In	her	book	Experience	Without	Qualities:	Boredom	and	Modernity—a	masterful	discussion	of	boredom’s	history	and	unsteady	relationship	with	both	philosophical	and	empirical	methods	of	approach—Elizabeth	Goodstein	outlines	boredom	as	such:	“Boredom	isolates,	individuates,	even	as	it	blurs	the	world	gray.	A	confrontation	with	nothing,	then,	or	Nothing,	or	something	like	it.	Perhaps	just	a	name	for	what	cannot	be	named,	an	encounter	with	the	limits	of	language.	An	experience	without	qualities,	with	the	deficits	of	the	self	masquerading	as	the	poverty	of	the	world.”35	For	Goodstein	boredom	individuates	and	renders	a	limitless	gray—a	world	perhaps	found	concretized	in	Tarr’s	films.	But	boredom	also	mistakes	this	grayness,	or	perhaps	displaces	it.	In	boredom	the	world	outside	appears	gray	and	bland,	but	this	blandness	and	indistinction	expand	past	the	boundaries	of	the	image,	they	are	also	felt	inside—to	be	bored	is	to	feel	that	you	are	yourself	as	gray	as	the	world	that	you	see;	one’s	self	feels	as	tired	as	the	object	on	display.	In	this	way,	boredom	confuses	the	boundary	between	inside	and	outside.	Goodstein	continues:	“In	boredom	there	is	no	distinguishing	in	here	form	out	there,	for	this	world	in	its	failure	to	engage	collapses	into	an	extension	of	the	bored	subject	who	empties	out	in	the	vain	search	for	an	interest,	a	pleasure,	a	meaning.”36	It	is	this	emptying	out	that	makes	room	for	the	wait,	that	produces	the	space	for	openness—true	indifference	and	impartiality	are	boredom’s	qualities,	it	is	constituted	by	absolute	distance	but	also	already	the	failure	to	distinguish	self	from	image.																																																									35	Elizabeth	Goodstein,	Experience	Without	Qualities:	Boredom	and	Modernity	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2005),	1.	36	Ibid.	
		
	 88	
	 For	Goodstein,	the	rise	of	boredom	is	tightly	tied	to	the	effects	of	industrialization,	and	results	from	what	she	calls	the	“democratization	of	skepticism	in	modernity.”37	Boredom,	for	Goodstein,	results	from	a	crisis	of	meaning	brought	on	by	the	secularization	of	society	and	the	constant	appeal	to	the	vagaries	and	vicissitudes	of	“progress”	as	the	motor	for	modern	urban	experience.	According	to	Goodstein	in	boredom,	“The	definitiveness	of	the	loss	of	traditional	frameworks	of	meaning	registers	in	a	hollow	emptiness	of	self.”38	If	it	is	in	the	absence	of	meaning	where	waiting	finds	its	value,	where	politics	opens	up	to	possibility	and	where	change	can	find	its	most	extreme	forms,	then	boredom	must	be	the	state	that	characterizes	this	wait.		 Another	term,	patience,	seems	to	be	likewise	valuable	for	approaching	the	wait,	but	what	separates	boredom	from	patience—and	indeed	renders	boredom	the	more	radical	response—is	to	be	found	in	the	way	that	the	subject	is	oriented.	That	is,	whereas	boredom	confuses	inside	and	outside	and	brings	the	object	of	boredom	in	close	relation	to	the	subject,	indeed	so	close	that	the	two	become	confused,	patience	maintains	a	distance	and	a	direction	in	relation	to	the	object.	The	difference	here	is	that	between	waiting	with	and	waiting	for.	Where	boredom	waits	with	the,	in	this	case,	film,	patience	waits	for	it;	for	it	to	offer	up	its	value	and	for	this	value	to	be	subsequently	accepted	or	rejected	by	the	viewer.	Boredom	is	then	surely	the	more	messianic	of	the	two,	as	in	it	the	contract	implied	by	patience	is	replaced	with	instability,	and	perhaps	also	the	more	idealistic.	But	it	also	offers	more—more	options	and,	potentially,	more	and	greater	difference.	In	light	of	Tarr’s	context,	his	equating	and	confusing	of	both	available	economic	options	and	perhaps	proposing	that	both	seem	to	offer	no	promise	other	than	misery,	boredom	becomes	the	far																																																									37	Ibid.,	10.	38	Ibid.,	398.	
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more	alluring	of	these	two	responses.	There	is,	for	Tarr,	nothing	to	patiently	await,	only	boredom	offers	the	radical	difference	of	completely	unhabituated	viewing	that	he	demands.		 Patrice	Petro,	in	her	book	Aftershocks	of	the	New:	Feminism	and	Film	History,	also	discusses	the	politics	of	boredom,	and	she	does	so	by	connecting	boredom	to	the	seemingly	antithetical	category	of	history.	As	Petro	notes,	boredom	is	typically	thought	of	as	inconsequential	and	therefore	unassimilable	to	history,	she	summarizes	this	typical	conception	of	boredom	as	such:	“A	time	without	event,	when	nothing	happens,	a	seemingly	endless	flux	without	beginning	or	end.”39	History,	on	the	other	hand,	typically	categorizes	and	collects	things	of	particular	consequence,	as	Petro	puts	it,	“History,	by	contrast	[with	boredom]	is	commonly	understood	to	document	that	which	happened—a	series	of	events	or,	at	least,	moments	thought	to	be	eventful,	which	suggest	that	something	occurred	(rather	than	nothing	at	all).”40	Petro’s	project,	in	contrast	to	these	traditional	conceptions	of	boredom	and	history,	is	to	connect	these	seemingly	incommensurate	terms,	and	film	and	photography	become	the	lever	for	this	connection.	That	is,	film	and	photography	open	up—in	a	particularly	Kracaurian	mode—a	space	for	reflecting	on	the	industrialized	spaces	depicted	precisely	because	they	present	boredom	as	a	historically	situated	mode	of	experience.	That	is,	boredom	itself	is	the	subject	of	the	images	that	she	finds	to	be	of	value.	We	have	boredom	now,	the	photographic	arts	seem	to	say,	because	of	our	current	relationship	to	the	industrialized	world.		 Boredom,	for	Petro,	is	the	state	of	experience	in	which	distraction—for	her,	as	well	as	Kracauer	and	Walter	Benjamin,	the	definitive	state	of	experience	for	the	industrialized																																																									39	Patrice	Petro,	Aftershocks	of	the	New:	Feminism	and	Film	History	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	2002),	57.	40	Ibid.,	57-58.	
		
	 90	
urban	subject—is	reflected	back	through	photography	and	turned	into	an	object	for	scrutiny.	Petro	proposes	this	model	as	such:	The	cultivation	of	boredom…	discloses	the	logic	of	distraction,	in	which	newness	becomes	a	fetish,	and	shock	itself	a	manifestation	of	the	commodity	form.	To	reverse	the	slogan	of	the	Russian	formalists,	boredom	habitualizes	
renewed	perception,	opening	up	the	potential	to	see	difference	that	make	a	difference,	and	to	refuse	the	ceaseless	repetition	of	the	new	as	always-the-same.41		For	Petro,	boredom,	as	cultivated	through	media,	is	a	historically	situated	mode	of	experience	that	is	valuable	in	its	ability	to	make	visible	the	repetitions	of	sameness	and	furthermore	the	possibility	of	difference.	If,	as	Benjamin	posited	in	his	Arcades	Project,	“Boredom	is	the	threshold	of	great	deeds”42	it	is	because,	as	Petro	puts	it,	“Hidden	in	the	negativity	of	boredom	and	waiting…	is	the	anticipation	that	something	(different)	might	occur.”43	There	are,	I	think,	two	particularly	significant	portions	of	this	quote	that	are	of	supreme	importance	for	understanding	the	political	potentials	of	boredom.	First	is	the	negativity,	and	it	is	indeed	this	quality	that	separates	boredom	from	patience.	For	boredom	to	shatter	the	repetition	of	the	new	and	the	tyranny	of	sameness	it	must	be	felt	as	a	negative	quality,	as	a	form	of	dissatisfaction	with	what	is	being	observed.	This	negativity	is	of	course	also	boredom’s	drawback,	as	it	brings	about	the	potential	for	dismissal.	But	what	I	figure	here	as	creative	boredom	must	push	up	against	its	own	failure	in	order	to	propose	the	possibility	of	difference.	This	is	why	the	indeterminate	is	of	such	value	to	boredom,	and	indeed	the	divide	between	non-event	and	event	(or	boredom	and	history)	becomes	of	such																																																									41	Ibid.,	66.	42	Quoted	in:	Patrice	Petro,	Aftershocks	of	the	New:	Feminism	and	Film	History	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	2002),	66.	43	Patrice	Petro,	Aftershocks	of	the	New:	Feminism	and	Film	History	(New	Brunswick:	Rutgers	University	Press,	2002),	66.	
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significance.	In	order	to	produce	the	possibility	of	difference,	the	barrier	between	event	and	non-event	must	be	dissolved,	and	it	must	become	clear	that	any	particular	moment	could	be	rendered	eventful.	Hence	Tarr’s	own	emphasis	on	disrupting	habituated	viewing:	what	appears	of	little	interest	is	exactly	the	thing	that	is	capable	of	asking	us	to	think	again.	Of	course,	in	this	total	attempt	at	disrupting	habituation,	what	events	are	valuable—and	will	subsequently	be	selected	for	history—also	becomes	indeterminate.	The	other	important	portion	of	the	above	quote	is	the	placing	of	“different”	inside	parentheses.	The	problem	that	this	parenthetical	proposes	is	that	the	act	of	singling	something	out	as	different	always	necessitates	a	figuration.	That	something	occurs	is	of	course	inevitable,	but	its	labeling	as	different—unique	and	thus	historical—is	exactly	the	kind	of	figuration	and	subsequent	habituation	that	signifies	the	end	of	waiting,	and	therefore	the	arrival	of	something	in	particular.	Greeting	and	verifying	the	moment	of	difference,	then,	remains	the	impossible	juncture	of	the	wait	and	its	accompanying	subject	position:	boredom.	
Sátántangó,	as	I’ve	previously	discussed,	runs	up	against	this	same	problem	of	ending	the	wait,	but	it	furthermore	refigures	this	discussion	of	boredom	by	virtue	of	its	historical	orientation.	Tarr’s	film,	of	course,	has	a	remarkably	complex	relationship	to	change	and	the	potentials	of	new	political	arrangements,	as	is	most	clearly	evidenced	in	its	distrust	of	the	legacy	of	communism.	If,	for	Kracauer,	Goodstein,	and	Petro,	the	function	of	boredom	serves	in	revealing	the	fissures	and	arbitrary	arrangements	of	capitalism’s	complex	and	seemingly	natural	mechanizations,	Tarr’s	film	reactivates	this	wish,	but	without	the	cogent	alternative	that	haunts	these	other	critiques.	If	indeed	Benjamin’s	famous	claim	that	“boredom	is	the	threshold	of	great	deeds”	proposes	the	clearest	
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summation	of	boredom’s	potential,	Tarr’s	cinema	is	of	particular	value	in	highlighting	the	hidden	assumptions	of	this	quote.	“Boredom	is	the	threshold	of	great	deeds”	for	sure,	but	always	just	that	threshold,	and	never	quite	more.	Through	the	semi-coherent	maneuverings,	ramblings	and	dances	of	its	characters,	Sátántangó	stands	on	this	threshold,	but	never	quite	enters.	The	aesthetic	approach	of	Tarr—his	tracking	shots	along	with	the	overwhelming	grayness	of	his	photography—strive	to	produce	boredom	and	waiting,	but	to	do	so	in	such	a	way	as	to	reduce	the	distance	between	audience	and	image.	As	Goodstein	notes,	part	of	the	structure	of	boredom	is	the	confusion	of	inside	and	outside.	What	this	confusion	yields	is	a	profound	and	total	disenchantment	with	oneself	and	the	world,	the	only	available	response	to	which	is	a	call	to	reconfigure,	to	think	anew	about	the	world	that	has	produced	this	disenchantment	on	the	screen	and	in	one’s	self.	This	is	Tarr’s	aim,	and	this	is	the	potential	of	boredom.	But,	as	will	be	explored	shortly,	the	limits	of	this	approach	always	and	immediately	haunt	this	film,	for	it	becomes	impossible	in	this	waiting	and	its	boredom	to	ever	do	anything—as	any	thing	always	ignites	these	flammable	images,	burning	away	all	their	potential	at	the	very	site	of	any	particular	arrival.		Democracy	and	Contingency		 What	the	viewers	of	this	film	await	is	not	some	religious	awakening,	but	a	forthcoming	political	change,	a	change	that	seems	inevitable	but	that	regardless	must	be	thought,	for	thinking	is	the	only	way	to	attempt	to	determine	and	condition	its	arrival.	But	as	the	cows	meander	across	the	screen,	what	becomes	available	that	has	been	otherwise	withheld?	Are	the	cows	a	communist	collective	or	a	cadre	of	capitalist	consumers?	Are	they	
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the	characters	that	are	to	come	or	the	vision	of	a	world	that	has	been	left	behind?	And	what	of	their	exit?	Is	this	emancipation	or	slaughter?	And	how	can	we	ever	tell?	These	are	the	questions	that	this	film	offers	up	but	refuses	ever	to	fully	form,	and	is	farther	still	from	ever	answering.		 Two	recent	books	on	the	work	of	Tarr	expand	on	this	waiting	process	by	figuring,	respectively,	the	end	of	waiting	and	its	perpetuation.	Their	titles	alone,	when	put	in	relation	to	each	other,	question	after	this	process.	The	first,	The	Cinema	of	Béla	Tarr:	The	Circle	
Closes	by	András	Bálint	Kovács	posits	that	politics	are	never	the	direct	concern	of	Tarr,	and	that	his	films	actually	work	to	create	a	vaguely	“Eastern	European”	space	that	is	never	particular	to	Hungary.44	The	second,	Béla	Tarr,	The	Time	After	by	Jacques	Rancière,	argues	that	Tarr’s	films	open	up	access	to	a	new	kind	of	temporality	that	allows	for	a	new	kind	of	relationship	to	the	material	world.		 Part	of	Kovács’	project	is	to	show	that	Tarr’s	films	are	coherent	across	his	directing	career,	and	not	easily	sectioned	into	two	periods,	as	other	critics	so	often	do.	He	explains	that	Tarr’s	films	“can	in	no	way	be	regarded	as	political,”	but	they	do	function	in	delivering	a	hopeless	vision	of	small-town	Hungary.45	To	quote	Kovács:	The	narration	is	slow;	the	environment	represented	is	poor,	shabby,	dirty	and	run-down;	and	the	stories’	atmosphere	is	bleak.	The	characters	are	sad	and	frightened;	they	often	suffer	and	often	cause	others	to	suffer;	nobody	in	any	of	these	films	smiles	or	laughs;	and	nobody	is	cheerful.	The	visual	atmosphere	is	dark,	with	no	colours.	The	stories	do	not	develop,	just	turn	in	circles,	and	there	is	no	hope	in	them	for	anybody.46		
																																																								44	András	Bálint	Kovács,	The	Cinema	of	Béla	Tarr:	The	Circle	Closes	(New	York:	Wallflower	Press,	2013),	97.	45	Ibid.,	173.	46	Ibid.,	172-173.	
		
	 94	
Given	this	attitude,	Kovács—who	in	fact	finds	a	lot	of	value	in	the	films,	if	perhaps	they	are	to	him	not	upbeat	or	useful	in	terms	of	politics—spends	the	majority	of	his	analyses	arguing	for	the	coherence	of	Tarr’s	oeuvre	in	terms	of	a	particular	style	and	categorizing	Tarr,	in	particular	his	tracking	shots	and	long-takes,	in	relation	to	earlier	European	directors.	For	Kovács	Tarr’s	films	function	to	generate	something	of	a	unified	stance	by	virtue	of	their	appearing	historical	without	actually	ever	presenting	anything	particular.	Due	in	large	part	to	their	strange	relationship	to	location	shooting	(the	exteriors	often	connect	far	disparate	locations	through	cuts	that	appear	to	conjoin	them	into	a	coherent	space),	Kovács	posits	that	what	Tarr	and	his	crew	want	to	achieve	is	“the	forming	of	this	mixture	of	historical,	social	and	political	signs	into	a	vision	that	shows	neither	national	characteristics	nor	particular	signs	of	a	period	of	time	any	more	specific	than	the	end	of	the	twentieth	century.”47	For	Kovács,	Tarr	ultimately	does	this	through	connecting	far	removed	spaces	and	by	depicting	“a	landscape	which	was	very	typical	of	a	region,	yet	remained	unspecific	as	regards	concrete	space	and	historical	time.”48	Through	this,	Tarr	is	able	to	represent	a	generalized	“Eastern	Europe”	that	is	knowable	to	a	wider	audience,	a	presentation	that	brings	into	view	a	kind	of	universal	particular,	a	specific	impression	that	accounts	for	the	audience’s	understanding	of	these	films	which	takes	the	form	of	“the	image	of	the	underdog,	the	image	of	a	helpless	life.”49		 Whereas	Kovács	paints	Tarr	as	a	kind	of	sculptor	of	hopeless	(and	disjointed)	spaces,	for	Jacques	Rancière	Tarr’s	cinema	opens	up	new	hopes	and	grants	access	to	a	different	kind	of	time.	Like	Kovács,	Rancière	pushes	back	against	the	idea	of	separating																																																									47	Ibid.,	63.	48	Ibid.,	175.	49	Ibid.	
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Tarr’s	work	into	two	distinct	periods.	According	to	Rancière,	“From	the	first	film	to	the	last,	it	is	always	the	story	of	a	broken	promise,	of	a	voyage	that	returns	to	its	point	of	departure.”50	What	this	circular	structure	allows	for	Rancière	is	remarkably	different	from	Kovács’	closed	circle	of	coherent	meaning	rendered	universal.	For	Rancière,	what	is	key	to	Tarr	and	what	he	uses	these	films	to	set	forth	is	a	kind	of	essential	grounding	for	his	ideas	on	“realism.”	According	to	Rancière,	The	essence	of	realism—contrary	to	the	program	of	edification	known	by	the	name	of	socialist	realism—is	the	distance	taken	with	regard	to	stories,	to	their	temporal	schemes	and	their	sequences	of	causes	and	effects.	Realism	opposes	situations	that	endure	to	stories	that	link	together	and	pass	from	one	to	the	next.51		Rancière	uses	Tarr’s	films,	then,	to	deploy	a	logic	of	realism,	but	his	is	a	realism	that	pushes	out	narrative	and	instead	asks	that	images	be	felt	and	sensed.		 Some	degree	of	narrative	disruption—in	Rancière	through	distance	and	in	Kovács	through	spatial	distortion—obviously	connect	the	two	thinkers,	but	Rancière’s	ideas	are	useful	in	describing	how	the	pauses	that	these	films	present	function	to	figure	a	politics.	Where	Kovács	finds	Sátántangó’s	ambiguity	disruptive	to	any	political	project,	for	Rancière	it	is	exactly	this	ambiguity	that	allows	for	politics.	According	to	Rancière,	the	disjuncture	between	narrative	and	form	that	Tarr	provides	generates	a	rupture	that	serves	to	produce	a	new	style	of	seeing.	For	Rancière,	“In	order	to	exploit	the	breach	[between	narrative	and	reality]	offered,	it	is	already	necessary	to	loosen	the	constraint	that	binds	the	arguments	of	stories	to	the	exposition	of	‘problems,’	the	existence	and	domain	of	which	are	defined	by	
																																																								50	Jacques	Rancière,	Bela	Tarr,	The	Time	After,	trans.	Erik	Beranek	(Minneapolis:	Univocal,	2011),	4.	51	Ibid.,	7.	
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the	power	of	the	planners.”52	While	Rancière	is	referring	explicitly	to	Tarr’s	work	during	“the	thaw,”	this	point	still	holds	for	Tarr’s	post-Soviet	films.	The	emphasis	on	“problems,”	or	what	might	also	be	called	direct	political	issues,	on	which	other	film’s	might	rely	is	avoided	here	in	favor	of	something	else,	something	that	disrupts	the	planning	of	a	new	(or	old)	society;	a	waiting	that	resists	the	reduction	of	these	images	to	paths	forward	and	instead	exhibits	what	Rancière	continually	refers	to	as	“reality.”	Rancière’s	term	for	what	Kracauer	might	call	waiting	is	“the	time	after.”	To	Rancière,	“The	time	after	is	not	the	morose,	uniform	time	of	those	who	no	longer	believe	in	anything.	It	is	the	time	of	pure,	material	events,	against	which	belief	will	be	measured	for	as	long	as	life	will	sustain	it.”53	This	vague	category	resembles	in	many	ways	Kracauer’s	notion	of	waiting,	but	it	elaborates	on	it	by	turning	to	materiality,	to	a	connection	between	the	spaces	of	the	film	and	the	characters	who	occupy	them.	Rancière	titles	his	chapter	on	Damnation	(1988)—Tarr’s	film	previous	to	Sátántangó	and	which	shares	many	of	its	characteristics,	except	of	course	its	length—“The	Empire	of	Rain,”	and	in	so	doing	highlights	the	connection	between	the	characters	and	the	world	that	they	inhabit,	and	furthermore	the	way	that	Tarr’s	takes	disrupt	narrative	action	and	instead	ask	the	audience	to	think	about	puddles	and	concrete	in	the	same	way	that	they	do	about	the	actors	repetitious	movements.	Rancière	goes	so	far	as	to	use	this	materiality	and	repetition	to	launch	a	kind	of	ontology	of	cinema.	As	Rancière	explains,	“cinema’s	proper	task	is	that	of	constructing	the	movement	according	to	which	these	affects	are	produced	and	circulated,	the	movement	by	which	they	are	modulated	according	to	the	two	fundamental	sensible	regimes,	repetition	and	the	leap	into	the	
																																																								52	Ibid.,	8.	53	Ibid.,	9.	
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unknown.”54	Given	this	ontology,	Tarr	serves	for	Rancière	as	von	Stroheim	did	for	Bazin,	his	cinema	affording	exactly	this	process	of	repetition	that	is	punctuated	by	a	sudden	leap.		 For	Rancière,	the	repetition	and	the	possibility	of	the	leap	generates	what	he	calls	a	“gap”	between	the	actions	that	the	narrative	contains	and	the	spaces	of	this	world.	According	to	Rancière,	“It	is	in	this	gap	that	cinema	constructs	its	intensities	and	makes	them	into	a	testimony	or	a	tale	about	the	state	of	the	world	that	escapes	from	the	dismal	record	of	the	equivalence	of	all	things	and	the	vanity	of	all	action.”55	What	is	allowed	to	emerge	through	this	gap	is	a	moment	where	tale	and	testimony	collide,	where	the	problems	of	politicking	fall	away	and	the	potential	for	change	opens	up.	When	meanings	melt	and	reform,	and	ultimately	reassemble	within	and	with	time,	material	spaces—the	mud	puddles,	the	decayed	buildings—allow	for	new	connections	to	arise,	but	never	to	fully	take	form.		 What	Tarr’s	cinema	allows,	finally,	via	Rancière,	Kracauer,	and	Bazin,	is	a	way	to	contemplate	what	Jacques	Derrida	calls	the	democracy	to	come.	In	discussing	the	idea	of	an	impending	but	unfigured	revolution	that	is	rising	on	the	horizon	but	not	having	yet	arrived	in	any	particular	form,	Derrida	writes,	As	paradoxical	as	it	seems,	it	is	in	this	unleashed	overflowing,	at	the	moment	when	all	the	joints	give	way	between	form	and	content,	that	the	latter	[the	coming	revolution]	will	be	properly	its	“own”	and	properly	revolutionary.	By	all	logic,	one	ought	to	recognize	it	by	nothing	other	than	the	excess	of	this	untimely	dis-identification,	therefore	by	nothing	that	is.	By	nothing	that	is	
presently	identifiable.	As	soon	as	one	identifies	a	revolution,	it	begins	to	imitate,	
it	enters	into	a	death	agony.56																																																										54	Ibid.,	49.	55	Ibid.,	49.	56	Jacques	Derrida,	Specters	of	Marx,	trans.	Peggy	Kamuf	(New	York:	Routledge,	1994),	144	(italics	added)	
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For	Derrida,	the	possibility	for	radical	change	must	always	arise	from	nowhere	and	it	immediately	dies	once	it	is	recognized.	This	is	also	the	structure	of	the	democracy	to	come.	To	quote	again	from	Derrida:	The	idea,	if	that	is	still	what	it	is,	of	democracy	to	come,	this	‘idea’	as	event	of	pledged	injunction	that	orders	one	to	summon	the	very	thing	that	will	never	present	itself	in	the	form	of	full	presence,	is	the	opening	of	this	gap	between	an	infinite	promise…	and	the	determined,	necessary,	but	also	necessarily	inadequate	forms	of	what	has	to	be	measured	against	this	promise.57			 Derrida	too	locates	a	gap,	but	now	it	is	between	the	infinite	promise	of	a	forthcoming	democracy	and	the	delimited	now	against	which	this	future	is	weighed.	Once	this	future	has	arrived,	once	the	revolution	is	measured	or	the	democracy	has	come,	the	future	must	escape	and	spread	out	again,	not	as	utopia	but	as	infinite	set	of	unfigured	potentials.	Derrida	continues:	“The	affectivity	or	actuality	of	the	democratic	promise,	like	that	of	the	communist	promise,	will	always	keep	within	it,	and	it	must	do	so,	the	absolutely	undetermined	messianic	hope	at	its	heart,	this	eschatological	relation	to	the	to-come	of	an	event	and	of	a	singularity,	of	an	alterity	that	cannot	be	anticipated.”58		 The	trouble,	of	course,	with	the	messianism	that	unites	Kracauer,	Derrida	and,	for	me,	Tarr	is	its	dedication	to	externality	and	its	subsequent	faith	in	the	arrival	of	forces	that	will	come	to	correct	the	suffering	and	chaos	that	Tarr	so	eloquently	proposes.	This	messianism	figures	Tarr’s	film	as	hopeful;	its	grey,	mud	soaked	streets	glow	with	the	availability	of	change.	But	it	also	undermines	the	capacity	for	human	action,	as	it	becomes	an	external	presence	that	looms	just	out	of	reach	that	promises	the	refiguration	that	these	grey	spaces	demand.	If	Rossellini	wished	for	new	modes	of	political	action,	Tarr’s	cinema	distrusts	any	and	all	responses;	it	undermines	the	collectivized	as	well	as	individualized																																																									57	Ibid.,	81.	58	Ibid.	
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responses	to	human	misery	and	demands	something	so	different	that	it	finds	itself	incapable	of	depicting	even	a	viable	goal	for	what	is	to	come.		 Herein	lies	the	tension	at	the	heart	of	Tarr’s	film.	The	promise	of	political	change	persists,	but	it	is	accompanied	by	a	total	failure	to	render	that	change.	In	fact,	this	failure	is	necessary	for	the	potential	to	persist,	as	it	is	only	in	failure	where	messianism	can	find	its	full	force.	The	messianic	wish	at	the	heart	of	Tarr’s	cinema	requires	misery	and	a	refusal	of	positive	outcomes,	as	it	is	in	these	conditions	where	hope	can	fully	emerge.	The	goal	is	to	deny	figuration	so	as	to	maximize	the	role	of	the	constitutive	outside	from	which	possibility	can	finally	arrive.	This	presents	an	impossible	bind,	one	even	more	restrictive	than	that	of	Rossellini	for	whom	collectivity	sill	loomed	as	a	positive	prospect.	The	final	shots	of	Sátántangó	are	of	particular	importance	in	this	regard.	The	doctor,	having	arrived	home,	finally,	after	being	awoken	by	and	subsequently	checking	on	the	church	bells	that	he	had	thought	dormant,	shuffles	through	the	papers	on	his	desk,	all	the	while	muttering	about	how	he	has	misrecognized	the	sound	of	the	ringing	bells.	The	rain	batters	his	windows	as	he,	increasingly	agitated,	digs	through	his	belongings.	The	camera	is	placed	at	the	rear	of	his	small	room,	a	window	in	the	other	end	creates	a	strong	silhouette	making	his	actions	difficult	to	immediately	decipher.	
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It	quickly	becomes	clear,	however,	that	the	doctor	is	removing	the	objects	from	in	front	of	the	window	and	placing	them	in	a	box,	which	he	then	places	off	to	the	side.		 The	doctor	then	walks	to	the	right	of	the	frame	and	opens	a	door.	The	door,	located	in	the	foreground,	totally	obscures	the	frame	and	blocks	nearly	all	light	from	the	window,	leaving	only	an	obscured	image	of	the	doctor’s	hand	now	very	close	to	the	camera.	The	doctor	proceeds	to	partially	close	the	door,	removing	much	of	the	obstruction	and	revealing	half	the	frame,	which	is	sporadically	occupied	by	the	doctor’s	silhouette.	The	doctor,	inexplicably	frustrated,	throws	things	from	the	closet	through	the	frame,	stopping	only	to	place	large	boards—perhaps	cupboard	drawers—neatly	against	the	chair	that	occupies	much	of	the	revealed	frame.		 Finally,	satisfied	with	the	amount	of	wood	slats	he	has	collected,	the	doctor	moves	the	shelf	pieces	to	the	side	of	the	chair	and	begins	to	clear	the	furniture	from	in	front	of	the	window.	Gradually,	it	finally	becomes	clear	what	the	doctor	has	been	preparing.	He	places	the	first	shelf	board	over	the	lower	quarter	of	the	window	and	nails	it	to	the	wall.	
	Next	the	second	and,	as	the	light	from	this	single	source	begins	to	be	extinguished,	the	third—meticulously	nailing	each	board	as	he	proceeds.	
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	Upon	placing	the	fourth	board	the	darkness	overtakes	the	frame	entirety,	leaving	only	the	sound	of	the	doctor’s	hammer.	But,	as	this	hammering	proceeds	a	faint	light	directly	in	the	center	of	the	frame	persists,	the	product	of	a	slight	gap	in	the	boards.	The	covering	and	reopening	of	this	slight	opening	tracks	the	doctor’s	movement.	The	sound	of	the	rain	persists	over	this	nearly	totally	black	image	until,	finally	and	without	explanation,	the	tiny	sliver	of	light	is	covered,	perhaps	the	film	has	faded	to	black	or	perhaps	he	has	finished	the	task	of	boarding	the	window	shut.	The	difference	here	is	imperceptible.	A	heavy	exhalation	is	heard.	Exhausted,	the	doctor	presents	his	monologue	about	the	rains	in	October,	a	monologue	similar	but	not	identical	to	one	presented	at	the	start	of	the	film—what	followed	the	cows	and	that	provided	what	little	explanation	there	was	of	this	rain-beaten	town.	Then,	finally,	the	credits	appear	over	the	blackness,	with	no	system	to	distinguish	their	space	from	the	blackness	of	the	now	totally	dark	interior	of	the	house.	Through	the	figure	of	the	doctor	this	film	extends	to	its	limit	an	attempt	to	keep	the	discussion	at	hand	in	the	present	tense,	never	producing	a	conclusion	to	the	events	depicted	and	the	allegories	they	reach	toward.	For	Pier	Paolo	Pasolini,	the	long	take	signified	cinema’s	capacity	to	reproduce	an	open	and	endless	present—an	incomplete	continuous	mode	that	can	only	be	synthesized	after	its	completion.	According	to	Pasolini,	“The	substance	of	cinema	is...	an	endless	long	take,	as	is	reality	to	our	senses	for	as	long	as	
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we	are	able	to	see	and	feel	(a	long	take	that	ends	with	the	end	of	our	lives);	and	this	long	take	is	nothing	but	the	reproduction	of	the	language	of	reality,	in	other	words	it	is	the	reproduction	of	the	present.”59	This	open-ended	present,	for	Pasolini,	is	totally	flexible	and	available	for	change,	and	it	is	only	on	the	occasion	of	its	ending—in	cinema	through	the	cut,	in	life	through	death—that	this	openness	can	be	systematized	and	subsequently	offered	up	for	meaning.	For	Pasolini,	these	openings	are	valuable,	but	they	also	hinder	expression.	As	he	proposes,	“As	long	as	he	has	a	future,	that	is,	something	unknown,	a	man	does	not	express	himself.”60	This	is	to	say	that	one’s	life	cannot	be	summarized	and	used	to	produce	decipherable	qualities	until	it	has	ceased,	and	for	Pasolini	this	is	likewise	the	case	for	cinema.	But	in	cinema	this	finality	is—perhaps—less	devastating:	it	arrives	at	the	moment	of	every	cut,	at	the	always	temporary	severing	from	the	current	tense	and	the	institution	of	a	new	stretch	of	time.		 In	light	of	Pasolini’s	claims,	when	the	doctor	shuts	out	his	lights	and	makes	room	for	the	credits,	the	cut	is	avoided	or	at	least	masked.	Obviously,	the	film	eventually	ends,	but	this	gesture	serves	as	an	attempt	to	perpetuate	what	Pasolini	refers	to	as	the	substance	of	cinema,	its	ability	to	proceed	without	returning	to	reflect	on	the	moments	it	has	produced	until	everything	has	come	to	a	conclusion.		 Mary	Ann	Doane	approaches	this	same	relationship	between	take	and	cut,	but	she	poses	this	dynamic	as	an	“invitation”	to	change.	For	Doane,	“The	long	take	is	a	gaze	at	an	autonomous,	unfolding	scene	whose	duration	is	a	function	of	the	duration	and	potential	waywardness	of	events	themselves.	Its	length	situates	it	as	an	invitation	that	is	abruptly	
																																																								59	Pier	Paolo	Pasolini,	“Observations	on	the	Long	Take,”	October	13	(1980):	5.	60	Ibid.	
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cancelled	by	the	cut.”61	For	Doane,	what	happens	during	a	long	take	is	a	clearing	of	space	for	possibility	to	arrive,	for	change	to	accept	the	invitation	and	to	attend.	But	this	dynamic	also	creates	a	kind	of	paradox,	a	situation	in	which	change	is	encouraged,	but	also	where	it	becomes	impossible	to	tell	if	it	has	arrived,	indeed	one	can	never	say	when	the	invitation	has	been	accepted	and	the	cut	can	be	enacted	in	order	to	make	change	legible.		 For	Doane,	then,	there	is	an	“intolerable	instability”	at	the	heart	of	cinema’s	relationship	with	time	and	the	present.62	To	Doane,	“The	image	is	the	imprint	of	a	moment	whose	particularity	becomes	indeterminable	precisely	because	the	image	does	not	speak	its	own	relation	to	time.”63	In	the	case	of	Tarr’s	conclusion,	it	is	the	unwillingness	to	cut,	to	stop	and	produce	something,	which	accounts	for	and	enacts	this	“intolerable	instability.”	But	this	resistance	to	speaking	for	itself	also	serves	as	the	mechanism	for	its	rejection	of	authority.	To	stop,	cut,	and	subsequently	speak	its	own	system	and	its	own	set	of	directives	would	amount	to	an	authoritative	gesture,	and	furthermore	one	that	would	dismiss	the	radical	opening	to	change	that	this	refusal	of	figuration	presents.	It	is	this	termination	that	this	film	resists.		 For	Doane,	this	opening	to	changeability	is	most	clearly	evidenced	in	early	cinema,	but	the	objects	that	she	lionizes	also	produce	systems	for	rendering	coherent	this	inchoate	relationship	to	time.	Her	objects	form	a	kind	of	dialectic	between	pure	openness	and	its	ordering,	a	conflictual	relationship	that	she	names	“cinematic	time.”	To	Doane,	The	unreadability	and	uncertainty	concerning	the	image’s	relation	to	temporality	and	to	its	origin	are	not	problems	that	are	resolved—they	are,	in	face,	insoluble.	But	they	are	displaced	through	the	elaborate	development	of																																																									61	Mary	Ann	Doane,	The	Emeregence	of	Cinematic	Time:	Modernity,	Contingency,	the	Archive.	(Cambridge	&	London:	Harvard	University	Press,	2002),	224.	62	Ibid.,	162.	63	Ibid.,	162-163	
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structures	that	produce	the	image	of	a	coherent	and	unified	‘real	time’	that	is	much	more	‘real’	than	‘real	time’	itself.	The	resulting	cinema	delicately	negotiates	the	contradiction	between	recording	and	signification.64		In	the	cinema	that	Doane	highlights	there	is	a	vacillation	between	rational	and	irrational	modes,	between	openness	to	contingency	and	the	production	of	structure.	As	the	history	of	cinema	progressed,	for	Doane,	it	was	this	contingency	that	was	forced	out	by	the	increasingly	structured	and	manageable	systems	of	cinematic	representation.	Tarr’s	cinema—and	in	particular	this	ending—attempts	to	negate	this	history	and	to	indeed	locate	a	cinema	even	more	extreme	than	that	Doane	finds	so	valuable.	This	ending	attempts,	that	is,	to	erase	totally	the	systems	of	evaluation	and	meaning	that	elsewhere	in	the	film	tended	to	emerge.	If,	say,	Irimiás’	actions	produced	something	of	a	cogent	yet	never	quite	fully	locatable	allegory,	a	return	to	an	always	escaping	but	somehow	also	available	meaning,	this	ending	strives	to	eradicate	these	meanings	entirely;	to	produce	nothing	but	the	wait,	and	indeed	to	turn	that	wait	back	onto	its	audience	in	the	form	of	boredom.	It	asks	those	who	watch	to	become	those	who	wait,	to	occupy	this	now	totally	inchoate	space	that	has	finally	severed	the	boundary	between	audience	and	image,	placing	both	in	the	darkness,	both	inside,	the	window	closed,	the	cut	denied.		Conclusion		 Sátántangó	offers	its	audience	a	democracy	to	come.	It	waits,	and	with	this	waiting	it	keeps	this	messianic	hope	in	its	sight.	The	hope	that	a	future	will	arrive,	but	the	awareness	that	once	it	does	it	will	already	be	compromised.	When,	in	this	final	shot	of	the	film,	the	doctor	slowly	boards	up	his	windows—and	with	them	the	light	that	illuminates	this																																																									64	Ibid.,	163.	
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scene—this	wait	is	perpetually	continued.	Rather	than	summarily	recap	or	finally	provide	a	final	rejoinder,	this	film	ends	with	a	waiting	all	its	own;	the	doctor	waits	with	us,	in	the	dark	and	without	hope	for	any	particular	outcome.65	This	is	how	this	film,	finally,	presents	a	politics.	Waiting	here	has	become	an	imperative,	a	system	for	elongating	the	hope	that	transformation	carries	but	always	immediately	extinguishes.	It	waits	and	so	do	we,	for	what	none	of	us	are	sure,	but	with	the	unfigured	spreading	of	potential	before	us.	Rancière	ends	his	chapter	on	Sátántangó	and	Werckmeister	Harmonies	(2001)	with	two	short	sentences:	“They	do	not	speak	of	hope.	They	are	hope.”66	Waiting	allows	for	the	hope	that	politics	requires,	a	messianic	hope	for	something	to	come,	but	that	always	slips	away	at	the	moment	of	its	ending,	a	hope	that	we	can	wait	for,	but	that	never	quite	arrives.	Its	hiccups	and	disillusionments,	to	return	to	my	beginning,	are	therefore	also	its	promise.		 It	is	this	capacity	for	the	simultaneous	and	contradictory	deployment	of	both	fear	and	hope	that	provides	this	film	with	its	unique	disposition.	But	these	conflictual	processes	also	map	the	film’s	politics,	allowing	it	to	serve	as	a	beacon	for	change	but	also	to	immediately	recede—a	triumph	of	potential,	but	a	failure	of	figuration.	When	the	doctor	summarily	boards	himself	into	his	space	and	sits	quietly	as	the	credits	role	this	position	of	complete	failure	that	creates	complete	hope	is	finally	cemented.		 The	doctor	may	have	lost	his	function	as	figure	of	surveillance,	but	he	has	instead	assumed	the	same	position	as	the	remainder	of	the	characters	in	the	film.	By	sitting	in	darkness	he	has	finally	and	definitively	acquiesced	to	messianism.	He	has	revoked	his	own																																																									65	I	toyed	with	placing	a	comma	in	this	sentence	and,	as	I	found	both	forms	accurate	and	valuable,	I	decided	to	place	another	version	of	this	sentence	here:	“the	doctor	waits	with	us,	in	the	dark	and	without	hope,	for	any	particular	outcome.”	66	Jacques	Rancière,	Bela	Tarr,	The	Time	After,	trans.	Erik	Beranek	(Minneapolis:	Univocal,	2011),	61.	
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capacity	for	vision	and	retreated	into	a	world	of	pure	darkness.	This	position,	and	indeed	that	occupied	by	the	characters	that	put	such	faith	in	Irimiás,	is	the	pure	position	of	hope,	a	hope	unbridled	from	the	actual,	but	a	hope	that	can	only	arrive	in	a	moment	of	absolute	misery.	The	trouble	with	this	kind	of	hope	is	that	its	rejection	of	easily	available	outcomes	in	the	name	of	a	more	radical	alternative	provides	no	system	to	ameliorate	the	misery	that	gave	it	rise	in	the	first	place.	This	is	too	the	problem	of	pure	un-habituated	sight	that	Tarr	lionizes.	Like	the	darkened	house	that	the	doctor	occupies,	aesthetic	formations—ways	of	seeing	or	perhaps	being	seen—are	essential	to	producing	a	unified	and	available	politics,	without	them	hope	may	spring	eternal,	but	not	in	a	way	that	can	directly	produce	the	components	needed	for	coherent	change.		 This	dynamic	is	perhaps	best	exemplified	by	the	infamous	scene	of	Estike	and	her	cat.	After	a	seeming	eternity	of	Estike	torturing	her	cat—rolling	onto	it,	striking	it,	repeating	harmful	names	and	phrases	that	she	has	heard	from	her	family	at	it,	and	finally	shoving	its	head	into	a	bowl	of	milk	laced	with	rat	poison—Estike	carries	the	cat,	rigid	in	death,	to	a	local	ruin.	Upon	arriving,	Estike	too	takes	the	rat	poison	and	lays	down	to	die	with	her	stiffened	pet.	As	the	camera	lingers	the	narrator	presents	Estike’s	interiority,	explaining	that	it	is	at	this	moment	that	she	realizes	the	connection	between	all	the	events	of	the	town,	an	“indescribably	beautiful	meaning”	that	bridges	these	characters.	
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	 Here	death	is	figured	as	the	extreme	form	of	waiting,	the	ultimate	way	to	escape	the	world	and	secure	the	expansion	of	external	messianic	forces.	But	it	is	also	the	moment	of	realization,	the	moment	where	meaning	finally	becomes	available.	Estike	here	goes	too	far,	hers	is	the	position	that	just	surpasses	the	doctor’s	self-imprisonment.	Estike	crosses	the	threshold	of	waiting	and	extinguishes,	finally,	the	capacity	to	react	to	the	meaning	that	only	now	arrives;	the	wait	has	ended	and	meaning	has	arrived	but	not	in	time.	Indeed,	the	waiting	that	this	film	produces	must	never	lose	track	of	time,	of	how	long	the	wait	has	lasted	and	what	it	is	that	is	being	waited	for.	Waiting	here	is	bound	between	two	poles:	the	end	signaled	by	action	and	the	continued	wait	that	crosses	the	threshold	into	death.	Both	of	these	extremes	produce	conclusions,	but	neither	is	capable	of	verifying	with	any	certainty	that	the	wait	has	succeeded.	The	rigidity	of	Estike’s	cat	concretizes	this	example.	Waiting	refuses	seeing	and	movement,	it	pushes	against	death.	But	death,	despite	its	similarity	to	the	wait,	must	never	arrive,	for	once	it	does	it	renders	form	and	rigidity,	as	it	has	with	this	cat’s	corpse.	Rather	than	the	openings	and	availabilities	of	the	wait,	Estike’s	death	concludes	and	closes	the	state	of	possibility.	The	wait	must	remain	on	the	precipice	of	this	extreme;	it	must	resemble	death	but	never	fully	allow	it.		 For	hope	to	burn	its	brightest	it	must	come	as	close	as	possible	to	death	without	ever	quite	finding	it.67	It	must	retain	some	possibility	to	act	but	remain	in	a	state	of	maximal	delay.	The	doctor’s	darkened	room	is	the	place	of	possibility,	but	it	must	still	keep	time.	Waiting	then	becomes	a	kind	of	activity	all	its	own,	it	is	conscious	and	alert	but	never	quite	fully	articulated	
																																																								67	I	will	return	to	the	topic	of	death,	and	its	relationship	to	hope,	in	Chapter	4.	
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Finally,	to	push	forward	upon	this	opening	up	to	hope,	my	next	chapter	proposes	still	more	refusal	and	rejection.	Hong	Sang-soo’s	Woman	on	the	Beach	(2006)	relies	on	the	traditions	of	ambiguity	but	in	such	a	way	as	to	level	a	critique	at	democracy,	and	in	so	doing	jettisons	the	major	bulwark	against	authoritarianism,	with	truly	devastating	results.	For	Tarr’s	cinema	a	hope	remains	that	something	will	arrive	to	reunite	the	world,	but	for	Hong	that	hope	is	dead.
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CHAPTER	3		 	The	End	of	Authority,	the	End	of	Democracy		
Sátántangó	displayed	a	distrust	for	communism	while	simultaneously	rejecting	its	capitalist	alternative.	In	so	doing,	it	produces	a	profound	ambiguity	as	to	what	economic	system	might	alleviate	the	misery	the	film	so	clearly	brought	into	view.	Hong	Sang-soo’s	
Woman	on	the	Beach	furthers	this	distrust.	Hong’s	film	adds	to	the	list	of	rejected	arrangements	democracy	itself,	and	it	accomplishes	this	task	by	drawing	and	evaluating	the	kind	of	individual	that	the	unique	pairing	of	democracy	and	capitalism	can	produce.	But	this	film	levels	its	critique	not	with	measured	distance,	but	from	within	the	boundaries	of	its	own	rejection.	That	is,	Woman	on	the	Beach	delineates	the	kind	of	subject	best	suited	for	success	under	a	neoliberal	capitalist	democracy	and	then	proceeds	to	critique	this	figure,	but	it	also	refuses	to	remove	itself	from	the	scope	of	its	criticism.	The	film’s	consistent	equating	of	the	main	character	with	the	writer/director	and	its	opening	to	an	autobiographical	reading	generate	what	can	only	be	described	as	ambivalence—a	kind	of	cold	unsureness	regarding	its	own	subjects	that	derives	from	a	distrust	of	the	filmmaker’s	own	authorial	perspective.	This	is	complicated	by	the	fact	that	ambivalence	is	perhaps	also	one	of	the	qualities	that	this	film	seems	to	reject,	creating	a	deadly	circuit	of	rejection	and	return	that	rhymes	with	the	characters’	own	actions.	Repetition	here	is	key,	as	Hong	himself	seems	to	return	to	the	same	set	of	circumstances	in	many	of	his	films.	Attempting	to	perform	the	difficult	task	of	diagnosing	himself	and	his	moment	from	within,	Woman	on	the	Beach,	like	the	other	films	discussed	thus	far,	never	quite	arrives	at	a	coherent	conclusion,	remaining	instead	content	to	repeat	its	actions	in	a	kind	of	endless	loop	of	self-critique	and	self-recrimination.	These	repetitions	
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are	another	characteristic	of	a	post-authoritarian	cinema.	South	Korea’s	authoritarian	past	haunts	this	film,	and	a	response	to	these	conditions	disallows	this	film	from	ever	positing	a	coherent	political	alternative.	All	the	while,	however,	this	film	helps	to	illuminate	the	ways	that	democracy	and	capitalism	work	together	to	reward	individuals	that	understand	that	the	openings	in	meaning	that	the	conditions	of	democracy	under	capitalism	can	produce	provide	opportunities	to	escape	punishment	for	brutal	and	totally	self-interested	actions.	This	dynamic	crystalizes	the	circumstances	of	this	turn	to	ambivalence,	for	it	is	exactly	the	lack	of	alternatives	that	leads	again	and	again	to	the	reoccurrence	of	and	reflection	upon	the	same	set	of	actions—a	set	of	actions	that,	as	I	shall	explore	shortly,	result	in	dissatisfaction	but	produce	no	coherent	available	alternative.1	In	what	follows,	I	first	describe	responses	to	the	film	and	the	literature	that	surrounds	it,	particularly	as	it	pertains	to	the	film’s	political	appeals	(or	lack	thereof).		I	then	move	into	a	discussion	of	the	historical	context	of	Hong’s	film,	focusing	on	its	relationship	to	the	more	overtly	political	films	of	the	1980s	and	early	1990s,	commonly	referred	to	as	the	“South	Korean	New	Wave.”	Following	this,	I	provide	a	formal	analysis	of	
Woman	on	the	Beach,	examining	in	detail	its	reflective	qualities	and	its	relationship	to	language	and	language’s	failings.	I	then	move	into	a	discussion	of	how	Woman	on	the	Beach	critiques	democracy,	ultimately	exploring	how	the	unique	combination	of	democracy	and	neoliberal	capitalism	combine	to	constitute	a	particular—and	particularly	destructive—subject.	I	next	turn	to	the	specific	circumstances	of	South	Korean	capitalism	in	order	to	explore	the	relationship	between	contemporary	economics	and	Hong’s	palpable	ambivalence	to	it.	Finally,	I	conclude	by	exploring	how	Hong’s	film	is	positioned	to	critique																																																									1	Excepting	of	course	the	return	to	authoritarianism,	the	possibility	of	which	will	be	discussed	closely	shortly.	
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neoliberalism	broadly,	and	the	role	of	ambivalence	in	leveling	this	critique.	This	discussion	emphasizes	how,	in	the	South	Korean	context,	this	example	post-authoritarian	art	cinema	rejects	democracy,	in	addition	to	authoritarianism.		Viewpoints	
Woman	on	the	Beach,	Hong	Sang-Soo’s	seventh	film,	was	released	in	2006,	the	year	after	the	economic	peak	of	what	has	been	dubbed	the	Hallyu,	or	Korean	Cultural	New	Wave.2	This	year	marked	a	significant	downturn	in	what	had	been	unprecedented	export	earnings	for	Korean	cinema	and	is,	in	retrospect,	commonly	qualified	as	the	first	step	in	a	dramatic	decrease	in	the	economic	health	of	South	Korean	film	exports	that	has	only	recently	been	reversed.3	Hong’s	cinema,	though,	lies	to	a	degree	outside	the	economic	peaks	and	valleys	of	South	Korean	mainstream	cinema.	Along	with	Lee	Chang-Dong’s	films,	Hong’s	films	map	what	Kyung	Hyun	Kim	calls	a	postpolitical	moment	in	South	Korean	cultural	production.	This	is	evidenced	by	a	move	towards	interiority	and	the	crisis	of	meaning	constituted	by	the	“withering	of	political	agency”	after	a	period	of	intense	political	engagement.4	This	reading	is	corroborated	by	a	number	of	critics	and	theorists	who	contend	that	Hong’s	cinema	is	concerned	primarily	with	interiority	rather	than	politics,	as	exemplified	by	critic/blogger	Acquarello	who	offers	that,	“Hong	exposes	the	subtly	
																																																								2	The	“Hallyu”	should	not	be	confused	with	the	realist	and	politically	minded	strictly	film-based	New	Wave	of	the	late	1980s.	3	Kyung	Hyun	Kim,	Virtual	Hallyu:	Korean	Cinema	of	the	Golden	Era	(Durham	&	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2012),	11.	4	Ibid.,	125.	
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imperceptible	(but	revealing)	acts	of	despair	that	momentarily	betray	the	human	soul	in	crisis”—noting	how	it	is	questions	of	existence,	not	politics,	that	define	Hong’s	cinema.5	Kim	posits	that	pleasure—rather	than	the	overt	political	concerns	that	occupied	the	directors	of	the	late	1980s	and	1990s—is	what	concerns	Hong	and	some	of	his	contemporaries	and	that	breakdowns	in	communication	are	what	primarily	occupy	Hong’s	films.	He	argues	that	Hong’s	brand	of	cinema	“strips	away	the	thin	veneer	of	reason	and	decency	that	covers	every	social	network	and	shows,	through	his	indignant,	socially	inept	characters,	that	miscommunication	is	not	the	exception	but	the	norm	in	everyday	interactions	between	people.”6	According	to	Kim,	this	stripping	away	of	reason	and	decency	offers	up	the	arbitrariness	of	language	and	in	so	doing	disrupts	nationalist	discourses.	Likewise	for	David	Scott	Diffrient,	“The	slipperiness	of	selfhood	and	the	ontological	trickiness	of	naming”	are	“pivotal”	for	Hong’s	cinema.7	The	breaking	apart	of	meaning	and	language	that	has	come	to	define	Hong’s	work,	is,	for	these	critique,	not	overtly	political,	but	it	nevertheless	serves	as	a	motif	that,	according	to	film	theorist	Akira	Lippit,	is	political	in	that	that	it	arrives	“at	the	other	end	of	politics.”8	But,	while	Lippit	too	utilizes	Kim’s	categorization	of	Hong	as	post-political	to	draw	his	point,	his	argument	takes	a	distinct	turn	when	it	claims	that	Hong’s	cinema	forms	“lines	of	inquiry,	communication,	defense	and	escape.”9	These	lines—lines	of	similarity	from	film	to	film,	lines	that	take	the	form	of	questions	posed	between	characters,	lines	of	vision,	and																																																									5	Acquarello,	“Where	are	the	Snows	of	Yesteryear?:	Hong	Sang-soo	Searches	for	Lost	Time	in	Woman	is	the	Future	of	Man,”	Senses	of	Cinema,	October	18th	2004.	http://sensesofcinema.com/2004/feature-articles/woman_future_man/.	6	Kyung	Hyun	Kim,	Virtual	Hallyu:	Korean	Cinema	of	the	Golden	Era	(Durham	&	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2012),	125-126.	7	David	Scott	Diffrient,	“South	Korean	Film	Genres	and	Art-House	Anti-Poetics:	Erasure	and	Negation	in	The	Power	of	Kangwon	Province,”	Cineaction	60,	(2003):	62.	8	Akira	Mizuta	Lippit,	“Hong	Sangsoo’s	Lines	of	Inquiry,	Communication,	Defense,	and	Escape,”	Film	Quarterly	57,	no.	4	(2004):	22.	9	Ibid.,	23.	
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literal	lines	that	appear	in	the	film—produce,	for	Lippit,	all	kinds	of	connections	but,	as	Lippit	is	careful	to	note,	“The	lines	never	seem	to	connect	the	point	of	origin	with	its	intended	destination.”10	For	Lippit,	this	excess	of	lines	creates	chaos	and	pushes	Hong’s	films	always	to	the	precipice	of	violence:	“The	questions	that	traverse	Hong’s	films	indicate	a	breakdown	of	the	lines	(through	a	proliferation	of	lines)	that	separate	order	from	disorder;	a	collapse	that	leaves	Hong’s	world	rife	with	nervous	disorders,	failed	personal	relations,	and	an	anxious	democracy.”11	For	Lippit,	these	lines	of	communication	that	so	often	take	the	form	of	questions	are	also	simultaneously	lines	of	escape,	systems	that	serve	to	evade	blame,	guilt	and	or	punishment	by	turning	things	around	or	reconstituting	the	situation.12	But	these	escapes	always	return	to	haunt	the	characters,	for	these	lines,	“Never	reach	their	destination;	they	disappear	somewhere	in	route,	only	to	reappear	again	elsewhere.”13	Rather	than	simple	explorations	of	those	who	successfully	depart	and	deceive,	Hong’s	cinema,	for	Lippit,	“is	not	one	of	limits	and	ends,	but	of	repetitions,	returns,	and	resumed	lines.”14	These	lines,	for	Lippit,	serve	to	connect	and	separate	the	characters,	always	pushing	outward	with	the	possibility	of	unity	but	also,	from	the	other	side,	separating	them	from	each	other.15	Lippit,	writing	in	2004,	explores	Hong’s	first	four	films,	but	the	trends	that	he	locates	continue,	and,	in	my	view,	find	their	crystalized	form	in	Hong’s	2006	film	Woman	on	
the	Beach.	In	a	scene	that	I	discuss,	the	lines	of	discussion	here	find	their	most	literal	form	in	a	drawing	by	the	main	character	that	serves	as	both	its	own	line	of	escape	and,																																																									10	Ibid.,	24.	11	Ibid.	12	Ibid.,	25.	13	Ibid.	14	Ibid.,	26.	15	Ibid.,	27.	
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simultaneously,	an	attempt	at	an	emancipatory	ideal.	The	line	that	is	drawn	both	serves	to	connect	and	to	deceive	and	hence	is	the	ultimate	example	of	Lippit’s	proposed	trope.	Where	my	argument	departs	form	Lippit,	however,	is	in	the	degree	to	which	politics	plays	a	role	in	constituting	the	grounds	of	our	understanding	of	Hong’s	cinema.	Lippit	is	evasive	when	it	comes	to	Hong’s	political	position,	but	he	does	bookend	his	discussion	by	saying	at	the	start	that	Hong’s	cinema	occurs	“at	the	end	of	and	after	politics.	After	the	end	of	politics,	at	the	end	of	the	political	lines	that	traverse	and	constitute	Korean	history,	at	the	other	end	of	politics.”16	And,	at	the	end,	“the	‘postpolitical’	nature	of	Hong’s	cinema	and	Hong’s	era	comes	not	so	much	with	the	end	of	politics	but	with	the	unending	nature	of	his	politics,	with	the	endless	politics	that	continue	to	come	after	the	end	of	politics.”17	Lippit’s	understanding	of	Hong’s	cinema	seems	to	figure	politics	as	a	kind	of	structured	absence,	indirectly	represented	but	immediately	significant	through	its	neglect.	But	this	postpolitical-and-therefore-arriving-at-politics	mode	is	troubled	by	the	haunting	and	insightful	claim	quoted	previously	in	which	Lippit	describes	Hong’s	cinema	as	producing	an	“anxious	democracy.”	Through	this	depiction	of	a	troubled	and	troubling	view	of	democracy,	the	film	arrives	at	politics	not	through	absence	but	directly,	and	indeed	with	vitriol.	It	is	through	a	critique	of	democracy	that	this	film	creates	a	space	for	rethinking	politics,	but	it	does	so	in	such	a	way	that	refuses	a	reinscription	of	the	authoritarian	logics	that	it	wishes	to	leave	behind.	To	make	this	point,	it	is	important	to	place	Hong’s	film	historically	in	a	particular	transitional	moment.		 	History																																																									16	Ibid.,	22.	17	Ibid.,	29.	
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In	1987,	after	over	25	years	of	military	rule,	a	wave	of	long-suppressed	democratic	enthusiasm	swept	through	South	Korea,	leading	to	the	first	direct	presidential	election	in	years	and	ultimately—after	the	presidency	of	military	figure	Roh	Tae-woo—to	a	civilian	government	beginning	in	1993.18	Pacing	this	politically	spirited	moment	was	an	equally	politically	minded	film	movement:	the	Korean	New	Wave.	Afforded	a	space	to	operate	within	the	South	Korean	filmmaking	landscape	thanks	to	changes	in	the	national	censorship	restrictions	and	the	funding	allowance	to	independent	producers	in	1988,	this	set	of	politically-minded	films	arrived	with	the	new	democracy	and	were	primarily	produced	by	figures	steeped	in	the	activism	of	the	1980s.19	Darcy	Paquet	describes	the	unifying	principle	of	this	film	movement	as	“a	commitment	to	using	the	medium	of	film	to	push	for	social	change”	and	further	argues	that	“the	turbulent	political	events	of	the	late	1980s	called	out	for	a	cinema	that	engaged	with	the	defining	issues	of	the	day,	and	shed	new	light	on	Korea’s	troubled	past.”20	This	New	Wave	movement	is	responsible	to	a	large	degree	for	building	and	otherwise	expanding	a	cine-culture	in	South	Korea,	which	eventually	led	to	the	boom	of	the	2000s;	but	as	a	politically-minded	and	in	many	ways	oppositional	cinema,	it	started	to	decay	in	the	mid	1990s.21		 As	Michael	Robinson	has	argued,	what	concerned	the	films	of	the	New	Wave	was	the	weight	of	history	and	politics	in	the	democratizing	moment.	Robinson	writes,	“For	forty	years	cultural	life	and	production	had	been	weighed	down	by	the	heavy	responsibilities	of																																																									18	Darcy	Paquet,	New	Korean	Cinema:	Breaking	the	Waves	(London	&	New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2009),	20.	19	Ibid.,	21.	20	Ibid.	21	For	much	more	on	the	politically	minded	cinema	of	the	1980s	and	its	unsteady	partnership	with	mainstream	politics,	see	chapter	1	of:	Young-a	Park,	Unexpected	Alliances:	
Independent	Filmmakers,	the	State,	and	the	Film	Industry	in	Postauthoritarian	South	Korea	(Stanford:	Stanford	University	Press,	2014).	
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national	cultural	preservations,	resistance	to	authoritarian	politics,	and	the	ambivalent	discourse	centered	on	the	debate	about	a	true	Korean	culture	and	the	assault	of	Western	popular	mass	culture.”22	Robinson	goes	so	far	as	to	say	that	in	this	politicized	moment,	by	virtue	of	the	ubiquity	of	political	pressures,	“There	was	little	room	not	to	be	political.”23	Hong’s	cinema,	of	course,	lies	far	outside	this	clearly	historically	bounded	period	and	is	instead	found	in	a	moment	when	the	economic	crisis	had	been	beaten	back—albeit	at	the	cost	of	increased	labor	demands	and	decreased	access	to	full-time	employment—and	South	Korea’s	status	as	economic	and	cultural	power	had	been	established.	For	Robinson,	in	the	contemporary	moment	that	Hong	occupies,	the	need	to	adhere	to	political	“master	narratives”	had	lessened	and	a	new	kind	of	cultural	production	emerged.	As	Robinson	points	out,	“Something	has	clearly	changed	within	the	cultural	industry	in	South	Korea.	The	failing	grip	of	the	old	master	narratives	has	loosed	new	energies	and	made	new	synergies	possible.”24	For	Robinson,	this	lightness	and	newly	allowed	freedom	grants	the	films	of	the	2000s	the	ability	to	“laugh	both	with	and	at	themselves,”	and	to	struggle	with	the	past	in	new	and	dynamic	ways.25		 But	the	directors	who	contributed	to	the	boom	of	the	early	2000s	also	had	a	complicated	relationship	to	contemporary	politics.	As	Park	Young-a	explores	through	the	example	of	the	Korean	Independent	Filmmakers	Association,	the	simultaneous	transition	to	democracy	and	the	turn	to	an	emphasis	on	cultural	production	led	to	a	series	of	unstable	alliance	between	filmmakers	of	the	“democracy	generation”—those	whose	politics	were																																																									22	Michael	Robinson,	“Contemporary	Culture	Production	in	South	Korea:	Vanishing	Meta-Narratives	of	Nation,”	in	New	Korean	Cinema,	ed.	Julian	Stringer	and	Chi-yun	Shin	(Edinburgh:	Edinburgh	University	Press,	2007),	24.	23	Ibid.	24	Ibid.,	28.	25	Ibid.,	29.	
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forged	during	the	anti-authoritarian	movement	of	the	1980s—and	the	seemingly	contrary	forces	of	a	government	committed	to	transitioning	South	Korea	to	a	global	economic	presence.26	For	Park,	much	of	the	success	of	the	South	Korean	cinema	of	the	2000s	came	about	as	a	direct	result	of	attempts	by	the	governments	of	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s	to	mobilize	the	democratic	generation	and	direct	them	towards	the	reconfiguration	of	the	South	Korean	economy.27	Referring	to	these	newly	minted	alliances	between	the	independent	film	world	and	the	government,	Park	posits	that	“This	emergent	cultural	field	reflects	a	foundational	shift	in	South	Korean	society,	especially	in	its	cultural	production,	in	that	the	rigid	boundaries	that	separated	the	state	and	political	activism,	corporate	conglomerates	and	independent	artists,	filmic	spaces	of	resistance	and	spaces	of	upwardly	mobile,	middle-class	consumption,	and	local	and	global	cultural	realms	have	increasingly	blurred.”28		 It	is	this	turn	that	accounts	in	part	for	the	apparent	lack	of	politics	in	Hong’s	cinema.	As	these	previously	perceptible	boundaries	blur,	so	too	blurs	the	clean	path	towards	political	critique,	making	oppositional	spaces	difficult	to	discern.	As	a	member	of	this	democratic	generation,	Hong’s	films	began	to	appear	just	at	the	moment	of	this	absorption	of	the	radical	into	the	mainstream,	and	his	critique	accounts	for	and	is	in	turn	accounted	for	by	this	transition.	Without	a	clearly	defined	inside	and	outside—a	stable	authority	and	those	excluded	by	its	mandates—Hong’s	cinema	finds	itself	unable	to	separate	from	the	sphere	of	its	own	critique	and	as	a	result	turns	to	ambiguity	as	the	only	available	avenue	for	avoiding	the	total	implication	of	its	own	creators.																																																									26	Young-a	Park,	Unexpected	Alliances:	Independent	Filmmakers,	The	State,	And	the	Film	
Industry	in	Postauthoritarian	South	Korea	(Stanford:	Stanfrod	University	Press,	2014),	3-4.	27	Ibid.,	13.	28	Ibid.,	14.	
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	 Hye	Seung	Chung	and	David	Scott	Diffrient	in	fact	place	Hong	and	his	close	compatriot	Lee	Chang-dong	as	latecomers	to	the	Korean	New	Wave.29	But	they	then	deviate	from	positioning	Hong	as	a	political	filmmaker,	instead	reproducing	the	argument	that	Hong	is	“apolitical”	because	he	is	dedicated	to	the	“social”	and	only	arrives	at	politics	obliquely.30	Chung	and	Diffrient	focus	on	narrative,	in	particular	what	they	label	the	“cubist”	process	of	Hong’s	cinema.	The	sputtering	starts	and	stops,	the	repetitions,	and	the	capacity	to	switch	from	the	point	of	view	of	one	character	to	another,	according	to	Chung	and	Diffrient,	“Disables	the	fundamental	impulse	of	narrative.”31	Politics,	for	Chung	and	Diffrient,	is	arrived	at	through	the	aporias	made	in	this	negative	narrative	trajectory.	As	they	put	it:	“Because	his	films	exude	a	textual	instability	based	on	narrative	repetition,	and	disjunction,	they	force	us	to	recognize	the	contradictions	and	nonconsenus	of	a	society	intent	on	denying	its	internal	disintegration.	In	doing	so,	all	three	films	show	Seoul,	its	surrounding	environs,	and	its	inhabitants	to	be	scattered	remnants	of	their	former	selves.”32	Chung	and	Diffrient	are	speaking	here	of	Hong’s	first	three	films,	The	Day	a	Pig	
Fell	into	the	Well	(1996),	The	Power	of	Kangwon	Province	(1998),	and	Virgin	Stripped	Bare	
by	Her	Bachelors	(2000).	But	Woman	on	the	Beach	too	shares	much	of	this	narrative	paralysis.	Where	my	analysis	departs	from	Chung	and	Diffrient’s	is	in	the	premise	that	what	is	revealed	in	these	sputterings	is	urban	inhabitants	who	are	“shattered	remnants	of	their	former	selves.”	Indeed,	central	to	my	argument	is	the	idea	that	a	return	to	some	great																																																									29	Hye	Seung	Chung	and	David	Scott	Diffrient,	“Forgetting	to	Remember,	Remembering	to	Forget:	The	Politics	of	Memory	and	Modernity	in	the	Fractured	Films	of	Lee	Chang-dong	and	Hong	Sang-soo,”	in	Seoul	Searching:	Culture	and	Identity	in	Contemporary	Korean	
Cinema,	ed.	Frances	Gateward	(Albany:	State	University	of	New	York	Press,	2007),	116.	30	Ibid.,	129.	31	Ibid.,	132.	32	Ibid.,	133.	
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and	powerful	past	is	haunted	by	the	legacy	of	authoritarianism—a	difference	that	reinforces	the	film’s	pessimism	and	the	radicalness	of	its	demand	for	change.33		 For	Chung	and	Diffrient,	Hong’s	cinema	serves	as	“an	attempt	to	rescue	‘meaning’	from	a	modern	milieu	by	way	of	repetition	and	variation,”	and	these	authors	proceed	to	use	this	goal	to	link	Hong’s	cinema	to	folkloric	narratives—in	particularly	Korea’s	Pansori	tradition.34	What	this	reading	neglects,	however,	is	the	possibility	that	revealing	meaning	in	all	its	contingency	is	just	as	valuable	as	rescuing	it,	and	it	is	the	possibility	of	both	reclaiming	and	destabilizing	meaning	in	a	single	gesture	that	makes	Hong’s	cinema	unique,	political,	and	always	so	obstinately	ambivalent.	Moon	Jae-cheol	takes	a	more	pessimistic	stance	in	relation	to	the	newness	of	contemporary	South	Korean	cinema.	For	Moon,	“Today…	social	contradictions	are	no	longer	treated	as	the	subject	of	film,	and	a	director’s	historical	consciousness	or	recognition	of	current	social	situations	is	no	longer	an	important	virtue.”35	Of	this	new	attitude,	Moon	writing	in	2006,	contends,	“The	self-identifying	consciousness	of	history	or	reality	is	weaker	for	today’s	directors	than	for	New	Wave	directors.	Even	the	directors	called	auteurs	show	a	different	consciousness	from	that	of	the	New	Wave	directors	whose	desire	for	newness	originated	from	criticism	of	premodernity,	ahistory,	and	commercialism.”36	To	Moon,	what	compels	these	new	filmmakers,	of	which	Hong	is	explicitly	included,	is	the																																																									33	This	distrust	of	authoritarianism	is	particularly	true	for	figures	like	Hong	Sang-soo,	people	whose	political	ideas	were	forged	in	the	fight	for	democracy	in	the	1980s.	Authoritarianism,	of	course,	for	others	continues	to	haunt	South	Korea	in	a	different	way,	and	has	returned	with	force	of	late	thanks	to	the	election	of	Park	Geun-hye,	Park	Chung-hee’s	daughter,	as	the	president	of	South	Korea.		34	Ibid.,	133-4.	35	Moon	Jae-cheol,	“The	Meaning	of	Newness	in	Korean	Cinema:	Korean	New	Wave	and	After,”	Korea	Journal	46,	no.	1	(2006):	40.	36	Ibid.,	40-41.	
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search	for	newness—particularly	as	it	pertains	to	technology—in	the	hopes	of	engaging	their	(in	large	part	international)	audiences.		 Whether,	then,	a	new	lightness	that	allows	new	freedoms,	as	Robinson	argues,	or	a	thirst	for	technological	novelty	that	effaces	politics,	as	Moon	implies,	it	is	clear	that	what	distinguishes	the	South	Korean	cinema	of	the	2000s	from	its	1980s	and	early	1990s	antecedents	is	a	distance	that	was	previously	unavailable.	But	counter	to	some	claims	as	to	the	apolitical	nature	of	2000s	cinema,	Woman	on	the	Beach	and	the	films	of	Hong	Sang-soo	more	broadly	engage	in	politics	directly,	in	a	way	that	might	be	more	aptly	described	as	working	in	line	with	the	New	Wave.	What	is	different	is	that	the	political	circumstances	to	which	Hong	wishes	to	respond	are	themselves	more	slippery	and	evasive	than	were	those	of	the	New	Wave	directors.	His	cinema,	I	propose,	engages	directly	with	its	political	moment	in	a	way	that	critiques	democracy,	arguing,	in	effect,	that	democratic	principles,	when	coupled	with	modern	capitalist	conditions,	give	rise	to	a	particular	subject	that	is	unsustainable	and,	ultimately,	deleterious.	What	complicates	this	critique,	however,	is	the	historical	position	of	Hong’s	films;	that	is,	he	levels	this	critique	of	democracy	knowing	full	well	the	dangers	and	damages	of	authoritarianism,	and	with	the	deliberate	goal	of	avoiding	the	reinscription	of	these	authoritarian	logics.	An	immediate	difference	between	Hong’s	film	and	the	others	previously	discussed	in	this	study	is	the	distance	between	the	film	and	the	events	that	position	it.	Both	
Sátántangó	and	Germany	Year	Zero	were	made	within	a	few	years	of	their	respective	revolutionary	moments	and	directly	inhabit	the	transitional	moments	that	spread	out	from	the	significant	events	that	they	refract.	Woman	on	the	Beach,	however,	arrives	anywhere	from	fourteen	to	eighteen	years	after	the	end	of	authoritarianism	in	South	Korean—
		
	 121	
depending	on	where	one	locates	this	ending—well	after	even	a	generous	accounting	for	a	transitional	period.		 This	film	is	in	fact	far	enough	removed	from	the	initial	turn	to	democracy	that	it	comes	after	a	series	of	financial	downturns	and	during	a	moment	of	relative	prosperity—especially	for	the	South	Korean	film	industry.	This	distance	is	actually	one	of	the	primary	factors	governing	this	film,	for	it	is	this	distance	that	allows	Woman	on	the	Beach	to	expand	its	critique	to	include	the	democracy	that	has	replaced	South	Korea’s	authoritarian	past.	If	
Sátántangó	and	Germany	Year	Zero	still	hold	tight	to	the	possibility	that	democracy	might	alleviate	their	concerns,	Woman	on	the	Beach	turns	its	ire	on	democracy	itself.	It	is	this	distance	between	event	and	critique	that	allows	this	film	to	widen	its	claims	and	to,	finally,	pull	democracy	into	its	list	of	failures.	It	is	because	of	this	distance,	then,	that	this	film	finds	the	space	to	delimit	and	complicate	the	assumption	that	democracy	will	arrive	and	obviate	the	need	for	further	inspection.	As	I	will	show,	Woman	on	the	Beach,	without	returning	to	authoritarianism,	figures	democracy	as	a	potentially	pernicious	system	whereby	authority	is	reconfigured	to	serve	the	individualistic	capitalist	subject,	who	is	intent	on	asserting	its	position	as	progenitor	of	meaning	but	with	no	particular	project	in	mind,	beyond	cultivating	a	new	and	novel	authority.	This	chapter	examines	Hong’s	film	through	a	series	of	ideas	drawn	from	thinkers	from	Western	Europe	and	the	United	States,	but	I	think	it	is	important	to	pause	one	last	time	to	address	the	specific	relationship	to	authoritarianism	that	makes	the	South	Korean	context	unique	and	allows	this	film	to	make	such	a	novel	claim	as	to	the	limitations	of	democracy	as	well	as	authoritarianism.	As	Kim	notes	and	as	I’ve	discussed,	South	Korea	in	the	1980s	was	torn	between	two	poles:	“It	was	a	period	of	political	inquietude	when	
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millions	of	people	marched	in	the	streets	protesting	the	military	rule	and	the	complicit	role	of	the	United	States	in	sustaining	dictatorships	in	South	Korea.	It	was	also	complicated	by	the	fact	that	economic	prosperity	enabled	millions	to	found	their	middle-class	identities	in	the	boulevards,	shopping	malls,	and	high-rise	apartment	buildings	that	mushroomed	throughout	Seoul.”37	In	South	Korea,	authoritarianism	and	the	comforts	associated	with	a	rapidly	improving	economy	are	uniquely	linked,	a	pairing	that	persists	and	manifests	itself	in	films	that	express	nostalgia	for	authoritarianism.38		 Unlike	the	cases	of	Italy	or	Hungary,	South	Korea’s	relationship	to	centralized	authority	is	tinted	by	the	possibility	of	authoritarianism	being	suited	for	economic	success.	This	linkage	is	tied	closely	to	some	of	the	economic	decisions	made	by	Chung	Doo-hwan,	president	of	South	Korea	during	the	1980s	and	Park	Chung-hee’s	successor	as	leader	of	South	Korea.	As	Kim	notes	of	the	differences	between	these	figures,	“Chun	differed	from	his	predecessor,	Park,	at	least	on	one	account	by	recognizing	the	importance	of	leisure	and	consumer	spending	as	the	crucial	engine	of	capitalism	and	the	comfort	pill	for	the	masses	to	temporarily	forget	the	dispossession	of	their	voting	rights.”39	It	is	this	difficult	set	of	conditions	that	led,	at	least	in	part,	to	the	specific	ambiguities	that	concern	Hong’s	film.	Given	this	relationship	between	authority	and	prosperity,	the	paths	for	critique	are	complicated.	Whereas,	in	the	case	of	Béla	Tarr,	the	relationship	to	authority	is	linked	to	economic	failure	and,	in	the	case	of	Rossellini,	to	national	shame,	the	South	Korean	example	of	authoritarianism	is	linked	to	rapid	and	striking	economic	improvements.	
																																																								37	Kyung	Hyun	Kim,	The	Remasculinization	of	Korean	Cinema	(Durham	&	London:	Duke	University	Press,	2004),	18.	38	Again,	the	election	of	Park	Geun-hye	comes	to	mind.	39	Kyung	Hyun	Kim,	The	Remasculinization	of	Korean	Cinema,	19.	
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	 The	angry	young	men	that	Kim	finds	to	be	prevalent	in	1990s	South	Korean	cinema	arise	from	these	conditions.	Having	achieved	their	democratic	goal	but	experiencing	economic	recession	in	the	1990s,	the	figures	that	Kim	highlights	lash	out	in	response	to	a	perceived	state	of	powerlessness.	For	Kim,	“Youth	violence—sometimes	explicit	and	disturbing—was	surely	redemptive	and	cathartic	like	those	pictured	in	other	emergent	national	cinemas	of	the	West	and	Japan	during	the	post-World	War	II	era,	and	the	compulsion	towards	inwardness	and	self-destruction	tendered	and	imagined	a	pure	form	of	male	subjectivity.”40	Kim	counts	Hong’s	characters	amongst	these	self-destructive	males	and	notes	that	the	director	went	to	college	and	his	politics	were	largely	formed	in	the	conditions	of	the	relatively	prosperous	and	authoritarian	1980s.41	Hong’s	turn	to	ambiguity	and	his	extreme	ambivalence	as	to	the	actions	and	abuses	of	his	characters	must	be	seen	in	light	of	this	political	trajectory,	a	path	that	greatly	separates	this	film	from	the	others	discussed	thus	far.	Authority	here	is	suspect	but	so	are	its	alternatives,	as	it	is	authority	that	in	the	case	of	South	Korean	politics	bought	with	it	prosperity,	and	its	absence	economic	failure.		Woman	on	the	Beach		 Near	the	beginning	of	the	film,	shortly	after	arriving	at	the	off-season	resort	that	contains	the	majority	of	the	film’s	action,	the	film’s	protagonist	Jung-rae	(Kim	Seung-woo),	a	successful	film	director	suffering	from	writer’s	block,	his	colleague	Chang-wook	(Kim	Tae-woo),	and	Mun-suk	(Ko	Hyeon-jeong),	the	woman	Chang-wook	has	invited	to	the	resort	and	later	Jung-rae’s	love	interest,	begin	a	conversation	that	sets	the	tone	for	much	of																																																									40	Ibid.,	20.	41	Ibid.,	131.	
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this	film.	After	inquiring	about	the	price	of	a	room	at	the	resort,	the	trio	discuss	their	lodging	options	as	they	stand	looking	at	the	sea.	
	The	topic	quickly	changes,	however,	as	Jung-rae	takes	the	opportunity	to	“compliment”	his	two	companions	on	their	actions	thus	far.	Having	heard	her	music	in	the	car	ride	to	the	resort,	Jung-rae	explains	that	he	really	likes	Mun-suk’s	musical	style	because	it	sounds	like	she	is	an	ordinary	person,	and	that	he	appreciates	her	music’s	amateur	feel.	He	then	moves	to	Chang-wook	who,	he	declares,	he	admires	because	he	brought	his	girlfriend	with	him	even	though	he	is	married,	which	he	says	indicates	that	Chang-wook	really	trusts	him.	Mun-suk	responds	by	indicating	that	she	is	not	Chang-wook’s	girlfriend,	which	Chang-wook	bristles	at.	Chang-wook,	offended,	argues	with	Mun-suk	as	Jung-rae	laughs,	enjoying	the	spectacle.		 Much	of	the	film	is	built	around	this	kind	of	sniping,	generally	coming	from	Jung-rae.	In	fact,	Jung-rae’s	ability	to	use	his	position	of	power	and	the	admiration	of	those	around	him	to	undermine	and	generally	irritate	his	companions	is	the	primary	way	in	which	he	achieves	the	romantic	results	that	he	seeks.	But	what	is	notable	about	his	tactics	is	the	way	that	they	are	depicted	with	a	distanced	tone	of	ambivalence;	it	is	never	made	clear	whether	Jung-rae	knows	what	he	is	doing.	At	times	it	seems	that	he	is	oblivious,	at	others	he	is	clearly	being	devious,	and	at	other	moments	still	he	seems	to	be	a	genuinely	compelling	
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figure	who	is	simply	speaking	earnestly,	and	as	the	film	proceeds	all	three	of	these	different	readings	become	increasingly	confused.	His	seemingly	accidental	detonation	of	Mun-suk	and	Chang-wook’s	relationship	surely	pleases	him,	but	it	is	never	made	clear	the	degree	to	which	he	can	be	thought	of	as	orchestrating	these	events.		 This	uncertainty	is	heightened	by	moments	where	Jung-rae	seems	to	be	genuinely	charming	and	thoughtful,	much	of	which	revolve	around	his	ideas	as	a	filmmaker.	Immediately	following	this	early	exchange,	for	instance,	Jung-rae	makes	the	first	substantive	description	of	his	idea	for	the	film	that	he	has	come	to	this	resort	to	write.	The	three,	now	standing	on	the	beach,	discuss	Jung-rae’s	film	idea,	which	he	has	titled	About	
Miracles.	As	he	mentions	this	title	the	camera	pushes	inward,	tightly	framing	the	three	characters.	
	After	being	prompted,	Jung-rae	explains	the	film:	A	man	visits	to	a	foreign	beach	and	stays	at	a	hotel,	and	in	his	room	he	plays	Mozart	on	his	CD	player.	Then	he	leaves	his	room	and	hears	the	same	music	on	the	elevator.	He	walks	out	of	the	hotel,	than	takes	a	turn	at	the	corner,	and	on	the	street	is	a	clown.	He’s	doing	his	mime	to	the	exact	same	music.	It’s	an	incredible	coincidence,	but	this	man	doesn’t	think	it’s	a	mere	coincidence.	He	wonders	why	he	heard	the	same	music	three	times,	and	he	concludes	that	if	he	can	find	the	reason	why	this	happened,	he	can	unravel	a	secret	to	the	world,	and	he’s	obsessed	with	that	thought.	So	he	starts	tracking	hints.	For	ten	years.	First,	he	begins	with	info	about	the	clown,	the	women	he	likes,	his	preferences,	everything	down	to	the	speaker’s	brand	in	the	hotel	elevators.		
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After	being	briefly	interrupted,	Jung-rae	concludes:	“In	the	end	he	finds	this	very	thin	string	that	links	everything.	I	think	that	might	be	hard	to	get	across,	people	only	believe	in	things	that	are	very	sound.	But	that	string,	even	if	he	finds	it,	well	it’s	something	like	a	soul.	There	is	nothing	bodily,	it’s	very,	very	light.”	After	a	brief	pause,	Jung-rae	asks	if	it	is	an	interesting	idea,	and	his	small	audience	responds	with	silent	bewilderment.	Finally,	Mun-suk,	smiling,	says	that	she	doesn’t	quite	get	it,	but	that	Jung-rae	“has	a	way	with	words,”	and	that	she	likes	people	who	are	eloquent.		 Moments	like	these	will	be	repeated	throughout	the	film:	Jung-rae	renders	a	puzzling	but	nonetheless	compelling	thesis	or	idea,	finds	that	his	audience	is	confused	but	regardless	impressed,	and	then	uses	this	confusion	to	his	advantage,	here	attempting	(and	as	we	learn	succeeding)	to	entice	Mun-suk	through	a	display	of	his	supposed	genius.	Whether	this	description	was	merely	a	lever	in	an	elaborate	plan	or	a	sincere	explanation	of	his	idea	for	a	film	is	never	verified,	but	this	same	kind	of	performance	by	Jung-rae	is	seen	over	and	over	throughout	the	film.	His	goals	always	remain	ambiguous,	but	as	the	film	progresses	he	begins	to	use	this	same	system	to	escape	punishment	for	his	actions.	Indeed,	he	justifies	whatever	brutal	decisions	he	makes	through	an	explanation	that	is	at	once	compelling	and	unique,	but	that	always	also	allows	him	to	escape	blame	and	critique.	Here,	he	has	escaped	any	recognition	of	his	backhanded	compliments	by	moving	the	discussion	to	his	idea	for	a	film,	and	later	he	repeats	this	pattern	over	again,	albeit	in	increasingly	dire	circumstances.	It	is	in	fact	his	capacity	to	render	these	ideas	that	justifies	the	perception	of	his	artistic	genius,	and	he	uses	this	perception	to	achieve	whatever	selfish	goal	he	has	in	mind	and	to	subsequently	evade	any	repercussions.	His	explanation	that	“People	will	only	believe	things	that	are	sound”	is	largely	his	justification	for	much	of	his	behavior:	if	the	
		
	 127	
world	only	respected	his	genius	and	the	difficulty	of	his	claims,	he	seems	to	say,	it	would	find	his	actions	to	be	justified.		 The	trouble	of	his	stance	and	what	causes	this	tone	of	ambivalence	is	that	the	arguments	that	he	makes,	the	justifications	for	his	actions,	are	always	convincing;	that	he	might	be	right.	Here,	coincidence	has	brought	these	three	together,	and	he	seems	to	be	indicating	that	further	actions	taken	by	them	at	this	beach	are	merely	a	product	of	their	following	these	mysterious	threads	that	lead	them	from	one	place	to	another.	This	is	at	once	a	striking	and	compelling	declaration	and	also	a	validation	for	whatever	actions	he	might	take	next.	Given	the	reflective	status	of	this	film—it	is	about	a	director	on	the	beach	writing	a	film	about	the	beach,	presumably	made	by	a	director	on	a	beach	who	at	one	point	wrote	a	film,	the	one	we	are	seeing,	about	a	beach—it	becomes	even	more	unclear	how	Jung-rae’s	ideas	are	to	be	received.	Whether	compelling	explanations	of	concepts	or	subtle	tactics	to	win	the	interests	of	those	he	addresses,	these	little	asides	are	the	fulcrum	of	this	film	and	imbue	it	with	its	palpable	ambivalence.	It	is	these	asides	and	their	constitutive	uncertainty	that	mark	this	film	as	critique,	as	they	reveal	the	ways	that	the	characters	of	this	film,	and	in	particular	Jung-rae,	are	capable	of	escaping	punishment	by	deploying	an	understanding	of	the	world	that	is	at	once	subtle	and	thoughtful,	but	also	possibly	illusory,	just	a	sleight-of-hand	that	allow	for	escapes	and	further	abuses.	The	conditions	that	allows	for	these	evasions	are	constituted	by	democracy	when	paired	with	capitalism,	a	system	that	rewards	those	who	champion	uncertainty	in	the	name	of	deception,	those	who	claim	genius	but	always	on	unstable	ground.	The	plot	of	Woman	on	the	Beach	is	surely	recognizable	to	those	familiar	with	Hong’s	work.	The	film	is	broken	into	two	parts.	In	the	first,	Jung-rae,	Mun-suk,	and	Chang-wook	go	
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to	the	aforementioned	resort	in	the	town	of	Shinduri.	At	the	resort	Mun-suk	and	Jung-rae	have	an	affair	that	leads	to	Jung-rae,	the	next	day,	acting	aloof	and	backing	away	from	their	now	pending	relationship	by	escaping	back	to	Seoul.	In	the	second	half	of	the	film,	however,	Jung-rae	begins	to	regret	his	actions	in	regards	to	their	relationship	and	returns	to	the	resort	in	the	hopes	of	rekindling	their	romance.	Upon	arriving	and	after	attempting	to	contact	Mun-suk,	Jung-rae	has	a	brief	affair	with	another	woman,	Sun-hee	(Song	Seon-mi)	to	whom	he	is	attracted	because	of	her	perceived	resemblance	to	Mun-suk.	Mun-suk	arrives	at	the	resort	unannounced	and	discovers	the	affair,	but	Jung-rae	firmly	lies	and,	for	the	rest	of	the	film,	refuses	to	admit	to	the	second	relationship—a	stance	which	becomes	increasingly	absurd	as	the	film	progresses.	Finally,	Jung-rae,	having	alienated	both	women	fully,	returns	to	Seoul	with	a	completed	treatment	for	his	screenplay—a	script	presumably	based	on	these	same	romantic	entanglements	and	which	is	perhaps	this	movie	that	we	are	watching.		 What	this	synopsis	neglects,	of	course,	is	the	style	of	the	film.	Consisting	primarily	of	single	take	sequences	of	characters	speaking,	this	film	consistently	undermines	its	melodramatic	thrust	and	instead	allows	its	characters	to	relentlessly	defend	their	actions.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	above	scene	when	Chang-wook	needlessly	becomes	frustrated	with	Mun-suk	for	explaining	that	they	are	not	a	couple.	“Do	we	have	to	have	sex	to	be	boyfriend	and	girlfriend?”	is	his	retort,	providing	further	information	for	Jung-rae’s	now	obvious	plan	to	subvert	their	relationship	and	further	alienating	Mun-suk,	who	responds	by	saying	that	yes,	they	do,	and	then	asking	Jung-rae	for	confirmation.	Shot	in	a	single	long	take	with	an	unmoving	camera,	this	exchange	illuminates	how	this	film	simply	allows	its	characters	to	defend	their	actions	endlessly,	giving	them	enough	rope,	so	to	speak,	to	subvert	each	of	
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their	decisions.	As	a	result,	these	characters	become	increasingly	unsympathetic	and	at	times	outright	intolerable.		 Another	moment	exemplifies	both	Hong’s	style	and	his	relationship	to	ambiguity	and	ambivalence.	Late	in	the	film	Mun-suk	asks	Jung-rae	outright	if	he	has	slept	with	Sun-hee.	Persisting	in	his	lie,	Jung-rae	argues	that	he	interviewed	her	to	get	an	understanding	of	the	character	he	is	writing	based	on	his	relationship	with	Mun-suk,	but	that	nothing	further	happened.	Attempting	to	change	the	subject,	Jung-rae	asks	Mun-suk	if	she	heard	his	earlier	confession	in	which	he	admitted	he	was	deeply	disturbed	by	her	acknowledging	that	she	slept	with	foreign	men	while	abroad.	While	she	had	seemed	to	be	passed	out	drunk	during	the	confession,	she	here	admits	that	she	was	in	fact	conscious.	His	semi-apologetic	final	response	unfolds	via	a	discussion	of	what	he	calls	“images.”	According	to	Jung-rae,	his	obsession	with	purity	and	Mun-suk’s	refusal	to	accept	his	denial	are	merely	“images”	that	were	imprinted	on	them	by	others.	In	explicating	this	idea	of	images	he	draws	a	squiggly	line	on	a	pad	of	paper,	a	drawing	that	Hong	emphasizes	with	one	of	the	few	inserts	of	the	film.	
	Jung-rae	defines	this	squiggly	line	as	the	“real	thing,”	what,	for	him,	is	constantly	changing	and	infinitely	curving.	He	then	adds	three	points	and	connects	them.	Pointing	to	the	new	triangle,	he	argues	that	this	is	the	“image	that	recurs.”	He	then	moves	the	triangle	and,	
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isolating	it	on	its	own,	redraws	the	three	points	to	explain	how	they	comprise	an	image	via	three	distinct	imaginary	objects:	the	foreigners	face,	the	foreigner’s	penis,	and	their	sexual	position	as	suggested	by	his	experience	with	porn.	
	Once	these	three	points	are	set,	he	explains,	they	come	to	correspond	with	the	bad	image	that	he	cannot	escape.	This	bad	image,	the	triangle,	then	comes	to	overpower	the	original	unknowable	event	(the	squiggly	line).	Finally,	adding	some	more	image-dots	to	the	original	squiggle—these	signifying	fond	moments—Jung-rae	draws	a	new	shape,	one	that	might	better	represent	his	experience	with	Mun-suk.	
	However,	this	image,	he	claims,	is	too	unusual	and,	despite	it	being	a	better	representation,	is	too	hard	to	understand.	He	ends	by	saying	that,	despite	the	difficulty	of	this	last	shape,	they	must	try	their	best	to	see	it	rather	than	default	to	the	triangle.	A	cut	back	to	Mun-suk	reveals	that	she	is	impressed	and	that	his	attempts	to	dig	himself	out	of	trouble	have	for	the	time	being	succeeded.	
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	 Referring	to	this	sequence,	critic	J.	Hoberman	notes,	“At	one	point,	the	irate	Joong-rae	[sic]	draws	Moon-sook	[sic]	a	diagram	to	illustrate	his	convoluted	mental	processes.	The	joke	is	that	it's	the	most	baffling	image	in	this	immaculately	constructed	movie.”42	This	is	to	say	that	this	sequence	generates	a	variety	of	problems	that	trouble	its	interpretation.	What	Jung-rae	calls	for,	at	first,	is	a	model	whereby	images	come	to	form	new	shapes	and	subsequently	new	perceptions.	The	problem	with	Jung-rae’s	model	is	that	these	shapes	remain	shapes	and	thus	will	always	fail	to	account	for	the	potentials	of	the	things	they	claim	to	represent.	For	Jung-rae,	there	is	no	way	out	of	this	bind,	only	the	softening	of	some	of	its	jagged	edges	via	the	introduction	of	new	shapes—themselves,	of	course,	full	of	jagged	edges	of	their	own.		 The	other	problem	that	haunts	this	scene	is	the	question	of	its	sincerity.	Jung-rae	has	utilized	this	explanation	as	a	system	for	escaping	Mun-suk’s	questioning.	She	has	here	confronted	him	directly	with	the	question	of	his	sexual	tryst	and	this	explanation	is	to	some	degree	an	attempt—and	ultimately	for	the	time	being	a	successful	one—to	avoid	her	accusations.	To	be	clear,	Jung-rae	has	developed,	or	at	least	outlined,	this	system	as	a	way	to	convince	Mun-suk	that	she	has	been	overcome	by	previous	images,	but	she	is	correct,	and	her	easily	deduced	conclusion	is	actually	on	the	mark—a	fact	of	which	Jung-rae	is,	of	course,	well	aware.	This	model	then	holds	a	double	meaning:	it	is	a	system	to	escape	ready-made	meanings	and	to	confront	the	boundaries	of	the	perceptual	system,	but	it	is	also	a	way	to	avoid	confrontation	and	to	escape	the	implications	of	one’s	actions.	The	question	that	this	scene	suggests	is	this:	how	can	one	determine	whether	Jung-rae	is	sincere	about																																																									42	J.	Hoberman.	“Sea	Change:	Sand,	Surf,	and	Everything	Comes	Undone	in	Hong	Sang-soo’s	Woman	on	the	Beach.”	The	Village	Voice.	Jan.	1st	2008.	http://www.villagevoice.com/2008-01-01/film/sea-change/.	
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his	model	or	if	the	system	for	coming	to	knowledge	that	he	outlines	is	merely	a	ruse?	And,	furthermore,	how	and	why	does	this	distinction	matter?		 The	dynamic	that	Jung-rae	activates	is	best	phrased	as	the	interaction	between	the	power	and	potential	of	a	productive	openness	and	the	avenues	for	retreat	and	deception	that	this	openness	makes	room	for.	In	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix	Guattari	produce	one	of	the	more	effective	lionizations	of	openness	and	its	potentials.	In	discussing	the	topic	of	“the	smooth	and	the	striated,”	Deleuze	and	Guattari	propose	that	the	act	of	bringing	contours	and	form	to	any	indeterminate	or	“smooth”	operation	(an	idea,	image,	memory,	or	piece	of	knowledge)	inevitably	brings	about	a	brutal	process	whereby	certain	ways	of	interacting	with	the	operation	are	excluded.	As	Deleuze	and	Guattari	posit,	this	process	of	“striating,”	or	giving	concrete	form,	Is	an	operation	that	undoubtedly	consists	of	subjugating,	overcoding,	metricizing	smooth	space,	in	neutralizing	it,	but	also	in	giving	it	a	milieu	of	propagation,	extension,	refraction,	renewal,	and	impulse	without	which	it	would	perhaps	die	of	its	own	accord:	like	a	mask	without	which	it	could	neither	breathe	nor	find	a	general	form	of	expression.43		The	content	of	this	claim	is	that	any	particular	arrangement—of	politics,	of	aesthetics,	of	thinking—always	produces	an	outside,	an	exclusion	that,	through	the	repetition	of	this	striating	process,	can	be	corrected	over	and	over,	always	creating	new	exclusions	but	moving,	however	slowly,	towards	inclusion.	It	is	the	procedure	that	they	call	“deterritorialization”	that	governs	this	process,	pushing	on	these	recently	erected	barriers	between	inside	and	out	and	asking	what	can	kinds	of	reconfigurations	are	necessary	and	available.	The	space	between	coherent	modes,	or	what	Deleuze	and	Guattari	call	a	smooth																																																									43	Deleuze,	Gilles,	and	Felix	Guattari.	A	Thousand	Plateaus:	Capitalism	and	Schizophrenia.	Trans.	Brian	Massumi	(Minneapolis	&	London:	University	of	Minnesota	Press,	1987),	486.		
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or	indeterminate	state,	is	the	space	of	pure	potential,	but	this	smooth	state	is	not	actualizable.	While	full	of	promise,	it	has	no	structure	of	its	own	to	make	it	material	or	coherent.	The	smoothness,	then,	must	always	call	forth	a	particular	configuration—a	reterritorialization—that	produces	another	set	of	contours,	a	knowable	arrangement	that	can	be	acted	upon	or	in	relation	to.	The	trouble	with	this	arrangement	is	that	it	must	be	restrictive,	delimited,	and	cogent,	and	it	must	therefore	produce	an	outside,	a	negated	section	that	makes	new	demands	on	the	inside.		 For	Deleuze	and	Guattari	this	back	and	forth	is	a	cruel	process	that	always	leaves	something	out.	But	it	is	also	a	model	for	change	and	creation.	That	is,	through	this	slow	process	something	like	a	gradual	but	substantive	change	is	constantly	underway,	and	throughout	these	developments	new	exclusions	can	constantly	find	their	voice	and	make	demands	on	the	reconstituted	whole.		 Jung-rae’s	doodles	gesture	towards	this	same	model.	His	attention	to	shapes	and	the	need	to	rearrange	them	so	as	to	account	for	difference	and	divergence	adheres	closely	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	ideas.	The	ideal	Jung-rae	procures,	new	shapes	that	are	less	familiar	but	that	better	account	for	his	experience,	matches	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	model	for	change	and	the	way	that	habituated	formations	must	be	pulled	apart	and	reconstituted.	But	Jung-rae’s	actions	too	serve	to	illuminate	the	dark	side	that	underwrites	this	system:	the	possibility	that	this	model	for	openness	and	reconfiguration	also	proposes	an	available	out,	a	mechanism	to	obscure	one’s	true	intentions	and/or	circumvent	processes	and	arrangements	that	might	condemn	or	otherwise	punish,	or	at	least	make	one	be	held	accountable	for,	a	set	of	actions.	
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	 Jung-rae’s	actions	then	enable	two	perspectives	that	point	in	totally	opposite	directions:	They	at	once	serve	as	a	sincere	attempt	to	break	apart	regressive	or	restrictive	modes	of	seeing,	but	also	renounce	nothing	in	particular	and	propose	the	possibility	of	new	understandings	of	the	world	in	order	only	to	provide	avenues	for	escape.	That	is,	Jung-rae	reserves	for	himself	openings	to	back	out	through	and	denies	to	other	the	path	to	pursue	him.	This	is	the	dark	brilliance	of	Jung-rae’s	actions	throughout	the	film.	Jung-rae	critiques	society	but	never	quite	verifies	the	critique	that	he	renders.	Never	gives	specific	structure	to	his	concerns	nor	indicates	how	they	might	be	leveraged	to	bring	about	any	particular	change.	His	critiques	only	serve	to	mystify	his	actions,	and,	given	the	particular	moments	when	he	voices	these	claims,	their	major	function	seems	to	be	misdirection.	His	arguments	serve	the	purpose	of	providing	an	avenue	for	escape,	an	escape	that	winds	a	path	through	the	language	of	inclusion	and	acknowledgement.	Woman	on	the	Beach	occupies	much	of	this	same	position.	This	is	a	film	capable	of	both	acknowledging	Jung-rae’s	accuracy	and	his	capacity	to	propose	substantive	arguments	for	change,	but	it	also	and	ultimately	eviscerates	him	for	using	his	intelligence	in	the	name	of	deception.	Like	Jung-rae	himself,	this	film	does	not	altogether	trust	the	system	for	slow	and	incremental	change	that	it	supplies.	Or	it	trusts	it	and	it	does	not.	It	sees	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	model	for	change	as	available	but	also	lacking—as	a	conditioning	mechanism	that	produces	a	deceptive	subject	as	much	as	a	real	model	for	politics.	It	is	this	tension,	this	thinking	of	this	model	for	change	as	both	productive	and	deceptive,	that	yields	the	ambivalence	that	structures	this	film.		Critiquing	Democracy	
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Woman	on	the	Beach	affords	a	view	of	the	modern,	upper-class	subject	as	constituted	by	the	transformation	from	authoritarianism	to	democracy.	In	order	to	support	this	proposition,	it	is	necessary	to	bring	into	this	discussion	how	democracy,	despite	its	myriad	clear	advantages,	when	coupled	with	capitalism	in	its	modern	mode	serves	to	constitute	a	particular,	and	particularly	troubled,	subject	position.		 In	his	“The	Eros	and	Ambitions	of	Psychological	Man,”	Stephen	Gardner	levels	a	critique	of	democracy	and	the	kinds	of	tensions	it	produces.	For	Gardner,	the	key	to	this	critique	is	his	locating	of	the	“psychological	man,”	a	particular	subject	constituted	by	the	circumstances	of	democracy.	Gardner	argues,	By	removing	or	crippling	the	old	formalities	and	conventions	of	social	life,	democracy	creates	a	culture	in	which	individuals	are	supposedly	free	to	relate	to	each	other	simply	as	such—pure	individuals	or	pure	“natural”	beings,	as	it	were.	This	idea	of	nature	evidently	presupposed	the	total	socialization	of	man,	but	in	a	way	unlike	any	other	society.	Believing	that	they	are	children	of	Eden,	these	“emancipated”	democrats	act	out	the	latest	script	written	for	them	by	popular	culture.44		For	Gardner,	then,	the	separation	of	authority	from	its	hierarchical	structure	and	any	claim	to	a	greater,	outside	knowledge	produces	a	desiring	figure	convinced	of	its	own	genius,	but	one	that	is	no	less	guided	by	the	circumstances	of	its	political	and	economic	position.	This	figure	is	what	Gardner	locates	in	the	psychological	man,	which	he	defines	as	“an	individual	who	is	morally	detached	from	communal	order	and	rendered,	at	least	in	his	own	psyche,	the	free	agent	of	his	desires,	the	demigod	of	his	Eros	and	ambitions.”45	Gardner	defines	this	subject	by	asking	us	to,	“Imagine	a	character	who	is	neither	outside	nor	above	the	social	order	(like	a	mystic	or	a	monk)	yet	not	at	home	within	it,	a	social	yet	a-social																																																									44	Stephen	L.	Gardner,	“The	Eros	and	Ambitions	of	Psychological	Man,”	in	The	Triumph	of	
the	Therapeutic:	Uses	of	Faith	After	Freud,	ed.	Elizabeth	Lasch-Quinn	(Wilmington:	Intercollegiate	Studies	Institute,	2006),	228.	45	Ibid.,	232.	
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individual,	able	neither	to	transcend	society	nor	to	identify	with	it.”46	Gardner’s	psychological	man	maintains	a	distance	form	society,	not	in	the	name	of	some	ascetic	principle,	not	because	of	a	wholesale	dismissal	of	any	particular	quality	of	the	modern	world,	but	because	this	subject	perceives	the	social	as	having	nothing	to	offer.	But	this	subject	is	unable	to	fully	disconnect;	instead,	the	subject	is	stuck	in	a	middle	space,	neither	all	in	nor	out,	bound	by	social	restrictions	but	not	believing	in	them,	trying	to	shirk	authority	but	unable	to	muster	a	coherent	alternative	(or	even	a	critique).	The	grounds	of	Gardner’s	model	for	the	psychological	man	are	based	upon	an	understanding	of	the	capitalist	subject	under	democracy	being	guided	by	the	desire	to	emulate	the	positions	and	actions	of	those	that	they	feel	are	successful.	Indeed,	for	what	Gardner	terms	“democratic	desire”	mimesis	is	key,	but	this	particular	kind	of	desire	is	found	not	in	the	qualities	of	desire	itself	(whatever	these	might	be),	but	“in	the	cultural	exigencies	of	democracy.”47	This	is	to	say	that	the	central	ideals	of	democracy,	when	combined	with	capitalism,	beget	a	kind	of	competitive	desire	as	a	result	of	the	mimetic	process	of	seeing	and	emulating	one’s	fellow	free	beings	in	a	kind	of	endless	loop	of	self-fulfillment	that	refuses	any	external	claims	to	authoritative	boundaries	or	to	any	set	of	goals	that	pertain	to	anything	other	than	one’s	self.	For	Jung-rae,	this	relationship	to	one’s	image	of	other	people	finds	its	logical	extreme	in	the	figure	of	repetition.	Jung-rae’s	rejection	of	Mun-suk	and	his	subsequent	replacement	of	her	with	a	woman	he	finds	reminiscent	of	her	figures	his	desire	as	the	attempt	to	replace	some	perceived	absence	with	the	very	object	that	he	himself	rejected.	Jung-rae’s	seeming	understanding	of	the	“images”	that	force	him	to	repeat	his	own	actions																																																									46	Ibid.	47	Ibid.,	230.	
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reveals	his	status	as	to	some	degree	self-aware	of	his	own	psychological	dynamics.	But	his	initial	and	obvious	locating	of	his	desire	in	his	friends’	romantic	interest	and,	in	the	second	half	of	the	film,	his	perception	of	having	lost	a	potential	wholeness,	locates	his	actions	squarely	in	the	cycle	of	endless	repetition	of	desire	and	rejection.	Jung-rae’s	desire	is	the	desire	of	the	Other,	and	what’s	more	he	knows	it.	What	eludes	him,	as	Gardner	might	say,	is	the	degree	to	which	democracy,	and	the	qualities	that	it	engenders,	are	responsible	for	this	knowledge.		 In	this	moment,	when	he	draws	this	shape	and	escapes,	for	a	time,	his	punishment	he	is	not	merely	presenting	a	viable	alternative	to	seeing	the	world,	he	is	also	(or	perhaps	only)	finding	a	way	to	justify	a	set	of	behaviors.	But	it	is	important	to	note	that	these	behaviors	are	not	what	he	necessarily	condones,	for	there	is	no	coherent	argument	on	his	part	that	serves	to	defend	them.	What	is	most	striking	about	this	moment,	and	this	film	in	general,	is	that	Jung-rae	has	no	particular	interest	in	reconstituting	society	in	a	new	direction,	no	particular	moral	position	or	any	emancipatory	spirit.	He	is	incapable,	it	seems,	of	identifying	with	the	figure,	Mun-suk,	that	he	defies,	but	he	holds	no	particular	belief	system	that	is	any	different	from	that	figure’s.	The	only	thing	that	makes	Jung-rae	unique	amongst	the	characters	in	this	film	is	an	unwavering	confidence	in	the	persistence	of	his	own	genius,	which,	for	him,	justifies	any	decision	he	makes	to	deceive	and	abuse	others.	Whereas	the	malaise	of,	say,	Antonioni’s	protagonists	or	Marcello	in	Fellini’s	La	
Dolce	Vita	seems	motivated	by	an	attempt—however	unsympathetic—to	find	an	understanding	of	their	place	in	the	world,	Jung-rae	seems	engaged	in	no	such	search.	His	is	not	a	quest	for	the	finding	of	meaning,	but	is	instead	an	attempt	to	shirk	the	burden	of	meaning	altogether.	He	holds	no	particular	point	of	view,	but	he	rejects	wholesale	the	
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world	with	which	he	interacts.	His	attempt	to	constitute	something	new—what	is	here	the	expansion	of	shapes	and	the	subsequent	expansion	of	images—connects	him,	perhaps,	with,	to	return	to	Bauman,	“Liquid	Modernity:”	the	ability	to	recede	into	the	fractures	of	meaning	that	poststructuralist	thought	offers	in	an	attempt	to	navigate	one’s	surroundings.	For	Bauman,	“The	present-day	situation	emerged	out	of	the	radical	melting	of	the	fetters	and	manacles	rightly	or	wrongly	suspected	of	limiting	the	individual	freedom	to	choose	and	to	act.	Rigidity	of	order	is	the	artifact	and	sediment	of	the	human	agents’	freedom.”48	The	attempt	to	expand	shapes	is	accounted	for	in	the	case	of	Jung-rae’s	by	a	kind	of	thoughtless	pursuit	of	freedom	for	freedom’s	sake,	an	empty	revolution	that	holds	no	particular	wish	for	change.	Speaking	of	the	absence	of	revolutions	in	the	contemporary	moment,	Bauman	states,	 If	the	time	of	systemic	revolutions	has	passed,	it	is	because	there	are	no	buildings	where	the	control	desks	of	the	system	are	lodged	and	which	could	be	stormed	and	captured	by	the	revolutionaries;	and	also	because	it	is	excruciatingly	difficult,	nay	impossible,	to	imagine	what	the	victors,	once	inside	the	building	(if	they	found	them	first),	could	do	to	turn	the	tables	and	put	paid	to	the	misery	that	prompted	them	to	rebel.49		Jung-rae’s	task	in	presenting	his	model	for	thinking	of	the	world	is	to	do	exactly	what	Bauman	presents	as	pernicious.	He	plans	here	to	remove	the	control	desks	and	hide	the	building	that	constitute	his	treachery,	and	in	so	doing	to	remove	any	system	whereby	Mun-suk	might	level	an	argument.	The	South	Korean	context	strongly	encourages	this	reading.	The	intense	modernization	that	South	Korean	underwent	in	the	1970s	and	1980s	was	overseen	by	violent	authoritarian	rule,	but	unlike	in	the	case	of	the	authoritarian	Italian	or	totalitarian																																																									48	Zygmunt	Bauman,	Liquid	Modernity	(Cambridge:	Polity	Press,	2000),	5.	49	Ibid.,	5.	
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German	governments	of	the	1940s,	the	arrival	of	democracy	in	South	Korea	was	not	punctuated	by	intense	destruction.	As	a	result	authoritarianism	in	South	Korea	avoided	a	connection	with	the	depths	of	depravity	and	guilt	that	are	associated	with	the	revelations	of	the	conclusions	of	World	War	II.	There	is	then	an	available	nostalgia	for	authoritarianism	that	is	unique	to	these	conditions.	The	possibility	that	a	centralized	and	hierarchical	authority	could	alleviate	some	of	the	insecurities	and	destructive	tendencies	that	compel	Jung-rae	contributes	to	the	ambivalence	on	display	here,	but	it	is	tempered	by	the	memories	of	violence	that	accompany	these	hierarchies.	This	is	to	say	that	the	competition,	doubt,	insecurity,	and	self-obsession	of	Jung-rae	offers	the	possibility	for	an	authoritarian	response,	but	this	path	is	in	this	case	blocked	by	the	violence	that	marked	authoritarian	South	Korea.	Without,	then,	either	authoritarianism	or	democracy	offering	any	respite	from	crisis,	what	can	be	done	in	light	of	the	critique	that	Hong	has	offered?	Jung-rae	never	attempts	to	assert	his	own	response	to	the	gaps	in	certainty	that	he	locates	and	takes	advantage	of.	He	just	wants	to	get	away	with	things,	and	he	is	happy	to	use	the	openings	in	meaning	inherent	to	democracy	to	achieve	this	goal.	He	is	the	figure	of	ambivalence	that	only	South	Korea’s	context	can	provide:	he	mistrusts	democracy	as	much	as	authoritarianism.	One	offers	brutal	hierarchies,	the	other	brutal	horizons,	and	neither	is	particularly	strongly	linked	to	wellbeing.	Jung-rae’s	actions	propose	a	critique	of	the	openings	provided	by	certain	avenues	of	critical	theory	as	readily	as	they	lionize	these	same	openings.	That	is,	Jung-rae	recognizes	the	contours—or	perhaps	the	potential	negative	outcomes—of	calls	to	openness	like	those	voiced	by	Deleuze	and	Guattari.	But	he	also	recognizes	that,	in	the	milieu	that	he	occupies,	this	emphasis	on	inclusion	also	provides	a	series	of	outs	that	he	is	happy	to	take	advantage	
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of.	This	film,	given	my	readings,	stand	as	both	a	celebration	of	openness	while	also	acknowledging	the	paths	for	escape	that	this	same	celebration	always—and	in	this	case	quite	literally—draws.	The	question	remains	though:	can	this	film	do	both	of	these	things	at	once?	Can	it	celebrate	and	critique	the	same	set	of	availabilities	simultaneously?		 For	Bauman,	the	history	of	critical	theory	was	predicated	on	the	coherence	of	a	centralized	authority	to	push	against	and	the	modern	crisis	of	critical	though	has	arisen	in	response	to	the	absence	of	this	authority.50	But	this	is	not	the	same	as	saying	that	the	anti-authoritarian	methods	of	old	are	no	longer	valuable.	It	simply	means	that	their	effectiveness—which	itself	was	always	in	question	in	the	first	place—has	diminished.	This	is	exactly	the	problem	that	Woman	on	the	Beach	strives	to	illuminate.	Its	purpose	is	not	the	rejection	of	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	project,	but	instead	a	striving	forth	that	recognizes	its	failures	and	difficulties	when	it	comes	to	contemporary	capitalist	democracy.	And	it	is	the	relationship	to	authority	that	concretizes	this	film’s	line	of	critique.	For	Hong,	authority	would	provide	the	cogent	inside	that	an	outside	could	then	push	again,	but	that	inside	has	disappeared	and	with	it	the	availability	of	leveling	a	call	for	a	new	reconfiguration.	What	is	there	to	reconfigure,	this	film	seems	to	ask,	if	all	the	methods	for	locating	and	constituting	an	authority	have	been	rejected	in	the	name	of	democratic	capitalism?		 Woman	on	the	Beach	illustrates	how	critical	thought,	at	least	in	the	Deleuzian	mode,	is	not	an	unassailable	methodology.	In	fact,	this	film	shows	how	its	methods	can	and	have	been	assimilated	into	neoliberal	capitalism,	and	how	market	logics	have	incorporated	fluidity,	inclusivity	and	openness	into	their	own	systems	of	self-justification.	
																																																								50	Ibid.,	25.	
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The	self-reflection	implied	in	Jung-rae’s	shapes	is	indicative	of	the	transition	to	democracy	that	haunts	this	film.	Jung-rae’s	actions	conflate	reflection	with	defense.	The	borders	that	line	the	self	are	the	focus	of	his	theory	of	the	world,	his	attempts	to	expand	them,	and	to	allow	others	to	expand	theirs,	is	his	goal,	but	his	purpose	remains	veiled	and,	perhaps,	incoherent	by	virtue	of	his	ulterior	motives.	According	to	Gardner,	the	psychological	man	“entered	into	the	twilight	zone	of	modernity,	the	realm	of	ambivalence	and	ambiguities	that	ensue	when	every	fixed	point	of	reference	is	dissolved	into	the	sheer	interplay	of	individuals	in	a	culture	that	can	no	longer	sustain	its	origins.”51	For	Jung-rae	the	fixed	points	that	might	account	for	the	shapes	that	he	draws	are	what	need	to	be	liquefied,	a	point	that	he	explicitly	makes	in	his	drawing	and	redrawing.		 The	capacity	to	create	and	represent	this	explanation	for	ideas	and	memories	and	their	becoming	calcified	is	surely	a	democratic	gesture	and	a	repudiation	of	a	centralized	authority,	as	it	was	for	Deleuze	and	Guattari.	But	the	available	interpretation	of	Jung-rae’s	actions	as	the	justification	for	an	elaborate	lie	with	only	escape	and	further	deception	as	its	ideal	outcome	dissipates	the	clarity	of	his	actions	and	brings	into	view	the	way	that	democracy	can	be	reduced	to	a	tool	to	justify	unethical	behavior.	Democracy,	for	Hong,	cuts	both	ways,	it	is	viable	both	for	liberation	and	for	manipulation	by	destructive	forces,	hence	his	ambivalence.	This	ambivalence	extends	too	to	the	precarious	position	of	the	women	in	this	film.	For	Freudian	theorist	Juliet	Flower	MacCannell,	democracy	has	positioned	its	subject	in	remarkably	new	and	different	ways.	For	MacCannell,	“Our	‘collective’	logic—our	naïve	belief—is	that	we	no	longer	have	a	superego,	that	It	wants	nothing.	If	we	look	more	deeply,																																																									51	Ibid.,	236-7	
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however,	we	find	that,	in	the	wake	of	the	democratic	revolution	in	governance,	what	has	been	done	away	with	is	only	the	recognizable	parental	function	of	the	super	ego,	and	its	best	part.”52	The	It	that	MacCannell	refers	to,	the	superego	or	big	Other	that	constitutes	social	standards	and	judges	our	actions,	has,	for	MacCannell,	not	been	erased	in	modern	democratic	society,	but	has	been	refigured.	Where	the	symbolic	figure	of	the	father	had	traditionally	held	this	position,	he	has	been	supplanted	in	the	modern	world	by	the	figure	of	the	brother.	In	what	MacCannell	calls	post-oedipal	society,	the	traditional	patriarchy	has	been	replaced	with	the	figure	of	the	brother,	a	figure	that	assumes	the	same	position	as	did	the	father	but	now	in	the	name	of	a	democratic	and	equal	world.	This	regime	of	the	brother,	rather	than	actually	diffusing	meaning,	creates	a	range	of	problems.	Speaking	of	this	figure	of	the	brother,	MacCannell	says,		Agent	and	sole	heir	of	patriarchy’s	most	negative	features,	he	creates	as	many	false	leads	and	artificial	ties	as	he	needs	to	cover	his	destruction	of	his	real	familial	roots	and	relations.	And	he	thus	absolves	himself	of	any	obligation	toward	them.	He	does	not	have	to	fill	the	father’s	role	any	more	responsibly	and	positively	than	the	tyrant	had:	he	is	only	acting,	after	all.	It	is	he	who	is	a	pro	forma	father,	without	a	communal	or	global	species-saving	goal,	a	despot,	a	mute	sovereign,	the	(only)	one	who	really	enjoys.53		That	is,	in	modern	democracy	the	superego	has	not	been	deposed	but	remains	the	center	of	orientation	for	the	rules	and	values	in	place.	But	the	form	of	this	superego	has	been	transferred	from	the	figure	of	the	father,	the	violent	but	obsessively	protective	tyrant,	to	that	of	the	brother,	a	figure	that	makes	claims	to	freedom	even	as	it	institutes	brutal	rules.	The	brother,	unlike	the	father,	enacts	controls	in	the	name	of	equality	and	self-governance,	and	has	therefore	shirked	much	of	the	protective	principle	that	constituted	the	father	in	the																																																									52	Juliet	Flower	MacCannell,	The	Regime	of	the	Brother	(London	and	New	York:	Routledge,	1991),	11.	53	Ibid.,	17.	
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first	place.	In	this	new	order,	the	brother	has	supplanted	the	father	as	the	organizing	principle	for	our	social	order	but	this	figure	is	no	less	destructive.	Its	major	difference	is	that	it	is	justified	by	the	rules	and	values	of	democracy	rather	than	those	of	traditional	society;	that	is,	it	asserts	its	position	by	virtue	of	its	relationship	to	freedom	and	self-governance,	not	hierarchical	control.		 The	regime	of	the	brother	is	then	much	more	deceptive	then	that	of	the	father,	as	it	occupies	a	position	that	modern	society	pretends	does	not	exist—self-governance,	after	all,	supposedly	subverts	the	need	for	this	figure.	As	MacCannell	outlines,	women	in	this	new	regime,	those	who	had	the	most	to	gain	in	the	deposing	of	the	patriarchal	order,	actually	find	themselves	in	a	heightened	position	of	precarity.	For	MacCannell,	“The	thought	that	he	[the	brother]	becomes	a	man	only	by	comparison	with	and	difference	from	his	equal	but	different	‘other’	is	never	admitted.	He	suppresses	his	sister’s	specific	desire—for	equal	access	to	identity—making	it	the	basis	for	his	law,	his	rule.	The	brother	seizes	the	sexual	‘symbol’	in	a	power	grab	rooted	in	his	own	inability	to	accept	a	mere	genital	difference	as	the	foundation	of	his	‘identity’—and	of	hers.”54	In	this	way	the	woman	in	the	regime	of	the	brother	must	bear	the	brunt	of	the	brother’s	insecurity,	his	need	to	justify	his	position	of	power	by	something	other	than	simply	his	similarity	to	the	father.	Deep	down,	the	male	in	this	arrangement	knows	that	he	has	no	particular	reason	for	his	central	power,	but	he	most	overcome	this	insecurity	by	virtue	of	his	differences,	of	which	gender	becomes	paramount.	Under	the	logic	of	the	regime	of	the	brother	male	domination	reinstituted	is,	now	with	a	heightened	animosity	for	women	that	results	from	the	knowledge	that	the	power	granted	to	men	is	arbitrary	and	constituted	only	by	their	capacity	to	wield	it.																																																									54	Ibid.,	26.	
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	 MacCannell’s	description	of	the	status	of	the	authority	in	modern	democratic	society	goes	a	long	way	in	explaining	the	otherwise	incoherent	actions	of	Jung-rae	in	his	treatment	of	Mun-suk.	At	once	demanding	her	approval	and,	once	securing	it,	rejecting	her,	Jung-rae	uses	Mun-suk’s	feelings	towards	him	as	the	measure	of	his	self-worth,	and	his	ability	to	reject	them	as	the	means	by	which	he	proves	his	genius	and	therefore	his	central	position	as	master	of	meaning.	Mun-suk,	who	is	at	times	no	less	manipulative	than	Jung-rae,	is	admonished	and	ultimately	rejected	for	acquiescing	to	Jung-rae’s	demands.	She	is	unable,	it	seems,	to	make	the	right	move,	for	any	position	she	takes	will	feed	back	into	Jung-rae’s	game	of	acceptance	and	rejection.	This	film’s	distrust	of	democracy	and	its	depiction	of	the	damages	of	a	society	dedicated	to	the	fiction	of	self-governance	is	helpful,	then,	in	revealing	the	way	that	the	supposedly	self-made	genius	capable	of	organizing	the	world	is	constituted	mainly	by	difference,	and	therefore	necessitates	gendered	exclusion	and	violence	in	order	to	reaffirm	these	positions	of	power.	MacCannell’s	take	on	the	structure	of	power	in	democratic	society	is	valuable	for	again	critiquing	democratic	capitalism,	but	like	this	film	in	general	it	can’t	help	but	produce	ambivalence,	as,	much	like	in	the	case	of	Woman	on	the	Beach,	the	traditional	society	that	this	new	regime	has	arisen	from	is	no	better.	This	ambivalence	refuses	outright	dismissal,	as	democracy	in	even	this	representation	holds	within	it	the	positive	potential	to	be	evaluated	and	hopefully	changed.	The	shapes	that	Jung-rae	previously	outlined	and	their	ability	to	be	rewritten	represent	just	this	kind	of	democratic	potential,	and	Woman	on	the	
Beach	does	not	wish	to	replace	it	outright.	What	confounds	this	position	is	the	question	of	what	is	to	be	done	with	distrust,	with	the	possibility	that	the	malleability	of	ideas	that	democracy	engenders	can	be	abused	and	destroyed,	and	furthermore	that	capitalism	
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encourages	and	rewards	those	who	wish	to	escape	through	democracy’s	gaps.	As	in	the	case	of	Jung-rae’s	explanation	of	memories	and	ideas,	democracy	is	at	once	a	valuable	and	coherent	arrangement	that	takes	into	account	the	capacity	for	humans	to	differ	and	diverge.	But	in	its	horizontality	it	also	produces	the	room	for	deception,	the	opportunity	to	disrupt,	overrun	and	most	importantly	to	take	advantage	of	the	decentralization	of	meaning	and	authority	that	democracy	demands.	Capitalism	furthermore	rewards	these	kinds	of	disingenuous	actions.		The	Market	The	topic	of	the	capacity	for	market	logics	to	undermine	the	Deleuzian	deterritorialization	process	is	perhaps	best	addressed	by	putting	it	in	relation	to	critiques	of	neoliberalism.	Such	critiques	have	grown	in	strength	and	precision	as	the	forces	of	market	capitalism	have	continued	to	ascend	in	recent	years.	As	David	Harvey	puts	it,	“Neoliberalism	is	in	the	first	instance	a	theory	of	political	economic	practices	that	proposes	that	human	well-being	can	best	be	advanced	by	liberating	individual	entrepreneurial	freedoms	and	skills	within	an	institutional	framework	characterized	by	strong	private	property	rights,	free	markets,	and	free	trade.”55	This	simple	definition	illuminates	some	of	the	issues	that	haunt	Jung-rae.	The	capacity	of	individual	entrepreneurs	totally	unfettered	by	regulation	and	free	to	pursue	any	new	system	for	increasing	gain	is	figured,	in	Woman	
on	the	Beach,	in	terms	of	relationships.	But	what	becomes	clear	thanks	to	Jung-rae’s	maneuverings	is	the	degree	to	which	this	logic	of	“free”	entrepreneurship	that	neoliberal	capitalism	demands	can	devastate	human	interactions	when	translated	from	its	original																																																									55David	Harvey,	A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005),	2.	
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context	as	a	market	principle.56	The	ways	in	which	neoliberalism	has	moved	from	the	market	and	into	other	contexts	has	produced	much—but	certainly	not	all—of	its	devastating	effects.	As	Harvey	posits,	neoliberalism	“has	pervasive	effects	on	ways	of	thought	to	the	point	where	it	has	become	incorporated	into	the	common-sense	way	of	many	us	interpret,	live	in,	and	understand	the	world.”57		 The	damages	of	neoliberalism	and	its	failure	to	account	for	those	on	the	wrong	end	of	its	ever	widening	income	divide	are	well	documented.58	The	damages,	however,	unleashed	on	those	who	stand	to	benefit	from	neoliberal	logics	are	less	often	discussed.	As	Harvey	effectively	notes,	Those	thoroughly	incorporated	within	the	inexorable	logic	of	the	markets	and	its	demands	find	that	there	is	little	time	or	space	in	which	to	explore	emancipatory	potentialities	outside	what	is	marketed	as	“creative”	adventure,	leisure	and	spectacle.	Obliged	to	live	as	appendages	of	the	market	and	of	capital	accumulation	rather	than	expressive	beings,	the	realm	of	freedom	shrinks	before	the	awful	logic	and	the	hollow	intensity	of	market	involvements.59		It	is	this	“hollow	intensity”	that	best	describes	Jung-rae’s	actions.	Left	to	pursue	some	vague	“freedoms”	that	yield	only	incoherent	and	irrelevant	gains	in	his	quest	for	proof	of	his	genius,	Jung-rae	attacks	each	human	encounter	as	though	a	potential	financial	victory.		 Through	the	character	of	Jung-rae	Hong	Sang-soo	strives	to	address	neoliberalism	from	the	angle	of	those	who	might	favor	it.	His	film	denounces	neoliberalism’s	failings	not	for	the	damage	that	it	does	to	those	who	might	benefit	from	the	services	it	cuts	and	the																																																									56	Market	restricted	neoliberalism,	I	should	add,	is	an	equally	significant	concern,	if	not	the	topic	of	this	discussion.	57	David	Harvey,	A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005),	3.	58	See,	for	a	particularly	useful	explanation:	Mark	Blyth,	Austerity:	the	History	of	a	
Dangerous	Idea	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013).	59	David	Harvey,	A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005),	185.	
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income	gap	that	it	creates,	but	because	of	the	ravages	it	proposes	too	to	those	who	might	stand	to	benefit	financially	from	its	principles.	Jung-rae’s	actions	are	severely	limited	by	the	corrupt	and	incoherent	“freedoms”	neoliberalism	creates—the	freedom	to	get	ahead	and	conquer	at	all	costs,	the	freedom	to	proceed	without	regard	for	the	ramifications	of	one’s	actions,	the	freedom	to	constitute	one’s	own	authority	and	to	proceed	with	no	regard	for	providing	any	justification	other	than	the	(supposed)	absolute	truths	of	action,	genius	and	individuality.	This	is	so	say	that	this	film	is	at	its	core	suffused	with	the	logics	of	neoliberalism,	but	its	reflective	and	ambivalent	depiction	of	these	events	also	creates	the	distance	needed	to	evaluate	them.	This	film,	then,	is	a	bit	like	Jung-rae’s	own	explanations	of	his	actions,	it	at	once	levels,	by	virtue	of	its	disdain	for	its	own	characters,	a	critique,	but	also	benefits	from	its	claims	to	ambiguity	and	genius.		 But	the	specifics	of	South	Korean	neoliberalism	help	to	account	for	the	particularities	of	Hong’s	critiques.	As	Jesook	Song	notes,	the	neoliberal	practices	of	flexible	labor	have	disturbingly	combined	in	the	South	Korean	context	with	the	claims	and	wishes	of	the	leftist	movements	of	the	1980s.	According	to	Song,	Radical	socialist	movements	that	led	to	the	end	of	the	South	Korean	fascist	capitalist	state	(1960-87)	not	only	promoted	the	emancipation	of	the	suppressed	working	class,	but	paved	the	way	for	the	liberalization	of	the	economy	and	the	emergence	of	individual	rights	discourse.	This	transition	to	liberalization	ushered	in	the	neoliberal	capitalist	logic	of	individual	responsibility	and	flexibility	after	the	Asian	debt	crisis.60		In	South	Korea	the	initial	leftist	conception	of	freedom	of	labor	was	predicated,	as	elsewhere,	on	the	emancipation	of	workers	from	the	brutal	conditions	of	the	workplace,	in	particular	factories,	but	was	quickly	coopted	by	the	market-minded	government	of	post-																																																								60	Jesook	Song,	“Between	Flexible	Life	and	Flexible	Labor:	The	Inadvertent	Convergence	of	Socialism	and	Neoliberalism	in	South	Korea,”	Critique	of	Anthropology	29,	no.	2	(2009):	141.	
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oppositional	South	Korea.	For	Song,	in	the	wake	of	an	oppositional	politics,	a	harmonious	relationship	between	the	state	and	the	citizens	was	presented	as	viable,	and	the	mass	demonstrations	of	the	past	were	presented	as	harmful	to	regular	and	reliable	business	practices.61	Ultimately,	for	Song,	The	flexible	and	self-sufficient	labor	subjectivity	that	South	Korean	leftist	intellectuals	devised	to	counter	the	late-developing	authoritarian	state	and	Fordist	capitalist	production	is	not	effective	in	defying	neoliberal	governmentality	and	post-Fordist	capitalist	production.	Unwittingly,	the	flexible	subjectivity	has	become	subsumed	in	the	new	system	of	capitalist	production	and	the	state	control	of	labor.62		Song’s	discussion	serves	here	not	only	to	lay	out	the	neoliberal	practices	of	flexible	labor	that	seem	to	factor	into	Hong’s	films,	but	also	to	explain	how	these	qualities	are	uniquely	grounded	in	the	change	from	an	oppositional	politics	to	a	post-political	moment,	exactly	the	same	moment	that	ended	the	run	of	the	Korean	New	Wave	directors.	This	film	presents	through	the	character	of	Jung-rae	an	individual	positioned	by	the	South	Korean	neoliberal	transition.	Jung-rae	is	a	figure	whose	labor	and	leisure	time	are	inextricably	linked,	indeed	to	such	a	degree	that	his	leisure	activities	are	not	only	subject	to	marketization	but	have	become	indistinguishable	from	his	labor.	In	fact,	the	justification	of	his	actions	as	contributing	to	his	screenplay	writing	process—the	system	by	which	he	helps	himself	and	others	to	make	money—is	what	allows	him	to	act	so	brutally	towards	the	other	characters	in	the	film.	As	long	as	it	is	in	the	name	of	genius,	Jung-rae’s	maneuverings	seem	to	assert,	any	set	of	actions	is	allowable.		 Hong’s	film	illuminates	the	way	that	flexible	labor	and	the	disintegration	of	a	labor-leisure	divide	encourages	any	set	of	actions	that	might	generate	economic	success.	This	is																																																									61	Ibid.,	143.	62	Ibid.,	152.	
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exactly	the	process	by	which	neoliberalism	begins	to	absorb	aspects	of	life	other	than	just	the	narrowly	defined	category	of	“the	workplace.”	The	question	of	how	to	overcome	this	set	of	pressures,	however,	is	much	more	difficult	to	answer.	If	Hong	implicates	Jung-rae	then	he	also	must	be	implicating	the	South	Korean	film	industry	in	which	the	genius	and	flexibility	of	a	figure	like	Jung-rae	is	so	richly	rewarded.	And	too	within	the	purview	of	this	indictment,	then,	must	of	course	be	Hong	himself,	the	figure	to	whom	Jung-rae	is	so	obviously	related.	How	then	does	one	escape	this	loop	of	increased	monetization,	and	furthermore	how	does	one	render	a	critique	from	the	position	of	being	rewarded	by	this	very	process?	Its	being	so	clearly	imbricated	within	the	system	it	wishes	to	denounce	leaves	this	film	at	an	impossible	juncture.	How,	it	asks,	are	we	to	proceed?		 Take,	for	instance,	the	final	scene	of	the	film.	After	Jung-rae	departs—admitting	to	his	ride	that	he	has	written	his	script	(presumably	based	on	these	events)	during	his	short	stay	at	the	resort—the	film	leaves	him	on	his	drive	back	and	returns	to	Mun-suk,	still	at	the	resort.	She	wakes	up	in	the	room	where	she	has	just	had	her	most	recent,	and	most	destructive,	row	with	Jung-rae	and	walks,	slowly,	to	the	hotel’s	front	porch.	Surprisingly,	she	receives	a	call	from	Jung-rae,	who	coyly	asks	her	again	if	she	is	still	interested	in	him.	She	responds	by	jokingly	asking	if	she	should	find	a	new	man	that	resembles	him	and	then	firmly	explains	that	she	does	not	repeat	mistakes.	They	agree	not	to	meet	and	she	hangs	up.	She	next	sees	Sun-hee,	hands	her	a	wallet	which	she	had	found	under	the	bed	in	Jung-rae’s	room	and	departs,	joyfully.	In	a	mysterious	final	scene,	Mun-suk	drives	away	from	the	resort	across	a	beach.	But,	as	she	finally	leaves	the	location,	her	car	gets	stuck	in	the	sand.	Two	men	arrive	from	off-screen	and	offer	to	help	her	by	pushing	her	car	free	of	the	sand.	
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They	push,	briefly,	and	ultimately	succeed	in	freeing	the	car.	She	thanks	them	and	they	leave,	and	so	does	she,	in	her	car,	smiling;	and	so	ends	the	film.	
		 This	final	sequence	refocuses	the	dramatic	thrust	of	the	narrative.	Whereas	Jung-rae,	in	his	call,	attempts	to	continue	in	his	unceasing	repetition	of	his	self	destructive	and	oddly	competitive	actions,	Mun-suk	clearly	indicates	that	she	will	continue	in	a	new	direction,	as	she	does	not	repeat	mistakes,	or	so	she	claims.	Whereas	Jung-rae	has	reasserted	his	genius	and	succeeded	in	what	he	needed	to	do	in	order	to	continue	in	his	repetitions,	Mun-suk	drives	off	into	an	uncertain	future,	thanks	to	the	help	of	a	pair	of	men	that	seemingly	expect	no	compensation.	I	would	hesitate	to	call	this	ending	hopeful,	as	it	provides	no	particular	solution	to	the	problems	that	the	film	has	unearthed	nor	any	positive	horizon	that	might	alleviate	the	concerns	that	haunt	the	film.	This	point	is	solidified	by	the	fact	that,	after	being	helped	free	of	the	sand,	Mun-suk’s	car	makes	a	subtle	but	clear	180°	turn	and	ends	up	heading	in	the	direction	from	which	she	initially	departed.	This	character’s	perspective,	as	a	result	of	this	turn,	is	left	ambiguous,	as	is	the	perspective	the	audience	is	to	have	in	relation	to	her.	Throughout	the	film	her	outbursts	and	general	pettiness	mirrored	Jung-rae’s,	but	her	ability	to	overcome	these	concerns	is	at	least	left	open,	if	never	in	any	way	verified.	
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It	is	this	reluctance	to	clarify	that	anchors	this	film’s	critique.	Whereas	for	Rossellini	and	Tarr,	ambiguity	served	as	the	opening	necessary	to	produce	a	perhaps	individuated	but	nonetheless	radical	difference,	in	the	case	of	Woman	on	the	Beach,	ambiguity	is	valuable	in	its	capacity	to	undermine	its	own	meanings.	Ambiguity	here	is	paired	with	ambivalence—a	system	through	which	the	authorial	perspective	refuses	to	render	apparent	its	own	understanding	of	what	is	on	display—in	order	to	undermine	authority	altogether.	In	this	way,	this	film	generates	a	unique	perspective	whereby	ideas	are	deployed	but	never	confirmed,	they	kind	of	bounce	freely	but	are	never	arranged	into	a	coherent	whole.		 This	non-confirmation	is	then	key	for	this	film.	If	Woman	on	the	Beach	feels	a	little	freer	to	produce	meaning	then	did,	for	instance	Sátántangó—as	is	evidenced	by	the	former’s	willingness	to	reject	certain	decisions	and	actions—its	rejoinders	are	not	any	more	structured	or	clear	as	a	result.	This	is	because	each	point	it	deploys—the	possible	efficacy	of	authoritarianism	as	well	as	that	of	a	radically	open	democracy—remains	unconfirmed.	However,	thanks	to	this	non-confirmation,	this	film	also	renders	perhaps	the	most	eloquent	critique	of	authority	of	all	the	films	discussed	in	this	dissertation:	a	mystifying	negation	of	its	own	authority,	and	subsequently	authority	at	large.	What	results,	however,	is	a	crushing	ambivalence,	a	total	dedication	to	indecision	figured	as	a	final	and	total	rejection	of	any	of	a	variety	of	political	possibilities.	Through	this	system	this	most	damning	critique	of	authority	also	manifests	as	itself	a	rejection	of	its	own	ideas.	A	gap	opens	here:	how	can	one	say	anything,	do	anything,	without	some	turn	to	authority?	In	a	particularly	revealing	moment	the	crisis	of	authority	that	this	film’s	characters	undergo	is	made	with	striking	clarity.	About	half	way	through	the	film,	after	the	characters	
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have	left	the	resort	and	returned	to	Seoul,	an	intertitle	declares	that	two	days	have	passed.	After	the	intertitle,	Jung-rae	is	shown	climbing	on	some	dunes	near	a	beach	that,	we	learn	shortly,	is	back	at	the	resort	in	Shindori.	He	stops	abruptly	as	he	sees	three	trees,	his	back	to	the	camera	as	he	seemingly	studies	them.	
	After	a	few	seconds	he	kneels	in	front	of	the	trees	three	times	in	what	appears	to	be	a	prayer.	
	After	the	third	bow	the	camera	pushes	in	on	him,	cuts	to	a	shot	of	the	trees,	and	then	back	to	Jung-rae,	now	in	close	profile,	his	head	resting	on	his	hands.	“Please	help	me,”	he	whispers,	as	he	drools	and	clenches	his	face,	indicating	that	he	is	crying.	
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	A	cut	back	to	the	dunes	reveals	Jung-rae,	now	walking	leisurely	and	leaving	a	voicemail	on	Mun-suk’s	phone	as	though	the	sequence	of	his	prayer	before	the	tree	never	happened.		 What	has	happened	here?	This	sequence	stands	out	in	that	it	shows	Jung-rae	in	what	has	to	be	taken	as	deep	introspection	and	regret,	but	once	it	disappears	he	returns	to	his	regular	abuses	in	the	second	half	of	the	film.	This	sequence	is	the	only	one	that	indicates	any	guilt	or	indecision	on	the	part	of	Jung-rae,	but	the	film	refuses	any	return	to	this	kind	of	display	of	emotion.	Jung-rae’s	later	actions	are	in	no	way	disrupted	by	this	brief	interlude.	The	appeal	to	some	religious	order	or	structure	of	authority	is	hinted	at	here,	but	Jung-rae	seemingly	dismisses	this	brief	episode.	Is	religion	an	authority	that	is	capable	of	ordering	these	events	and	providing	Jung-rae	with	a	hierarchy	that	can	help	allow	some	solution	to	the	lack	of	authority	in	his	life?	The	distanced	camera	and	abrupt	cut	away	from	this	sequence	refuses	to	substantiate	this	reading,	and	the	sequence	is	swept	away	as	the	film	moves	back	into	a	close	analysis	of	Jung-rae’s	maneuverings.	This	sequence	is	valuable	in	that	it	seems	to	push	hard	on	the	problems	that	haunt	the	actions	of	its	characters,	but	too	because	it	returns	with	no	answer.	It	proposes	the	possibility	of	solution—something	like	a	traditional	authority—but	refuses	to	articulate	it	fully.	And	how	could	it?	What	amounts	to	a	solution	here	must	also	always	simultaneously	
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register	as	a	failure—as	must	be	the	case	when	authority	is	negated,	for	with	it	departs	the	capacity	to	verify.		 This	pulling	away	from	a	straightforward	critique	is	also	embodied	in	Jung-rae’s	status	as	the	director’s	surrogate.	At	the	end	of	the	film	his	completed	script	is	based,	it	seems,	on	these	very	experiences,	and	it	is	therefore	fair	to	assume	that	his	film	will	look	something	like	Woman	on	the	Beach.	Are	we	to	think,	then,	that	his	will	be	a	film	that	critiques	these	characters,	as	did	Hong’s?	Is	Jung-rae	too	planning	a	Stephen	Gardner-esque	evisceration	of	the	subject	under	democratic	conditions?	And,	conversely,	can	we	then	assume	that	Hong’s	life	bespeaks	some	experience	similar	to	this	new	script?	Does	Hong	himself	evidence	some	of	these	same	qualities?		 This	film	is	historically	situated	in	such	a	position	as	to	require	the	kinds	of	problems	that	this	ending	produces.	Located	in	a	moment	free	from	the	“weight”	of	politics,	and	maintaining	the	distance	it	requires	to	toy	with	the	past,	this	film	presents	its	critique	of	the	modern	democratic	subject,	but	always	with	an	eye	turned	backwards	to	a	moment	when	authoritarianism	was	the	arrangement,	and	with	an	understanding	of	the	damage	that	this	arrangement	can	bring	about.	Hong’s	ending,	coupled	with	the	confusion	as	to	the	viability	of	Jung-rae’s	expansion	of	shapes,	performs	its	critique	of	democracy	in	such	a	way	that	brings	into	question	a	particular	moment	without	implying	the	converse	(in	this	case,	authoritarianism).	What	this	gesture	supplies,	then,	is	an	argument	that	refuses	to	figure	a	viable	alternative,	and	in	so	doing	simultaneously	refuses	its	own	status	as	master	of	meaning,	it	denies	its	own	position	as	authoritarian	figure	capable	of	presenting	something	new.	
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Hong’s	is	an	anti-authoritarian	cinema;	it	refuses	even	its	own	expertise	and	leaves	the	audience	stranded	in	its	ideas	with	no	recourse	to	any	kind	of	closure.	This	film	critiques	democracy,	but	brings	in	to	question	its	own	critique,	and	in	the	process	forces	its	audience	to	struggle	with	these	ideas.	The	demolition	here	finally	pertains	as	much	to	authoritarianism	as	it	does	to	democracy,	for,	while	it	shows	the	terror	at	meaning	that	democracy	might	create,	it	targets	with	equal	accuracy	the	authoritarian	past	it	so	vehemently	wishes	to	reject	and	centers	this	targeting	by	implicating	the	filmmaker	within	its	zone	of	denunciation.	Hence	the	impossible	aporia	with	which	the	film	ends.	Mun-suk’s	driving	away	serves	as	a	cogent,	if	clichéd,	attempt	to	forge	ahead	towards	an	unpaved,	open	horizon—a	path	that,	given	her	smile,	we	are	led	to	believe	she	is	happy	to	be	on.	But	what	can	we	make	of	this	smile?	Particularly	given	the	film’s	ambivalence,	this	smile	as	readily	suggests	irony	as	it	does	hope.	Perhaps	the	future	she	heads	towards	is	no	less	devastating	than	the	past,	or	the	present—she	has,	after	all,	headed	back	the	way	she	came.	Perhaps	Mun-suk’s	hopes	are	naïve,	and	the	film	is	articulating	that	the	kind	of	optimistic	openness	that	she	embraces	will	only	lead	again	to	one	of	the	subject	positions	that	the	film	so	vehemently	rejects.	Woman	on	the	Beach	takes	advantage	of	its	unique	historical	position	and	declares	as	its	project	an	exploration	of	how	ambiguity	and	ambivalence	erode	meaning.	Whether	the	openings	declared	in	this	film’s	conclusion	amount	to	hope	or	failure,	however,	likewise	becomes	undecipherable.	Whether	Mun-suk’s	journey	into	the	horizon	is	rendered	here	as	viable	or	dismissed	as	too	inarticulate	and	uncertain	to	resist	cooptation	by	contemporary	capital	is	offered	up	here	to	ambivalence,	another	meaning	overwhelmed	by	its	shattering	gaze.	
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	 If	Germany	Year	Zero	held	firm	to	the	availability	of	a	positive	but	as	yet	unfigured	future,	and	Sátántangó	disintegrated	the	readily	available	options	for	change	but	held	too	to	hope	as	a	fulcrum	from	which	change	could	arise,	Woman	on	the	Beach	tests	these	assumptions,	particularly	with	respect	to	the	possibility	of	hope.	Hope,	here,	is	brought	into	question	as	the	film	turns	on	itself	and	seems	to	eradicate	the	possibility	for	a	positive	future	altogether.		 To	put	this	another	way:	by	constantly	undermining	its	own	authorial	voice,	this	film	renders	readability	impossible,	but	it	also	overturns	the	Deleuzian	dynamic	whereby	instruction	falls	away	in	favor	of	pure	potential,	and	as	a	result	critiques	the	capacity	for	creation	rather	than	simply	reproducing	attempts	at	creating	openings.	What	remains	after	all	this	turning	is	a	series	of	negations,	a	crashing	of	meanings	that	points	away	from	possibility	and	towards	what	must	be	described	as	a	dialectic.	Every	position	that	is	proposed	in	this	film	is	turned	on	its	end,	each’s	weaknesses	being	exposed.	But	this	is	not	to	say	that	each	proposal	for	a	positive	future	is	rejected	outright—each	is	negated	as	itself	an	entire	trajectory,	but	this	turning	always	leaves	behind	some	residue,	the	salient	markings	remaining	in	a	kind	of	reduction	that	indexes	some	qualities	of	what	has	been	reduced.	This	is	a	process	that,	as	is	discussed	shortly,	is	best	named	thought.	Thanks	to	this	structure,	Hong’s	cinema	offers	up	a	kind	of	methodology—a	posing	and	position	that	generates	argument	but	that	never	totally	adheres	to	a	cogent	project.	What	is	left	of	each	cogent	point—whether	it	is	illuminated	by	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	views	on	creativity,	Gardner’s	on	democracy,	capitalism,	and	authority,	MacCannell’s	on	patriarchy,	Bauman’s	on	liquidity,	or	the	critics	of	neoliberalism’s	take	on	contemporary	capitalism—after	each	
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has	been	turned	and	dismantled	is	the	germ	of	an	idea	that	still	holds	the	spirit	of	each	approach.		 These	negations	and	diminishments	do	not	amount	to	a	coherent	political	agenda,	but	they	do	allow	the	particularities	of	this	case	to	speak	back	to	each	of	the	ideas	under	discussion.	This	is,	perhaps,	an	ineffective	approach	to	political	realities—and	it	is	no	doubt	rather	cynical—but	it	does	digest	a	range	of	availabilities	and	holds	tight	to	the	rejection	of	a	single,	coherent	approach	as	a	way	to	reconstitute	a	democratic	subject.	What	arises	thanks	to	this	constant	turning	is	a	kind	of	detritus	of	ideas,	a	series	of	detonations	that	leaves	behind	the	ruins	of	a	cogent	response.	Whether	these	ruins	amount	to	a	productive	approach	remains	unclear,	but	the	project	of	cobbling	together	something—anything—coherent	from	this	rubble	remains	available.	What	would	happen,	this	film	seems	to	ask,	if	we	were	to	build	upward	from	these	oppositional	and	irreconcilable	groundings?	Could	a	politics	be	built	that	unifies	these	approaches?	These	questions	are	what	this	film	proposes,	but	in	the	spirit	of	anti-authoritarianism	it	refuses	to	produce	a	response.		 Woman	on	the	Beach	the	finds	itself	in	the	same	impossible	position	as	the	other	films	I	discuss	in	this	study.	It	stands	amongst	ruins	but	finds	itself	incapable	of	proceeding.	
Medium	Cool	too	locates	this	juncture,	but	in	the	context	of	a	remarkably	different	series	of	events,	and	furthermore	in	direct	relation	to	the	violence	that	these	aporias	can	produce.	It	is	to	this	final	film	that	I	now	turn.	
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CHAPTER	4		 Force,	Hope,	and	Death		 Haskell	Wexler’s	Medium	Cool	(1969)	is	the	clear	outlier	in	the	group	of	films	I	am	analyzing.	Made	in	1968	and	shot	in	large	part	at	or	around	the	1968	Democratic	National	Convention	in	Chicago	and	its	surrounding	political	demonstrations,	Medium	Cool	was	not	made	in	or	after	authoritarian	rule.	It	is	not	my	intention	here	to	denounce	the	U.S.	as	authoritarian,	nor	to	indicate	that	authoritarianism	can	exist	in	some	kind	of	covert	form.	This	might	very	well	be	the	case,	but	it	is	not	my	focus.	Instead,	I	examine	the	approaches	employed	by	a	filmmaker	who	perceived	the	infiltration	and	reproduction	of	an	authoritarian	presence.	This	topic	is	of	particular	importance	since	it	allows	a	glimpse	of	how	a	film	might	rush	to	a	cause	early	in	its	development,	and	how	in	so	doing	it	might	differ	from,	or	connect	to,	the	other	films	included	in	this	study.	Medium	Cool,	then,	shares	with	my	other	examples	a	preoccupation	with	authority—both	the	ways	that	it	is	reproduced	and	the	ways	that	it	can	be	resisted.	One	of	the	primary	differences	that	separates	this	film	from	the	others	I	have	discussed	is	its	profound	distrust	of	media.	What	Medium	Cool	rejects	is	neither	economic	nor	governmental	authority,	at	least	not	in	the	traditional	sense.	Instead,	it	rejects	the	literal	means	by	which	it	might	render	its	critique:	that	is,	a	critique	in	and	through	the	media.	A	distrust	of	the	media	and	its	perceived	proclivity	for	making	coherent	and	knowable	events	that	might	otherwise	present	something	remarkably	different	from	what	we	expect	is	one	of	the	major	concerns	of	this	film.	The	way	that	this	film	renders	its	critique	of	media	representation	while	also	attempting	to	itself	produce	something	like	an	anti-authoritarian	stance	is	central	to	this	examination.		
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In	this	chapter,	I	begin	by	contextualizing	this	film	historically	and	philosophically.	I	then	explore	the	aesthetic	philosophy	of	force	as	proposed	by	Christoph	Menke,	and	in	so	doing	examine	how	this	film’s	connection	to	force,	its	unique	relationship	to	and	own	understanding	of	a	kind	of	unordered	but	nonetheless	palpable	power,	works	to	render	an	anti-authoritarian	politics.	I	then	turn	to	the	topic	of	death,	discussing	how	death	and	hope	interact	and	how	the	unique	dynamic	between	them	provides	this	film	with	a	system	to	render	an	argument	that	finally	and	fully	rejects	systems	of	authority	that	might	otherwise	command	meaning.	Finally,	I	examine	the	context	of	politics	in	1968,	positioning	Medium	
Cool	within	contemporary	political	movements	and	exploring	the	role	that	art	and	art	films	play	in	regards	to	the	political	conditions	of	massive	youth	based	demonstrations	and	strikes.	Ultimately,	my	goal	here	is	to	explore	how	film	interacts	with	governance,	and	how	authoritarianism	can	be	met,	comprehended,	avoided,	and	perhaps	reaffirmed	through	rejections	of	authority	and	the	ambiguities	that	arise	in	its	absence.	This	chapter	is	largely	concerned	with	distrust:	distrust	of	government	and	distrust	of	the	capacity	of	mediation	to	evaluate	the	failings	of	a	centralized	ruling	force.	Through	its	unique	aesthetic	approach,	Medium	Cool	reveals	a	palpable	suspicion	of	the	events	and	figures	that	it	examines,	but	it	does	so	with	equal	doubt	as	to	its	own	capacity	to	give	form	to	meaning.	This	film,	like	my	other	examples,	pushes	back	against	authority	via	the	path	of	ambiguity,	but	it	does	so	from	another	vantage	point:	that	of	fear	of	a	developing	authoritarian	presence.	How	to	simultaneously	reveal	and	reject	authority,	and	how	to	do	so	through	a	medium	that	the	film	explicitly	rejects,	is	the	question	that	Medium	Cool	provokes.		
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Contexts		Medium	Cool	follows	John	Katselas	(Robert	Forster),	a	news	photographer,	through	his	personal	life,	in	particular	his	exploits	at	upper	crust	parties	and	subsequent	romantic	affairs.	Intertwined	with	these	activities,	though,	is	John’s	increasing	awareness	and	interactions	with	the	social	movements	of	the	late	1960s,	particularly	through	his	role	as	a	news	photographer.	John	remains	more	or	less	indifferent	to	the	issues	and	events	that	he	is	asked	to	record	on	assignment	for	the	news.	But	when	his	reporting	takes	him	to	the	neighborhood	and	eventually	to	the	home	of	Eileen	(Verna	Bloom)	and	her	son	Harold	(Harold	Blankenship),	John	begins	to	take	an	interest	in	the	events	that	he	had	previously	ignored.	Initially	in	pursuit	of	Eileen,	John’s	growing	romantic	interests	eventually	culminate	with	his	gaining	a	much	stronger	connection	with	the	political	demonstrations	of	1968	in	Chicago.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	neither	John	nor	Eileen	become	significantly	involved	in	these	demonstrations;	instead	they	seem	to	mainly	distrust	them	despite	the	role	these	events	increasing	play	in	their	lives.		 1968,	of	course,	contained	a	number	of	worldwide	political	movements,	particularly	the	May	1968	strikes	and	revolts	that	shut	down	France	for	weeks	in	protest	of	the	conservative	politics	of	Charles	de	Gaulle.	The	events	in	France	reverberated	globally,	instigating	and	escalating	social	movements	around	the	world.	Of	these,	the	anti-war	political	movements	of	the	United	States	in	the	1960s	are	paramount.	Sharing	many	of	the	characteristics	of	their	French	equivalents,	the	United	States’	political	movements	were	likewise	largely	associated	with	a	youth	culture	concerned	with	what	appeared	to	be	a	principally	and	increasingly	authoritarian	government	hell-bent	on	deflecting	communism	globally	at	all	costs.	Of	course,	principal	to	the	costs	of	the	United	States	in	the	fight	against	
		
	 161	
communism	were	the	very	young	people	so	opposed	to	this	war,	as	the	universal	draft	demanded	that	many	of	those	who	rejected	this	conflict	fight	and	die	in	it.	As	in	France,	the	anti-war	American	movements	of	the	1960s	were	predicated	on	disrupting	the	affairs	of	a	government	that	cared	little	for	those	whom	it	was	willing	to	demand	so	much	of.	The	demonstrations	at	the	1968	Democratic	Convention	in	Chicago	were	one	of	the	culminating	activities	of	these	anti-authoritarian	youth	events.	Robert	Kennedy’s	assassination,	which	happened	only	six	months	before	the	convention,	left	the	Democratic	Party	in	disarray;	these	circumstances	led	to	the	primary	being	contested,	with	the	anti-war	Eugene	McCarthy	and	the	more	hawkish	vice-president	Hubert	Humphrey	as	the	remaining	figures.	Despite	anti-war	candidates	McCarthy	and	Kennedy	receiving	eighty	percent	of	the	primary	vote,	Humphrey,	the	more	conservative	and	supposedly	responsible	and	“tested”	of	the	remaining	candidates—and	the	contender	who	maintained	lineage	with	Lyndon	B.	Johnson’s	war-time	presidency—received	the	nomination	thanks	to	his	performance	in	caucusing	states,	even	though	he	did	not	enter	any	primaries.	This	result	was	not	totally	unexpected,	but	the	nomination	of	the	pro-war	candidate	inflamed	the	anti-war	movement’s	fears	and	furthered	the	disenfranchisement	of	anti-war	activists	that	had	escalated	throughout	the	decade.	This	was	a	nation,	it	might	have	seemed	then,	dedicated	to	war	more	than	it	was	dedicated	to	democracy,	an	authoritarian	system	predicated	on	violence,	the	certainty	of	its	economic	system,	and	securing	a	global	market	place	at	all	costs.	The	idea	of	democracy,	that	citizens	of	the	country	had	the	right	to	choose	between	a	range	of	candidates	in	the	name	of	having	their	interests	represented,	seemed	to		dissolve	with	the	decision	to	nominate	Humphrey,	as	the	role	of	the	country	in	Vietnam	and	
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indeed	in	other	anti-communist	wars	seemed	to	be,	thanks	to	both	presidential	nominees	being	for	it,	no	longer	under	debate.	
Medium	Cool	culminates,	famously,	in	documentary	footage	shot	around	and	inside	this	convention,	but	it	narrativizes	this	footage	by	placing	Eileen	at	the	center	of	the	protests	in	search	of	her	son.	During	Eileen’s	search,	John,	having	lost	his	job	after	losing	his	temper	upon	hearing	the	news	that	his	footage	had	been	repeatedly	provided	to	the	FBI	in	advance	of	its	broadcast,	meanwhile	navigates	the	inside	of	the	convention	as	a	free-lancer.	The	film’s	final	sequence	is	generally	the	focus	of	most	analyses,	and	this	discussion	will	focus	on	it	as	well.	What	remains	striking	about	this	scene	is	how	harrowing	it	appears;	police	violence	is	quite	literally	on	display	in	this	film,	as	is	the	striking	size	and	military	might	of	Chicago	mayor	Richard	Daley’s	police	force.	But	what	is	similarly	striking	here	is	the	strange	novelty	of	the	narrative	properties	of	this	footage.	Eileen’s	navigations	of	the	crowds	and	the	extended	takes	of	her	interacting	with	both	demonstrators	and	police	remains	unique,	and	indeed	seemed	to	have	baffled	both	parties	at	the	time—particularly	the	police,	who,	oddly,	allow	her	to	cross	barriers	and	otherwise	disrupt	their	attempts	to	pen	and	later	abuse	the	demonstrators.	Ethan	Mordden,	in	a	book	for	which	he	borrows	the	film’s	name,	places	Medium	Cool	at	the	center	of	the	post-studio	era	of	the	1960s.	According	to	Mordden,	“By	the	late	1960s,	movies	spoke	intimately	yet	pandemically	to	their	various	publics.	Film	no	longer	regarded	itself	as	a	church,	an	enforcer	of	the	received	social	values,	normative	above	all,	but	as	an	agent	of	transformation,	often	defiant	of	the	ruling	interests.”1	Medium	Cool,	for	Mordden,																																																									1	Ethan	Mordden,	Medium	Cool:	The	Movies	of	the	1960s	(New	York:	Knopf,	1990),	241.	
		
	 163	
fits	this	defiant	mold:	“The	film	is	made	of	antagonisms—generation	war,	class	war,	race	war,	the	Vietnam	war,	even	the	war	of	the	moral	free-lancer	against	the	reckless	Corporation,	and	of	course	the	war	of	the	camera	with	its	subject.”2	But,	for	Mordden,	all	of	this	warring	and	aggression	met—for	him	productively—with	the	fragmentation	and	disorder	that	arrived	with	the	end	of	a	coherent	authority.	Continuing	with	the	church	analogy,	Mordden	contends,	“This	marked	not	merely	a	separation	of	church	and	state,	but	a	reformation	that	broke	the	church	up	into	many	sects,	each	free	to	challenge	or	support	the	relevant	wisdoms.”3	Mordden	continues	by	presenting	a	list	of	films	that	map	to	different	views	on	the	generational	conflict,	but	he	carefully	leaves	Medium	Cool	off	these	lists.	And	he	does	so	rightly	as	this	film’s	politics	are	difficult	to	decipher.	That	is,	it	wears	its	distrust	openly,	but	it	is	hard	to	gather	exactly	what	it	says	outside	of	its	myriad	rejections	and	refusals.	This	difficulty	poses	a	number	of	questions:	what	is	to	be	made	of	a	film	so	deeply	invested	in	politics	but	that	refuses	to	render	a	coherent	platform?	That	is,	why	not	make	John	and	Eileen	political	activists?	Why,	instead,	is	this	film	careful	to	delineate	their	distance	from,	and	inability	to	identify	with,	the	demonstrations	and	protests	that	it	depicts?	What	good	is	a	film	about	politics	but	without	politics?		Toward	the	end	of	Medium	Cool,	Eileen	and	John,	at	this	stage	a	couple,	attend	a	nightclub.	Suddenly	departing	from	preparations	at	the	convention	center,	this	sequence	begins	with	an	abrupt	intertitle	that	reads,	mysteriously,	“AMERICA	IS	WONDERFUL”	in	bold,	red,	white,	and	blue	capital	letters.	
																																																								2	Ibid.,	239.	3	Ibid.,	241.	
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	But	this	text	is	promptly	replaced	with	a	dissolve	in	which	the	letters	and	the	blackness	that	surrounds	them	are	supplanted	with	footage	of	people	dancing	at	a	nightclub.	Abstract	images	turn	out	to	be	reflections	that	announce	Eileen	and	John’s	entry	into	this	space.	The	pair	walk	through	cavernous	hallways	illuminated	in	different	colors	as	snippets	of	dialogue	are	overheard	from	the	oblique	figures	whom	they	pass	by.	Finally,	they	arrive	at	the	dance	floor.	The	band	on	stage,	clad	in	flower	patterned	fabric	and	with	psychedelic	images	projected	behind	them,	plays	as	strobe	lights	provide	glimpses	of	the	violently	dancing	crowd.	John	and	Eileen	navigate	this	crowd,	walking	through	without	taking	part.	A	previous	romantic	partner	approaches	John	on	the	dance	floor,	says	something	we	can’t	hear,	and	John	and	Eileen	leave	abruptly.	In	a	film	full	of	odd	and	awkward	sequences	this	one	stands	out	as	perhaps	the	strangest	of	all	and	serves	well	to	illustrate	the	barriers	to	analysis	that	this	film	presents.	John	and	Eileen’s	motivation	for	coming	to	this	club	remains	as	indecipherable	as	their	total	unwillingness	to	interact	with	those	in	attendance.	What	is	communicated,	though,	is	a	clear	ambivalence	in	regards	to	the	other	people	at	the	club.	It	remains	unclear	whether	this	sequence	was	presented	to	setup—perhaps	critique?—1960s	youth	culture,	to	show	the	shallow	underside	of	the	youth	movement’s	political	edge,	or	simply	to	indicate	how	John	and	Eileen	are	simply	unaccustomed	to	interacting	with	people	younger	than	
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themselves.	All	that	is	made	clear	in	this	sequence	is	Eileen	and	John’s	awkwardness	and	unease.	They	surely	are	not	those	who	would	have	fun	at	this	club,	we	can	gather	once	the	sequence	has	concluded,	but	it	is	never	revealed	why	they	had	decided	to	attend	in	the	first	place.	The	irony	of	the	title	card	too	loses	its	teeth	in	light	of	this	ambiguity.	“AMERICA	IS	WONDERFUL”	is	the	bridge,	here,	from	an	empty	convention	center	which	will	soon	be	full	of	high-minded	presidential	rhetoric	that	will	subsequently	be	dwarfed	in	importance	by	the	police/protestor	clashes	happening	outside	to	a	full	nightclub	where	people	dance	to	songs—perhaps	themselves	ironic—about	smoking	weed	in	San	Francisco.	If	the	initial	available	reading	leads	us	to	see	the	vapid,	self-indulgence	of	1960s	youth,	then	this	is	perhaps	revealed	on	the	faces	of	John	and	Eileen.	But	what	generates	this	ire	and	what	role	does	it	play	in	the	subsequent	police	violence?	These	dancers	are	not	figures	at	this	moment	deeply	engaged	in	radical	change,	but	John’s	life	is	indeed	not	any	more	purposeful.	The	meaning	of	this	sequence,	like	the	title	card	itself,	hangs	in	the	air,	somewhere	between	unearned	cynicism	and	under-thought	sincerity,	and	this	is	indeed	largely	the	tone	of	this	film.	It	distrusts	what	it	depicts,	but	it	conversely	feels	something	of	great	power	and	sincerity	spilling	from	this	very	thing	it	distrusts.	This	is	how	this	film	depicts	these	political	actions,	and,	as	we	shall	see,	how	it	views	the	media	more	broadly.	It	is	suspensions	of	judgment	like	these	that	this	film	strives	to	create.	What	separates	Medium	Cool	from	films	like	Z	(Costa-Gavras,	1969)	or	The	Battle	of	Algiers	(Pontecorvo,	1966)—films	also	about	significant	political	events—is	the	incoherence	of	its	politics,	and	its	ambivalence	about	political	currents.	On	the	other	hand,	what	separates	it	from	La	Dolce	Vita	(Fellini,	1960)	or	John	Schlesinger’s	Darling	(1965)—films	about	wealthy	socialites	and	their	melancholic	escapades—is	the	film’s	direct	association	with	
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political	events.	Herein	lies	the	unique	quality	of	Medium	Cool.	It	is	a	political	film	without	politics	and,	conversely,	it	is	a	film	about	melancholy	and	celebrity,	but	one	that	explodes	with	direct	images	of	political	violence,	images	that	indeed	render	its	critique	of	success	insignificant.	Medium	Cool	is	like,	to	take	the	opening	of	La	Dolce	Vita	as	example,	if	Marcello	Mastroianni’s	Marcello	Rubini	character	were	to	pilot	his	helicopter	into	1968	Paris	or	1968	Chicago.	It	is	a	film	that	uses	the	tools	of	art	cinema	in	pursuit	of	political	commentary,	but	it	at	the	same	time	veers	form	this	goal	just	before	its	arrival,	content	instead	to	simply	extend	forward,	incapable	of	producing	the	distance	required	for	mannered	critique	but	likewise	unable	to	produce	the	direction	needed	for	a	more	direct	politics.	This	unique	configuration,	I	contend,	is	exactly	what	allows	this	film	to	reject	authority	as	efficiently	as	it	does.	To	further	support	this	point	it	is	necessary	to	look	at	the	contemporary	responses	the	film	engendered.	For	Roger	Ebert,	writing	in	1969,	Medium	Cool	signified	a	radical	shift	in	the	way	that	American	films	interact	with	their	audience.	Aligning	the	film	with	The	Rain	People	(Coppola,	1969),	Easy	Rider	(Hopper,	1969),	Alice’s	Restaurant	(Penn,	1969),	Midnight	
Cowboy	(Schlesinger,	1969),	and,	particularly,	The	Graduate	(Nichols,	1967),	Ebert	explains	that	the	significance	of	Medium	Cool	lies	precisely	in	its	refusal	to	separate	documentary	from	fiction.	Ebert	contends	of	the	various	events	of	the	film:	“They	are	all	significant	in	exactly	the	same	way.	The	National	Guard	trips	are	no	more	real	than	the	love	scene…	All	the	images	have	meaning	because	of	the	way	they	are	associated	with	each	other.”4	Wexler,	for	Ebert,	looks	closely	at	the	characters	and	arrangements	and,	“Sees	not	the	symbols	but	
																																																								4	Roger	Ebert,	“Medium	Cool,”	The	Chicago	Sun-Times,	Sep.	21,	1969.	
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their	function.”5	For	Ebert,	this	associative	vision	is	totally	novel	for	American	cinema.	Whereas	previous	films	would	present	narratives	that	developed	characters	and	foreshadowed	their	eventual	actions,	Medium	Cool,	for	Ebert,	skips	the	foreshadowing	and	explains	how	the	immediate	presence	of	people	and	events	interact,	and	indeed	does	so	on	a	massive	scale.	For	Ebert,	the	freedom	of	Wexler	and	his	contemporaries	to	do	this	was	predicated	on	their	audience’s	familiarity	with	cinema,	with	our	ability	to	“understand	cinematic	shorthand,”	as	he	puts	it.6	The	cognitive	process	outlined	by	Ebert	is	striking	for	its	teleological	assumptions.	Because	we’ve	seen	John	Wayne,	he	contends,	we	can	imagine	the	narrative	gaps	that	this	film	inevitably	opens	and	closes	thanks	to	a	series	of	tested	assumptions,	a	procedure	that	brings	to	mind	the	gestalt	process.	This	process	lessens	the	need	for	a	coherent	narrative	flow	by	relying	on	the	audience,	already	familiar	with	the	traits	and	tropes	of	Hollywood	cinema,	to	draw	the	missing	connections	and	in	so	doing	to	proceed	as	though	the	narrative	were	more	traditionally	arranged.	For	Ebert,	the	entire	plot	of	Medium	Cool	relies	upon	these	tested	assumptions,	and	what	this	approach	creates	is	a	cinematic	short-hand	that	allows	the	director	to	focus	on	images	that	surprise	or	shake	us.	What	I	see	in	this	film	is	precisely	the	opposite.	What	is	valuable	about	Medium	Cool	is	its	ability	to	disrupt	this	associative	process,	or	at	the	very	least	its	ability	to	ask	us	to	reevaluate	it.	When	John	and	Eileen	enter	and	leave	the	club	we	can	intuit	some	of	their	motivations,	but	the	film’s	reluctance	to	fill	in	these	gaps	is	precisely	what	is	useful—it	asks	its	viewers	not	to	reproduce	the	meaning	they	have	seen	established	elsewhere,	but	to	risk	not	understanding	at	all.	Rather	than	functionalize	the	narrative,	Medium	Cool	makes	it																																																									5	Ibid.	6	Ibid.	
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dysfunctional;	things	fall	apart,	they	fail	to	work,	and	they	leave	us	with	no	explanation	as	to	why.	This	is	a	film,	then,	in	a	state	of	disrepair.	The	gears	of	the	industry	to	which	it	belongs	have	ground	to	a	halt,	and	it,	like	this	film,	lingers	in	a	state	of	suspension.	Characters	do	things,	but	why	is	never	made	clear.	This,	too,	is	the	attitude	this	film	takes	toward	the	police	and,	to	a	degree,	the	protestors.	Rather	than	outline	either	side’s	concerns	and	then	weigh	in	on	them,	this	film	shows	these	events	as	though	no	explanation	is	available.	Wexler,	of	course,	was	no	nihilist,	and	his	political	concerns	are	well	outlined	by	his	later	films.7	But	what	he	chooses	to	address	in	Medium	Cool	is	not	the	contours	of	an	argument	about	America’s	authoritarian	turn.	Instead,	he	leaves	this	meaning	open	without	verifying	it.	In	what	serves	as	a	truly	anti-authoritarian	gesture—in	the	sense	that	it	rejects	authority	more	directly	by	denying	its	own—Wexler	refuses	to	establish	narrative	coherence	for	the	events	he	depicts,	and	in	so	doing	he	largely	disables	his	own	capacity	for	routing	a	path	through	these	turbulent	images.	This	is	evident	in	the	previously	discussed	scene	set	in	the	night	club.	The	reasons	for	John	and	Eileen’s	abrupt	arrival	and	departure	and	the	function	of	this	sequence	in	terms	of	its	narrative	contribution	are	met	with	an	ambiguity	that	is	mirrored	by	the	depiction	of	the	space	of	this	disorienting	nightclub.	What	Wexler	proposes	here	is	an	explanation	of	the	capacity	of	cinema	to	escape	meaning,	rather	than	its	ability	to	contain	it.	In	his	review	of	the	film,	Vincent	Canby	touched	upon	some	of	the	issues	outlined	so	far,	but	for	Canby	these	conflicts	amount	to	negative	qualities.	“The	story	of	the	gradual	emotional	and	political	awakening	of	John	Cassellis	[sic],”	he	writes,	“is	somehow	dwarfed																																																									7	Wexler	went	on	to	make	a	variety	of	politically	minded	documentaries.	
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by	the	emotional	and	political	meaning	of	the	events	themselves,	which	we,	in	the	audience,	experience	first-hand,	rather	than	through	the	movie	protagonist.”8	Indeed	where	this	move	appears	abnormal,	as	Canby	posits,	is	in	the	way	that	the	experience	of	the	lead	characters	does	little	to	illuminate	the	deeply	disturbing	events	that	surround	them.	This	disjunction,	however,	creates	a	novel	viewing	experience,	one	in	which	the	viewer	is	asked	not	to	come	to	understand	events	through	the	perspective	of	a	coherent	narrative,	but	to	reject	that	narrative	in	the	name	of	an	extended	relationship	to	disorder.	Canby	continues,	“This	is	a	fundamental	problem	in	the	kind	of	movie-making	that	attempts	to	homogenize	fact	and	fiction,	particularly	when	the	fiction	has	the	oversimplified	shape	of	nineteen-thirties	social	protest	drama	and	the	fact	is	so	obviously	of	a	later,	more	complicated	world.”9	Canby’s	claims	as	to	the	qualities	and	complexities	of	both	fiction	and	fact	in	the	1960s	versus	the	1930s	ring	rather	hollow,	but	his	concerns	about	the	homogenization	of	fact	and	fiction	remain	valuable.	Canby	continues	this	line	of	thought:	“The	shock	of	
Medium	Cool	comes	not	from	the	fiction,	but	from	the	facts	provided	Wexler	by	mayor	Daley,	the	Illinois	national	guard	and	the	Chicago	police.”10	For	Canby	there	is	a	sense	of	the	impact	of	this	film	being	unearned,	the	sense	that	its	power	is	derived	not	from	working	the	characters	through	something	in	any	recognizable	fashion,	but	from	the	impact	of	these	events	and	those	who	perpetrated	them.	Judgements	of	quality	aside,	for	this	study	Canby’s	observations	provide	a	significant	example	of	a	film	engaging	with	politics	in	a	novel	way.	Rather	than	interjecting	a	narrative	perspective	into	some	issue	or	event,	as	the	aforementioned	Z	and	The	Battle	of																																																									8	Vincent	Canby,	“Medium	Cool	(1969):	Real	Events	of	'68	Seen	in	'Medium	Cool':	Haskell	Wexler	Wrote	and	Directed	Movie,”	The	New	York	Times,	Aug.	28,	1969.	9	Ibid.	10	Ibid.	
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Algiers	might	be	said	to,	Medium	Cool	does	the	opposite,	interjecting	a	significant	event	into	its,	admittedly	slight,	narrative	perspective.	The	footage	of	1968	Chicago,	then,	serves	as	a	kind	of	disfiguration,	a	rupture	that	renders	a	relatively	inconsequential	narrative	powerful,	but	provides	no	direction	for	this	power	to	take.	Indeed	Canby,	despite	his	distaste	for	the	film,	is	careful	to	recognize	this	power:	“The	result	is	a	film	of	tremendous	visual	impact,	a	kind	of	cinematic	‘Guernica,’	a	picture	of	America	in	the	process	of	exploding	into	fragmented	bits	of	hostility,	suspicion,	fear	and	violence.”11	Canby	here	compares	Medium	Cool	to	Picasso’s	famous	painting	that,	it	is	often	contended,	serves	as	a	response	to	the	bombings	of	the	village	of	Guernica	by	the	axis-backed	nationalists	during	the	Spanish	Civil	War	of	the	1930s,	connecting	the	two	as	pieces	of	art	that	are	said	to	digest	political	turmoil.	Finally,	Canby	ends	on	a	particularly	mysterious	note:	“Medium	
Cool	is	an	awkward	and	even	pretentious	movie,	but,	like	the	report	of	the	President’s	National	Advisory	Commission	on	Civil	Disorders,	it	has	an	importance	that	has	nothing	to	do	with	literature.”12	The	report	referenced	here	was	a	large-scale	explanation	of	civil	disobedience,	particularly	as	it	pertained	to	African	Americans,	commissioned	in	the	1960s	by	Lyndon	B.	Johnson’s	government.	This	report	advocated	for	the	improvement	of	social	services,	particularly	housing,	as	a	solution	to	the	demands	of	civil	rights	and	the	unrest	that	accompanied	those	demands.	This	report	serves	as	an	interesting	comparison	for	
Medium	Cool,	which	is	by	no	means	strapped	with	the	responsibility	of	producing	solutions	to	the	problems	it	depicts.	But	the	comparison	is	telling	in	that	it	signals	to	some	non-arts	based	power	that	this	film	seems	to	hold,	as	does	the	mysterious	assertion	that	this	film	has	nothing	to	do	with	literature.																																																									11	Ibid.	12	Ibid.	
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What	Canby	seems	to	be	suggesting	is	some	relationship	to	non-representative	power,	some	ability	to	produce	unmediated	access	to	these	events.	This	film	serves,	for	Canby,	as	a	report	on	the	events	that	it	depicts.	Whereas	narrative,	in	this	analogy,	is	indirect,	this	film—despite	its	refusing	to	produce	a	coherent	object	or	solution—is	nonetheless	direct,	like	a	kind	of	commission	designed	to	reproduce	and	distill	the	variables	of	an	issue.	I’m	not	sure	that	I	agree	with	Canby’s	claim	that	this	film	can	have	no	relationship	to	literature,	but	the	judgment	that	he	locates—that	this	film	is	a	narrative	disaster	but	that	it	is	nonetheless	powerful—is	exactly	the	reason	that	I	too	find	Medium	
Cool	of	interest.	To	address	this	power,	I	transition	now	to	a	discussion	of	the	images	depicted	here,	and	indeed	the	mysterious	hold	of	unmitigated	force.		Force	 At	a	pivotal	moment	in	Medium	Cool	John	and	Eileen	stand	watching	a	television	show.	The	show,	a	special	on	the	lives	of	John	F.	Kennedy,	Martin	Luther	King,	and	Robert	Kennedy,	is	never	shown,	and	is	represented	here	only	in	light	cast	on	the	characters’	faces.	“Jesus,	I	love	to	shoot	film,”	John	interjects	as	the	two	stare	at	the	television.	“Do	you	feel	it?,”	he	continues,	holding	his	hands	towards	the	out-of-frame	television	set.		
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“X-rays,	is	that	what	it	is?	Does	it	grow	hair?	Is	it	vitamins?	Can	you	feel	violence?”	“I	don’t	know	what	to	think,”	Eileen	responds,	“It	seems	like	no	man’s	life	is	worth	anything	anymore.”	On	this	point	John	turns	to	Eileen,	then	continues,	“You	see,	the	media’s	got	a	script	now,	by	the	numbers.	Flags	at	half-mast.	Trips	cancelled.	Ball	games	called	off.	Schools	closed.	Memorial	meetings.	Memorial	marches.	Moments	of	silence.	A	widow	cries,	and	then	she	says	brave	words.	More	moments	of	silence,	then	the	funeral	procession.”	Dripping	with	disdain,	John	smirks	then	continues,	“A	lot	of	experts	saying	how	sick	our	society	is,	how	sick	we	all	are.	The	script	is	a	national	drain-off.	People	says,	‘Yeah,	yeah,	we’re	guilty.	We’re	bad.’	Cause	a	lot	of	people	are	afraid.	They’re	afraid.	The	Negroes	are	coming	to	tear	up	their	stores,	burn	neighborhoods,	so	they	have	this	nationwide,	coast-to-coast	network	serial	called	‘Mourn	the	Martyr.’	Nobody’s	really	on	the	hook,	you	see?”	John	approaches	a	nearby	window,	now	looking	out.	“When	the	script	is	finished	and	Tuesday	comes	around	or	Saturday	and	national	drain-off	week	is	over,	everybody	goes	pretty	much	back	to	normal.	Normal	this,	normal	that.	You	know,	normal.”	In	the	background	as	the	two	stare,	confounded—Eileen	at	John,	John	out	the	window—the	televised	speech	continues,	now	with	the	monumental,	“Free	at	last,	free	at	last,	thank	god	almighty	free	at	last!”		 What	is	striking	about	this	brief	scene,	and	what	is	corroborated	by	John	and	Eileen’s	anguish,	is	the	degree	and	object	of	this	pair’s	frustration:	frustration	at	the	media’s	proclivity	for,	in	John’s	opinion,	rendering	clear	and	normal	the	world	shattering	events	that	had	become	so	routine	by	1968;	but	also	frustration	at	the	undeniable	power	of	the	images	that	the	television	provides.	It	is	in	fact	this	very	dynamic	that	is	the	source	for	John	and	Eileen’s	turmoil.	The	trajectory	of	this	film	serves	as	an	attempt	to	explore	and	perhaps	alleviate	this	conflict.	How,	Medium	Cool,	asks,	is	a	film	to	use	and	extend	the	
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power	of	the	image	without	simultaneously	reducing	the	events	it	depicts	to	easily	understood	platitudes?	How	is	it	able	to	show	anything	without	rendering	into	knowable	terms	the	effects	and	circumstances	that	it	reveals?	And	how	is	it	to	deliver	information	and	ideas	without	suturing	the	wound	that	events	like	this	create?	This	film	strives	to	answer	the	question	of	how	film	can	produce	politics	that	serve	as	a	radical	break	from	the	normalcy	and	restrictions	of	the	world	that	we	occupy.		 The	system	by	which	this	film	pursues	these	questions	is	through	its	use	of	documentary	footage	at	the	Democratic	Convention,	an	event	during	which	an	estimated	25,000	police	clashed	with	the	10,000	demonstrators.	The	primary	frame	this	film	uses	to	present	these	events	is	Eileen’s	search	for	her	lost	son.	Shown	navigating	increasingly	violent	and	inchoate	spaces,	Eileen,	dressed	in	bright	yellow,	walks	in	and	out	of	protest	activities	and	police	organization.	
	 	But	what	renders	these	images	most	striking	is	her	seeming	disinterest.	Eileen,	dressed	and	framed	so	as	to	contrast	with	both	protests	and	police,	navigates	these	conditions	as	a	kind	of	outsider,	unconcerned	with	the	actual	protestors	and	cops	except	in	so	far	as	they	divide	her	from	her	son.	In	one	striking	moment	she	even	crosses	a	police	line,	for	some	reason	the	cops	assuming	her	to	be	different	from	the	crowd.	The	effect	of	this	framing	mechanism	is	to	create	a	kind	of	ambiguity	as	to	the	actions	being	depicted.	It	is	through	this	ambiguity	
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that	Medium	Cool	positions	its	attempt	to	render	this	significant	course	of	events.	What	this	ambiguity	provides	is	a	kind	of	distance,	but	also	its	opposite,	an	undeniable	power	and	immediacy.	That	power	also	felt	by	John	in	the	light	of	the	TV.	This	power	is	the	force	of	these	images.		 In	Force:	A	Fundamental	Concept	of	Aesthetic	Anthropology,	Christoph	Menke	pursues	what	he	feels	is	the	central	question	of	philosophical	aesthetics:	“How	to	conceive	of	the	indeterminacy	of	the	beautiful,	as	an	effect	of	the	imagination,	in	view	of	its	overwhelming	power.”13	Medium	Cool	connects	with	Menke’s	project	through	the	way	that	both	are	centrally	concerned	with	this	“overwhelming	power,”	but	this	film	joins	this	energy	to	the	specifics	of	the	protests	in	1968	Chicago,	and	furthermore	to	the	perceived	authoritarian	response	that	they	engendered.	To	be	clear,	what	Menke	will	provide	for	this	discussion	of	Medium	Cool	is	the	language	and	ideas	for	how	to	conceive	of	the	film’s	relationship	to	radical	politics,	but	this	is	not	to	say	that	I	believe	that	these	texts	engage	in	an	exploration	of	the	same	project—far	from	it.	Medium	Cool	is	deeply	concerned	with	the	power	of	images,	but	is	confounded	by	the	constant	counter	tendency	of	their	being	reabsorbed	into	knowable	forms	for	viewing	the	world,	forms	that	this	film	indeed	finds	to	be	venal	and	destructive.			 Menke	uses	the	concept	of	imagination	to	push	upon	the	boundaries	of	the	parent	category	to	which	it	belongs:	the	sensible.	For	Menke,	“The	imagination	belongs	to	the	domain	of	sensibility,	for	it	is	incapable	of	endowing	its	idea	with	any	representational	capacity	or	its	images	with	any	cognitive	capacity.”14	According	to	Menke,	who	draws	upon																																																									13	Christophe	Menke,	Force:	A	Fundamental	Concept	of	Aesthetic	Anthropology	(New	York:	Fordham	University	Press,	2012),	9.	14	Ibid.,	5.	
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Descartes,	“sensibility”	is	defined	in	part	by	its	relationship	to	imagination	and	indeterminacy,	but	also	by	its	difference	from	“intellect”—the	domain	of	rational	thought	and	activity.	But	Menke	presses	upon	this	divide,	ultimately	contending	that,	“The	intellect	requires	the	resources	of	the	imagination…	yet	for	this	to	happen,	imagination	must	be	brought	under	the	guidance	of	the	intellect.	The	intellect	must	have	command	over	the	imagination.”15	Menke	has	thus	far	examined	and	clarified	the	dynamic	between	intelligence	and	imagination,	but	he	begins	to	trouble	Descartes’	claims	when	he	writes:	“The	imagination	is	anarchic	and	undisciplined,	and	that	is	why	it	not	only	must	be—but	also	can	be—subject	to	the	guidance	of	the	intellect	in	its	methodical	progression.	But	why	
is	external	regulation	necessary?	On	its	own,	the	imagination	is	always	unpredictable;	it	does	not	pursue	its	own	direction;	thus	it	can	be	directed	at	will.”16	This	is	the	conflict	that	haunts	Medium	Cool:	how	can	imagination—an	unrationalized	and	indeterminate	movement	that	still	holds	within	it	some	connection	to	thought—persist	without	always	surrendering	its	power	to	the	rationalized	and	“active”	realm	of	the	intellect,	a	realm	that	in	this	example	is	perceived	to	be	bankrupt	and	shot	through	with	a	growing	authoritarian	strain?		 The	specifics	of	this	problem	are	realized	through	aesthetics.	For	Menke,	“Aesthetics	is	a	different	way	of	conceiving	sensibility.	It	is	not	merely	a	reevaluation	of	sensibility,	although	it	is	that,	too,	because	it	involves	a	redescription	of	sensibility.	Aesthetics	is	a	way	of	thinking	that	conceives	the	indissoluble	indeterminacy	of	sensibility	in	conjunction	with	its	internally	guided,	principled	activity.”17	For	Menke,	aesthetics	takes	from	the																																																									15	Ibid.,	6.	16	Ibid,	emphasis	added.	17	Ibid.,	11.	
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imagination	the	inchoate	madness	of	the	sensible	world,	but	orders	it	in	some	kind	of	way	that	follows	a	semi-systematic	guide,	allowing	it	to	function	autonomous	of	the	intellect.	Menke	continues:	“The	sensible	is	radically	indeterminate	because	its	generation	of	ideas	cannot	be	reduced	to	self-conscious	and	self-controlled	acts,	performances	of	methodical	operations	of	the	intellect.	At	the	same	time,	the	ideas	generated	by	the	senses	are	neither	a	mere	confluence	of	causal	effects	nor	a	haphazard	and	arbitrary	play	but	an	internal,	
though	unconscious,	operation	belonging	to	the	imagination.”18	Aesthetics	is	capable	of	eliding	the	rational	world	while	still	maintaining	the	capacity	to	produce	ideas	and	coherence.	As	Menke	puts	it,	“The	program	of	aesthetics	aims	to	think	about	sensibility	as	a	phenomenon	beyond	the	Cartesian	alternatives	of	self-conscious	actions	and	causal	mechanism,	of	self-guidance	and	haphazard	projection.	Indeed	it	must	reconsider	these	very	alternatives	and	reconceptualize	our	ideas	of	knowledge	and	action,	of	play	and	imagination.”19		 In	order	to	further	explore	this	problem	of	aesthetic	experience’s	relationship	to	any	concretized	form	of	knowledge,	Menke	reactivates	Leibniz’s	bifurcation	of	aesthetics	into	two	primary	“aspects”:	faculty	and	force.	The	first	of	these	aspects,	faculty,	allows	us	to	“grasp	the	things	around	us	adequately,	although	not	consciously	and	methodically.”20	This	first	aspect	is	defined	by	Menke	as,	“The	faculty	of	engendering	sensible	cognitions	that	are	as	indeterminate	as	they	are	adequate.”21	Never	quite	rational,	the	functions	of	aesthetic	experience	defined	by	faculty	nevertheless	have	some	organizational	drive,	one	governed	by	an	“internal	principle”	whereby	things	are	ordered	and	rendered	coherent,	even	if	never																																																									18	Ibid,	emphasis	added.	19	Ibid.	20	Ibid.,	12.	21	Ibid.	
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quite	fully	readable.	The	second	aspect	of	aesthetic	experience	is	the	drive	that	pushes	in	just	the	opposite	direction.	Menke	defines	“force”	in	this	way:	“The	force	propelling	an	ongoing	transformation	of	the	unconscious	ideas	that	constitute	us.”22	According	to	Menke,	what	provides	a	glimpse	of	force	at	work	is	the	sensation	that	“there	is	an	efficacy	or	power	to	these	perceptions	that	far	exceeds	that	exercised	by	the	judgments	of	the	intellect,	a	power	that	draws	us	into	an	infinite	‘sequence’	of	images	engendered	by	and	transforming	into	one	another	that	confounds	the	intellect.”23		 The	idea	of	force	as	described	by	Menke	brings	cinema	into	view.	The	sequence	of	images	that	constantly	melt	into	one	and	another	and	seem	to	link	in	a	way	that	surprises	and	confounds	the	capacities	of	cognition	is	perhaps	best	described	by	the	incoherence	of	cinematic	experienced	as	a	kind	of	reverie.	But	cinema	too	always	reproduces	and	relies	upon	the	forces	of	faculty—the	capacity	for	it	to	be	contextualized	and	experienced	as	a	reproduction	of	coherence,	what	brings	to	mind	the	logic	of	continuity.	Never	fully	organizable	into	a	coherent	set	of	repeatable	principles,	continuity	takes	up	some	kind	of	generalizable	logic,	some	kind	of	“internal	principle”	that	is	never	exactly	fully	available	but	always	familiar.	This	is	the	way	that	cinema	reproduces	meaning	or,	at	least,	presents	itself	as	readable.	There	is	the	constant	puncture	of	force	with	faculty,	and	this	is	the	model	for	experience	that	cinema	reproduces.		 What	confounds	John	about	these	images	is	whether	force	can	be	maintained	without	its	descending	back	into	faculty.	He	is	haunted	by	the	“efficacy	or	power”	of	the	filmed	image,	and	indeed	the	way	that	it	“far	exceeds	that	executed	by	the	judgments	of	the	
																																																								22	Ibid.	23	Ibid.	
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intellect.”24	He	loves	shooting	film,	but	can	never	exactly	explain	why,	as	indeed	this	explanation	would	always	fail	to	account	for	the	force	of	the	images,	or	worse	yet	work	to	defuse	it.	The	distrust	that	this	sequence	finds	in	faculty,	for	John,	has	two	aspects	of	its	own.	First,	faculty	is	feared	to	reduce	the	power	of	the	image	in	that	it	might	function	to	transform	force	back	into	practical	material,	to	reduce	the	capacity	to	shake	and	disturb,	to	nullify	the	image’s	relationship	to	raw,	inchoate,	indeterminate	power.	But	what	frightens	John	more	about	faculty	is	the	way	that	its	organizing	tendencies	reinstitute	the	corrupt	and	anti-democratic	principles	that	governed	these	events.	He	agrees,	of	course,	in	the	tragedy	of	the	deaths	shown	in	the	television	special	titled	“Mourn	the	Martyr,”	but	it	is	when	these	events	are	rendered	meaningful	that	he	comes	to	distrust	them.	John’s	response	is	then	one	of	profound	disillusionment.	John’s	wish,	it	seems,	is	to	relegate	everything	to	force,	a	state	“without	normative	substance”25	where	faculty	is	avoided	altogether.	This	is	the	wish	of	a	true	skeptic,	of	one	who	is	truly	disenchanted,	one	that	wishes	for	something	radically	different,	anything	that	might	fundamentally	upset	how	we	organize	the	world.	But	what	this	wish	betrays	is	also	hope,	and	indeed	hope	in	its	most	potent	form—a	radical	hope	dedicated	to	absolute	difference.		 This	radical	hope	is	also	deeply	messianic;	it	provides	no	outlet	for	activity,	but	it	holds	within	it	absolute	potential.	The	sequence	of	Eileen	navigating	the	protests	of	1968	Chicago,	then,	takes	on	a	new	form.	Where	these	images	identify	with	the	political	agenda	of	the	protestors	is	not	in	the	particular	platforms	of	the	anti-war	movement—although	they	do	of	course	to	some	degree	identify	with	these—but	in	the	very	incoherence	that	these	images	and	events	offer.																																																									24	Ibid.	25	Ibid.,	40.	
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	 What	little	contextualization	exists	arrives	primarily	in	the	form	of	John’s	navigating	the	convention	itself—a	privilege	he	has	been	granted	due	to	his	role	as	a	photographer.	Of	course,	this	contextual	information	is	perhaps	already	provided	by	the	promptness	of	this	film’s	release.	It	was	initially	distributed	on	the	one-year	anniversary	of	the	events	it	depicts.	Regardless,	while	obviously	focusing	on	the	overwhelming	police	presence	and,	ultimately,	police	violence	that	took	place,	this	film	nonetheless	refuses	to	align	itself	with	the	protestors.	Indeed	Medium	Cool	is	unwilling	even	to	explore	the	platform	of	these	demonstrators.	What	the	lack	of	clear	allegiance	in	this	semi-documentary	footage	produces	is	a	kind	of	inchoate	and	unpatterned	depiction	of	these	brutal	proceedings.	Indeed,	even	continuity	is	tested,	as	most	of	the	sequence	is	shown	through	the	use	of	full	shots	or	unestablished	close-ups	of	Eileen	walking	through	the	protest	activities,	and	what	cuts	it	does	contain	appear	irrational.	This	refusal	of	a	clear	perspective	results	in	horror	at	the	police	violence	against	the	demonstrators	as	the	only	immediately	available	response.		 What	this	footage	strives	to	produce	is	force,	the	unmanaged	flow	of	material	that	withstands	order	and	reproduces	the	power	that	John	felt	emanating	from	the	television.	For	Menke,	“The	aesthetic	force…	turns	against	its	own	expression,	transforming	it	into	another.	The	aesthetic	expression	is,	therefore,	as	initially	antagonistic	as	the	aesthetic	force	itself.”26	This	internal	antagonism	is	on	display	in	Medium	Cool,	for	it	wishes	to	reproduce	force	as	force,	without	betraying	any	recognizable	standards	or	norms.	But	this	is	an	impossible	task,	as	the	systems	of	organization	always	reassert	themselves—they	must	for	any	footage	to	“travel”	and	“arrive”	at	any	destination,	both	figuratively	and	materially.	This	pushing	towards	its	impossible	task	is	also	an	emblem	of	the	film’s																																																									26	Ibid.,	44.	
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extremism.	It	holds	tight	to	the	hope	that	whatever	form	aesthetic	experience	does	take	will	be	strikingly	new—somehow	organized	in	such	a	way	as	to	overcome	the	brutal	reductions	that	John	attempts	to	reject.		 Force,	then,	is	here	figured	as	radical	politics,	an	attempt	to	resist	to	such	a	degree	that	any	possibility	for	organization	must	always	arrive	in	the	form	of	total	departure	from	the	expected	and	available	outcomes.	As	Menke	contends,	“In	the	operations	of	aesthetic	force	nothing	realizes	itself.”27	And	it	is	exactly	this	nothing	that	yields	ambiguity.	What	this	radicalism,	this	attempt	at	total	force,	signals,	however,	is	the	wait.	Waiting	here	becomes	the	only	response	that	can	continue	to	leave	open	the	possibility	for	total	and	unexpected	difference.	Given	the	circumstances	of	the	time,	including	the	rising	police	violence	and	what	appears	to	be	the	systematic	elimination	of	those	that	oppose	it,	absolute	aesthetic	force	remains	perhaps	the	best	available	response;	a	wish	made	when	there	is	no	hope,	as	this	is	exactly	when	hope	is	most	available.	But	what	this	solution	faces	is	the	specter	of	absolute	inaction;	such	is	the	bind	of	messianism,	which	holds	that	most	opportunity	for	change	is	totally	unverifiable,	indeed	totally	incoherent	and	totally	impossible	to	generalize,	and	the	only	way	to	usher	it	in	is	to	wait	for	it,	never	to	encourage	its	arrival.	What	is	lost	in	this	case,	then,	is	the	play	between	force	and	faculty	that	constituted,	for	Menke,	the	aesthetic	process.	Indeed	this	film	ultimately	finds	again	the	trouble	of	imagination;	it	has	no	outlet	towards	reflection,	no	system	by	which	order	might	be	generated	and	allow	something	like	cognition	or	change	to	arrive.	The	film,	in	this	way,	meets	its	goal,	it	persists	in	its	messianic	wish,	but	this	wish	must	always	be	just	a	wish.	
																																																								27	Ibid.	
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	 A	final	quote	from	Menke	is	instructive,	here	on	innovation:	“It	[innovation]	does	not	happen	as	a	consequence	of	reasons,	as	a	realization	of	purposes	I	already	have,	but	because	my	forces	are	alive	in	an	unknown	situation,	before	an	unknown	object.”28	This	is	the	gift	that	art	can	provide,	the	vantage	from	which	it	can	look	back	on	us.	What	John	finds	in	these	images—in	the	colors	they	cast	toward	him,	the	force	with	which	they	press	upon	him—is	the	possibility	of	the	unknown,	the	hope	with	which	they	irradiate	us.	But	this	hope	must	find	its	way	back	into	faculty,	for	the	only	alternative	is	an	inactionable	and	incoherent	eternity,	or	worse	yet	the	possibility	for	the	arrival	of	something	far	more	devastating	than	what	we	have.	John’s	dream	and	what	too	must	be	the	dream	of	this	film	is	also	a	nightmare,	force	without	faculty,	unknowability	that	uproots	order,	a	waiting	asymptotic	with	death.		Accidents		 At	the	end	of	the	film,	John	and	Eileen,	having	finally	found	each	other	in	the	crowd,	escape	downtown	Chicago	in	a	news	station	wagon.	Shown	riding	home	and	listening	to	the	escalating	protests	at	the	convention	site	on	the	radio,	John	and	Eileen	exchange	troubled	glances	as	the	radio	report	declares	the	accelerating	police	violence.	Finally	the	radio	report	dissolves	from	the	chaos	of	the	convention	coverage	to	a	clearer	report,	more	likely	recorded	in	a	studio.	“The	victim	was	identified	as	former	Channel	8	news	cameraman	John	Katselas,”	the	report	explains.	“Katselas	was	taken	to	Michael	Reese	Hospital	where	he	is	reported	to	be	in	critical	condition.	Cause	of	the	accident	is	under	investigation.	A	woman	companion,	not	yet	identified,	was	dead	on	arrival,”	it	continues.	During	this	report	the																																																									28	Ibid.,	90.	
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exterior	of	John	and	Eileen’s	car	is	shown.	Upon	cutting	back	inside,	however,	the	radio	report	returns	to	the	erratic	coverage	of	the	protest.	The	report	elucidates	the	bloodshed	caused	by	the	police	response	to	the	demonstrations,	and	all	the	while	the	camera	pushes	forward,	towards	Eileen’s	shocked	face.	
	As	the	camera	zooms	the	intermittent	glare	reflected	on	the	windshield	caused	by	the	breaks	in	the	tree	cover	begins	to	increase.	
	Using	the	over	exposed,	almost	white	image	as	a	kind	of	fade,	the	film	cuts	on	the	white	to	show	John,	himself	totally	blown	out	by	the	glare,	in	a	matching	close-up.	
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The	film	continues	to	cut	between	the	two	as	the	amount	of	glare	likewise	increases.	The	image	is	increasingly	obscured	as	the	white	intervals	overtake	the	characters’	close-ups.	Abruptly,	the	sound	of	tires	squealing	breaks	their	concerned	gazes.	The	camera	wheels	wildly,	then	cuts	between	an	approaching	tree,	close-ups	of	John	and	Eileen,	and	a	broken	car-window	until	a	crash	and	then	a	scream	are	heard	followed	by	darkness.	The	radio	report	covering	the	protest	continues	over	the	black.	Finally,	another	car	is	shown	driving	by,	its	driver	leaning	out	the	window.	
	The	camera	pans	with	this	car	and	reveals	the	news	station	wagon	that	John	and	Eileen	had	been	driving,	smashed	into	a	tree.	The	onlooker	continues	to	slowly	drive	by	as	a	child	in	the	back	seat	leans	out	and	takes	a	photo.	An	abrupt	cut—the	last	of	this	film—shows	another	angle	of	the	wreck.	
	The	onlookers	gone,	John	and	Eileen’s	car	is	shown	now	in	a	wide	shot,	aflame.	The	camera	zooms	slowly	out,	the	soundtrack	still	consisting	of	radio	coverage	of	the	demonstrations	at	the	convention.	The	camera	begins	to	pan;	as	it	does	other	voices—presumably	
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demonstrators—begin	to	overtake	the	radio	broadcast.	“The	whole	world	is	watching,”	they	chant	as	the	camera	pans	left.	The	chant	increases	in	volume	as	a	new	subject	is	revealed,	another	camera	with	its	own	operator.	The	new	camera	pans,	slightly	behind	the	pan	of	our	view,	and	points	directly	into	this	frame.	
	A	zoom	takes	us	into	the	lens	of	this	new	subject,	pushing	forward	into	the	black	square	that,	presumably,	returns	the	gaze	that	has	produced	this	image.	As	the	black	square	of	the	new	camera’s	lens	overtakes	the	frame,	serving	as	a	kind	of	fade	to	black,	the	credits	appear.		 This	final	sequence	is	notable	for	many	reasons.	Its	abrupt	and	overwhelming	cynicism	helps	to	situate	this	film	clearly	in	the	pessimism	of	the	New	American	Cinema	of	the	late	1960s	and	early	1970s—Easy	Rider,	another	significant	early	entry	in	this	cycle,	had	been	released	only	roughly	a	month	before,	and	shares	an	ending	in	which	the	main	characters	are	abruptly	killed	and	a	piece	of	automotive	wreckage	concludes	the	film.	But	formally	the	scene	is	striking.	The	use	of	glare	to	interrupt	the	close-ups	of	the	characters	before	the	crash	creates	a	similar	effect	to	what	appears	when	a	camera	runs	out	of	film,	and	prefigures	the	conclusion	of	the	subsequent	film	Two-Lane	Blacktop,	in	which	the	film	stops	and	then	appears	to	burn	in	front	of	the	projector.	This	appearance	of	a	“roll	out,”	as	
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it	is	called,	strives	to	reveal	the	film	to	be	artifice,	a	series	of	fictions	set	to	a	documentary	score.	The	chant	of	“The	whole	world	is	watching,”	however,	complicates	this	analysis.		 As	was	established	in	John’s	monologue	about	television	reporting,	this	film	distrusts,	or	at	least	strives	to	complicate,	the	rhetoric	that	reproduces	the	idea	that	the	media	has	the	capacity	to	represent	the	world-rending	events	of	the	1960s	without	reducing	them	to	repetitions	of	already	known,	and	necessarily	conservative,	truths—events	that	include	the	demonstrations	at	the	Democratic	National	Convention	in	Chicago.	Its	previously	declared	distrust	of	images	makes	this	final	sequence	significantly	more	difficult	to	interpret.	The	chant,	“The	whole	world	is	watching,”	often	met	the	appearance	of	news	cameras	at	demonstrations	of	the	time,	and	the	repetition	of	this	phrase	in	Chicago	is	clearly	the	product	of	news	coverage	prominently	appearing	at	the	demonstrations.	Protestors	chanted	this	particularly	often	in	regards	to	moments	of	police	aggression	and/or	violence,	indicating	to	the	police	force	that	they	can	be	held	accountable	for	their	violent	actions	as	a	result	of	their	now	being	recorded	proof	of	their	activities.	Medium	Cool	is	not	so	sure	about	this	possibility.	The	film	here	indicates	that	the	qualities	of	the	moving	image	do	no	so	clearly	map	to	accountability.	As	this	sequence	indicates,	images	are	in	fact	quite	malleable.	The	fast	and	aggressive	editing	of	the	crash	in	particular	notes	the	capacity	of	cinema	to	clearly	present	an	event	without	ever	directly	showing	it.	There	is	no	doubt	about	the	occurrence	of	this	accident	(in	a	narrative	sense)	despite	direct	evidence	being	totally	absent.	Fiction,	in	Medium	Cool,	is	absolutely	available,	what	it	finds	more	difficult	to	produce	is	fact.	Indeed	the	juxtaposition	of	“the	whole	world	is	watching”	with	images	of	a	camera	itself	presents	a	puzzling	series	of	images:	on	one	hand	reaffirming	the	capacity	of	the	camera	to	record—the	second	camera	serving	as	a	kind	of	reminder	of	the	presence	
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and	proliferation	of	images.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	this	sequence	seems	to	be	questioning	the	roles	this	camera	can	play	in	events	such	as	these.	The	cameras—the	one	recording	and	the	one	that	is	being	recorded—in	fact	at	once	reproduce	the	hopeful	and	disillusioned	dynamic	that	John	had	previously	declared	and	that	this	film	in	general	posits.	The	reproduction	of	images	is,	hopefully,	capable	of	redistributing	truth	and	accountability,	but	it	is	this	same	reproduction	that	haunts	the	capacity	of	these	images	to	do	anything.	When	the	cameras	face	each	other	it	brings	to	mind	a	kind	of	hall	of	mirrors,	indeed	the	cascade	of	reproducible	images	that	all	seem	to	undermine	each	other	are,	this	film	contends,	exactly	and	only	the	kind	of	images	that	cameras	can	reproduce.	This	sequence	and	its	culmination	with	the	other	camera	poses	a	long	and	increasingly	complex	series	of	questions:	what	can	we	say	about	this	final	sequence?	And	what	do	the	images	that	this	second	camera	presumably	records	say	about	us?	Is	this	a	call	for	an	audience	to	interact	and	ultimately	take	action	in	response	to	what	they	have	just	seen?	If	so,	what	does	it	ask	us	to	do	in	regards	to	this	film,	and	what	part	of	the	film	does	it	have	in	mind?	Are	we	here	looking	at	ourselves?	Or	are	we	looking	at	the	media	that	would	record	and	witness,	rather	than	act	upon,	tragedies	such	as	these?	Or	are	we	outside	the	media?	Is	this	camera	recording	us?	The	other	camera?	Nothing	at	all?	And	are	these	all	the	same	thing?	These	kinds	of	questions	about	media	and	action	and	images	reflects	John’s	monologue	back	on	the	viewer,	but	it	never	quite	verifies	what	it	has	established.	It	values	images	in	their	force	but	distrusts	their	faculty.	What	it	grants,	then,	is	the	annihilation	of	meaning	that	accompanies	the	utter	confusion	of	this	ending.	When	the	camera	looks	into	the	lens	of	its	compatriot/competitor,	it	registers	nothing.	In	response	it	zooms,	looking	
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closer	and	closer,	indeed	as	closely	as	it	can.	But	it	finds	only	blackness,	the	closer	it	looks	the	more	the	blackness	increases,	a	blackness	that	can	only	consume	the	film	as	it	has	the	frame	in	a	kind	of	total	irresolution.	Like	Sátántangó,	Medium	Cool	concludes	with	the	obliteration	of	visibility,	and	in	this	obliteration	it	finds	again	its	capacity	for	force	or,	as	John	might	put	it,	its	capacity	for	love.	But,	again,	what	of	the	other	camera,	the	one	that	turns	to,	at	once,	this	film	and	its	audience.	What	does	it	see?	When	it	zooms	into	our	lens,	what	does	it	find?	Blackness?	But	blackness	is	something,	it	is,	at	the	least,	the	image	unexposed,	the	possibility	for	a	new	image,	the	possibility	that	John	and	Eileen	might	return—Medium	Cool	2—or	that	there	is	something	important	still	to	be	found	within	the	lens	of	the	camera.			Death		 Speaking	at	a	moment	not	at	all	far	removed	from	the	production	of	Medium	Cool	and	the	events	that	it	depicts,	philosopher	Jean	Baudrillard	discusses	what	are	a	similar	set	of	difficulties	when	it	comes	to	reproducing,	articulating,	and	critiquing	the	culture	of	late	capitalism.	For	Baudrillard,	the	fight	against	the	oppressive	forces	of	capitalism	had	met	a	series	of	dead-ends	because	many	of	the	approaches	of	1960s	radical	politics	had	misidentified	the	nature	of	their	target.	According	to	Baudrillard	You	can’t	fight	the	aleatory	by	imposing	finalities,	you	can’t	fight	against	programmed	and	molecular	dispersion	with	prises	de	conscience	and	dialectical	sublation,	you	can’t	fight	the	code	with	political	economy,	nor	with	“revolution.”	All	the	outdated	weapons	(including	those	we	find	in	first-order	simulacra,	in	the	ethics	and	metaphysics	of	man	and	nature,	use-values,	and	other	liberatory	systems	of	reference)	are	gradually	neutralized	by	a	higher-order	general	system.	Everything	that	filters	into	the	non-finality	of	the	
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space-time	of	the	code,	or	that	attempts	to	intervene	in	it,	is	disconnected	from	its	own	ends,	disintegrated	and	absorbed.29		For	Baudrillard,	the	order	of	late-capitalism	has	developed	a	relationship	to	the	symbolic	in	which	the	lines	between	signifier	and	signified	have	been	drawn	and	redrawn	so	often	that	the	signifier	prefigures	the	supposed	connection	it	is	said	to	have	to	reality.	This	creates	a	network	of	empty	linkages	that	claim	to	present	reality	but	in	actuality	constitute	it,	pointing	always	to	its	own	hollow	linkages	as	proof	of	its	grounds.	This	unmoored,	free-floating	scaffolding	creates	a	system	whereby	traditional	methods	of	resistance	are	from	their	inception	incapable	of	reconstituting	a	new	order;	they	are	incapable	of	contributing	or	signaling	to	another	order	of	things	because	they	no	longer	have	any	ground	that	can	escape	the	destructive	forces	of	late-capitalism.	To	this	situation	Baudrillard	poses	a	question:	“Is	there	a	theory	or	practice	which	is	subversive	because	it	is	more	aleatory	than	the	system	itself,	an	indeterminate	subversion	which	would	be	to	the	order	of	the	code	what	the	revolution	was	to	the	order	of	political	economy?”30	To	this	Baudrillard	posits	his	own	tentative	response:	“Perhaps	death	and	death	alone,	the	reversibility	of	death,	belongs	to	a	higher	order	than	the	code.	Only	symbolic	disorder	can	bring	about	an	interruption	in	the	code.”31		 Given	John’s	previously	stated	interest	in	taking	on	and	subverting	the	“code”	though	which	images	and	events	are	reconstituted	and	absorbed	by	a	knowable	system—the	system,	for	him,	of	hegemonic	order	and	sanctioned	grief	reproduced	through	funeral	footage—this	ending	sequence,	its	turn	to	death	as	the	final	rejoinder,	is	of	major																																																									29	Jean	Baudrillard,	Symbolic	Exchange	and	Death,	trans.	Iain	Hamilton	Grant	(Thousand	Oaks:	SAGE	Publications),	3-4.	30	Ibid.,	4	31	Ibid.	
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significance.	Death	serves	as	the	only	outside	to	the	code	of	continuity	that	covers	over	the	reception	of	events.	Death	as	the	experience	of	utter	rupture	in	the	order	of	things.	This	is	a	kind	of	death	that	can	arrive	and	interrupt	the	codes,	it	is	not	JFK’s	death,	or	RFK’s	or	MLK’s,	but	death	as	experienced	by	John	and	Eileen.	This	ending	is	then	only	satisfying	for	these	two	characters	as	for	us	their	death	is	simply	reabsorbed	back	into	a	knowable	system	of	images.	Hence,	the	significance	of	the	radio	broadcast	that	prefigures	this	accident;	over	this	broadcast	we	hear	how	the	random	tragedy	that	has	befallen	these	two	is	already	being	rendered	in	coherent	terms.	And	indeed	the	specifics	of	this	broadcast	are	valuable:	John,	of	relative	fame	and	notoriety	around	the	city,	is	recognized,	but	Eileen,	who	remains	anonymous	to	the	broadcasters,	remains	unidentified.	The	forces	of	power,	through	John,	are	already	at	work	reproducing	how	we	should	feel	about	his	death—womanizing	wealthy	cameraman	dies	after	convention—without,	of	course,	the	turn	to	a	more	radical	politics	or	a	critical	attitude	towards	current	events	finding	its	way	into	his	eulogy.	Eileen,	having	had	less	financial	success,	falls	totally	out	of	view.		 Baudrillard	continues	evaluating	the	function	of	death	by	remarking	that,	“Every	closed	or	metastable,	functional	or	cybernetic	system	is	shadowed	by	mockery	and	instantaneous	subversion	(which	no	longer	takes	the	detour	through	long	dialectical	labour),	because	all	the	system’s	inertia	acts	against	it.”32	This	is	to	say	that	a	system	designed	to	be	totalizing	and	entirely	available	for	inspection	and	that	is	insulated	from	its	outside	by	efficiency	and	certainty,	is	overturned	most	easily	by	its	disavowed	outside,	what	is	always	its	failure:	death.	Baudrillard	continues,	“This	is	the	fatality	of	every	system	committed	by	its	own	logic	to	total	perfection	and	therefore	to	a	total	defectiveness,	to																																																									32	Ibid.	
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absolute	infallibility	and	therefore	irrevocable	breakdown:	the	aim	of	all	bound	energies	is	their	own	death.”33	For	Baudrillard,	systems	that	present	themselves	as	total	inevitably	fail	because	of	the	vehemence	with	which	they	deny	the	very	possibility	of	that	failing,	of	an	outside	that	they	absolutely	disavow.	The	refusal	of	this	outside	means	that	it	will	only	return	with	greater	precision,	at	some	point	undermining	the	system’s	functioning.	And,	for	Baudrillard,	this	undermining	must	present	itself	as	death,	as	the	radical	disruption	that	totally	subverts	a	principle,	turning	over	its	functions	and	proving	its	inadequacy.	Death	opens	up	a	fissure	in	the	otherwise	stable	façade	of	modern	rationality,	and	in	so	doing	points	always	to	its	limits.	This,	for	Baudrillard,	is	why	“the	ever	increasing	fascination	with	the	catastrophic,	the	accident	and	the	assassination	attempt:	reason	itself	as	pursued	by	the	hope	of	a	universal	revolt	against	its	own	norms	and	principles.”34	Indeed	death	is	the	one	subject	that	reason	cannot	strive	towards	addressing.	Fascination	with	catastrophe,	for	Baudrillard,	is	evidence	of	a	society’s	reversibility;	this	is	not	a	subject	that	can	be	investigated,	and	that	is	what	makes	it	so	fascinating.		 Baudrillard’s	major	intervention	here	is	not	the	deployment	of	the	way	that	death	haunts	and	undermines	total	systems—this	is	no	doubt	a	significant	topic,	but	it	is	not	his	emphasis.	His	intention	is	instead	to	focus	on	the	ways	to	combat	these	total	systems,	and	death	is	simply	one	way	of	doing	this.	According	to	Baudrillard,	“Things	must	be	pushed	to	the	limit,	where	quite	naturally	they	collapse	and	are	inverted.	At	the	peak	of	value	we	are	closest	to	ambivalence,	at	the	pinnacle	of	coherence	we	are	closest	to	the	abyss	of	corruption	which	haunts	the	reproduction	of	signs	of	the	code.”35	Hence	the	impossible																																																									33	Ibid.	34	Ibid.,	162.	35	Ibid.,	4.	
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bind	that	John	recounts:	all	his	systems	for	defense	and	critique	are	reduced	only	to	the	code	for	understanding	and	evaluating	media	images.	And	hence	too	this	film’s	turn	to	this	abrupt	ending,	this	ending	where	any	system	for	making	meaning	clearly	fails,	and	where	these	cameras	turn	to	look	at	each	other,	only	to	be	met	with	emptiness	in	return,	an	utter	blankness	that	refuses	to	tell	us	anything	more.		 Baudrillard	contends	that	“Simulation	must	go	further	than	the	system.	Death	must	be	played	against	death:	a	radical	tautology	that	makes	the	system’s	own	logic	the	ultimate	weapon.”36	Rather	than	deploying	a	cogent	critique	or	a	constructive	retort	to	a	system’s	qualities,	the	most	effective	response	to	the	total	system	is	to	push	it	towards	its	own	extremes.	The	approach	whereby	Medium	Cool	mounts	its	attack	on	a	government	that	it	depicts	as	increasingly	violent	and	threatening	is	not	to	point	outs	its	flaws,	but	to	escalate	them.	The	shallow,	image	obsessed	John	doesn’t	find	a	solution	in	the	radical	politics	of	the	1960s,	he	in	fact	finds	that	route	as	unwelcoming	as	the	world	he	fights	against.	Instead	of	building	a	system	to	identify	with	the	demonstrators,	Medium	Cool	further	distances	itself	from	the	world,	content	to	observe	this	seeming	disintegration	of	order	and	to	reproduce	it	through	images—what	can	be	loved	but	also	should	be	distrusted.	The	film’s	solution,	then,	is	neither	to	point	out	the	order	whereby	images	find	meaning	nor	to	attempt	to	present	images	unavailable	to	that	order.	Instead,	Medium	Cool	responds	by	reproducing	the	system	over	again.	Hence	again	the	radio	broadcast	that	prefigures	the	crash,	these	images	will	be	rendered	knowable.	In	this	way	a	random	event	will	become	meaningful,	but	the	function	of	the	code	will	be	to	render	these	meanings	in	a	very	strict	way,	it	will	absorb	them	into	its	system.																																																									36	Ibid.	
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	 Baudrillard	labels	one	way	to	disrupt	this	system	of	absorption	“pataphysics,”	what	he	defines	as	“a	science	of	imaginary	solutions.”37	It	is	through	the	process	of	producing	“the	extreme	limit	of	simulation”	whereby	the	boundaries	of	a	system	can	finally	be	viewed,	and	perhaps	reversed.38	This	film	presents	the	absolute	limit	of	the	violence	on	which	the	system	relies—for	Wexler	a	major	marker	of	a	growing	authoritarianism.	This	is	a	system	of	pure	media	reproduction	that	locks	in	an	ideology	simply	through	the	multitudes	of	mirror	like	reproductions	that	contain	it,	a	media	environment	with	such	control	and	centralization	but	almost	no	platform.	When,	earlier	in	the	film,	John	lost	his	job,	it	was	because	of	his	refusal	to	authorize	his	footage	for	government	inspection.	This	moment	crystalized	John’s	project:	his	simultaneous	love	and	distrust	for	images	is	finally	placed	explicitly	against	its	use	as	a	tool	for	stabilizing	and	reproducing	power.	This	is	the	pataphysics	of	this	film:	that	the	moving	image	holds	within	it	some	mystical	power	that	exceeds	its	ideological	potential,	a	kind	of	asignifying	thrust	whereby	the	images	can	amount	to	something	that	overwrites	perspective	and	captures	something	new.	And	it	is	the	reproduction	of	images—highlighted	by	the	dueling	cameras	at	the	end	but	also	the	protest	footage	itself—that	trouble	this	project,	that	reveal	it	to	be	just	an	imaginary	solution,	one	with	no	substance	or	coherence	but	that	nonetheless	contains	something	of	significance,	a	solution	that,	even	its	failing,	helps	us	see	something	of	the	boundaries	of	the	system.	This	is	the	appeal	of	a	pataphysics,	it	reveals	something	in	its	own	failing,	and	in	so	doing,	hopefully,	points	to	its	own	reversibility	and,	finally,	to	the	reversibility	of	what	it	critiques.	
																																																								37	Ibid.,	5.	38	Ibid.	
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For	Wexler,	the	kind	of	death	that	Baudrillard	describes	is	literalized.	John	and	Eileen’s	abstract	collision—the	cause	of	which	is	never	presented	to	us—arrives	and	punctuates	the	narrative	of	the	film,	breaking	apart	its	already	disruptive	order	and	offering	up	the	possibility	of	its	own	failing,	the	possibility	that	it	too	only	locates	the	same	order	that	it	tries	to	disrupt,	the	order	that	puts	tragedy	in	its	place	and	denies	the	possibility	for	something	new.	But,	to	be	clear,	it	is	its	doubt	that	allows	this	film	to	critique	these	totalizing	systems.	Wexler’s	film	can	be	said	to	align	with	Baudrillard’s	ideas,	and	the	system	that	produces	its	own	outside	that	it	wishes	to	dismantle	is	indeed	American	democracy	threatened	by	authoritarianism.	An	American	democracy	in	particular	predicated	on	order	and	economic	prosperity.	This	is	not,	as	was	Woman	on	the	Beach,	a	total	rejection	of	the	concept	of	democracy,	but	a	rejection	of	a	democracy	that	seems	to	be	trending	towards	authoritarianism,	for	it	is	authoritarianism—its	mixture	of	violence	and	certainty—that	is	total	and	self-justifying	and	that	most	clearly	pushes	against	the	invisible	boundaries	that	Baudrillard	discusses.	This	film	tries	to	photograph	its	own	death,	tries	to	figure	an	outside	to	the	systems	of	organization	that	it	is	itself	trapped	within.	Its	solution,	though,	can	only	ever	be	blackness.		 The	totalizing	system	at	play	here	is	constituted	by	the	belief	that	what	is	happening	in	the	U.S.	around	1968	is	a	revolt	against	a	hierarchical	logic	that	points	upwards	towards	a	supposedly	legitimate	and	perhaps	universal	authority	that	accounts	for	the	range	of	available	political	arrangements.	What	this	film	pushes	against	is	the	specter,	to	whatever	degree	present,	of	authoritarianism.		A	Global	1968	
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	 In	May	1968	in	France	there	were	riots	and	strikes	on	a	massive	scale.	Starting	in	the	universities	and	spreading	eventually	though	much	of	the	country,	in	the	range	of	nine	million	workers	across	all	fields	of	employment	took	part	in	the	strikes,	halting	France	altogether	for	weeks.	As	Kristin	Ross	explains,	May	’68	was	the	largest	mass	movement	in	French	history,	the	biggest	strike	in	the	history	of	the	French	workers’	movement	and	the	only	“general”	insurrection	the	overdeveloped	world	has	known	since	World	War	II.	It	was	the	first	general	strike	that	extended	beyond	the	traditional	centers	of	industrial	production	to	include	workers	in	the	service	industries,	the	communication	and	culture	industries—the	whole	sphere	of	social	reproduction.	No	professional	sector,	no	category	of	worker	was	unaffected	by	the	strike;	no	region,	city,	or	village	in	France	was	untouched.39		Largely	a	response	to	the	conservative	government	of	Charles	de	Gaulle,	May	1968	has	become	famous	as	a	beacon	of	both	the	possibility	of	radical	change	and	its	failings.	The	later	because,	according	to	many	accounts,	the	French	1968	movement	failed	to	bring	about	major	political	reforms,	and	conservative	forces	even	managed	to	further	consolidate	power	in	its	wake.	Regardless	of	its	effects,	the	modern	conception	of	May	1968	in	France,	as	Kristin	Ross	argues,	is	that	of	a	non-violent	and	relatively	benign	series	of	events	that	have	merely	mapped	the	transition	“form	an	authoritarian	bourgeois	state	to	a	new,	liberal,	modern	financier	bourgeoisie.”40	Ostensibly	muting	its	political	aspirations,	Ross	contends	that	May	1968	now	serves	as	a	kind	of	mere	teleological	transition	from	a	pre-democratic	moment	to	a	modern	capitalist	democracy,	an	essentially	toothless	undertaking	that	simply	prefigured	modern	France.	Ross,	of	course,	pushes	back	against	this	trajectory,	and	instead	focuses	on	an	attempt	to	question	the	official	story	of	May	1968	in	the	hopes	of	re-finding	
																																																								39	Kristin	Ross,	May	’68	and	its	Afterlives	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press),	3-4.	40	Ibid.,	6.	
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some	of	its	radical	potential.	Ross	proposes	her	project	as	follows—I	shall	here	quote	it	at	length	because,	I	think,	it	resonates	well	with	Medium	Cool:	The	paradox	of	May’s	memory	can	be	simply	stated.	How	does	a	mass	movement	that	sought	above	all,	in	my	view,	to	contest	the	domain	of	the	expert,	to	disrupt	the	system	of	naturalized	spheres	of	competence	(especially	the	sphere	of	specialized	politics),	become	translated	in	the	years	that	followed	into	little	more	than	a	“knowledge”	of	’68,	on	the	basis	of	which	a	whole	generation	of	self-proclaimed	experts	and	authorities	could	then	assert	their	expertise?	This	moment	swept	away	categorical	territories	and	social	definitions,	and	achieved	unforeseen	alliances	and	synchronicities	
between	social	sectors	and	between	very	diverse	people	working	together	to	conduct	their	affairs	collectively.	How	did	such	a	movement	get	relocated	into	defined	“sociological”	residences:	the	“student	milieu”	or	“the	generation”?41		These	are	the	problems	that	confound	Medium	Cool.	Having	seen	the	world	changing	events	that	took	place	in	the	U.S.	throughout	the	1960s,	Medium	Cool	asks	how	the	protests	that	it	records	are	to	avoid	the	reduction	that	Ross	attributes	to	1968	in	France;	that	is,	how	are	they	to	avoid	being	taken	up	by	the	forces	who	might	solidify	and	stultify	their	effects?	How	can	they	do	what	John	hopes	moving	images	can	do,	present	something	new,	without	falling	again	into	a	teleology	of	democratic-capitalist	transition?		 Ross’	solutions	to	this	problem	follows	two	trajectories,	on	the	one	hand	tracing	the	legacy	of	May	1968	in	France	through	the	actions	and	ideas	of	philosophers	and	activists	that	it	helped	to	inspire	and,	on	the	other	hand,	examining	the	practices	of	those	who	participated	in	these	events.	Her	main	assertion	is	that	the	events	of	May	1968	represent,	“Above	all	else	a	massive	refusal	on	the	part	of	thousands,	even	millions,	of	people	to	see	in	the	social	what	we	usually	see.”42	Medium	Cool	is	of	value	in	its	striking	degree	of	refusal.	John’s	distrust	of	the	ways	that	images	are	ordered	and	this	open	and	ambiguous	ending																																																									41	Ibid.,	6-7.	42	Ibid.,	7.	
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refuse	the	status	of	this	film	as	progenitor	of	meaning	or	prominent	talking	piece.	Instead,	the	camera	turns	itself	on	itself,	turns	itself	inside	out,	and	refuses	its	status.	This	film	then	stands	with	the	movement	it	depicts	as	resoundingly	refusing	to	see	the	social	in	the	rigid,	predetermined	ways	that	might	deploy	a	cogent	rejoinder,	renunciation	or	clear	rendering	of	the	events	it	depicts.	Instead,	it	stands	in	refusal.		 Ross	uses	the	example	of	the	art	students	who	occupied	their	university	in	order	to	address	the	function	of	the	arts	during	the	May	events	themselves.	For	Ross,	the	incommensurability	between	politics—defined	broadly	as	the	contestation	of	some	order—and	culture	was	essential	to	the	movement.	“The	failure	of	cultural	solutions	to	provide	an	answer,	the	invention	and	deployment	of	political	forms	in	direct	contestation	with	existing	cultural	forms,	the	exigency	of	political	practices	over	cultural	ones”	was,	for	Ross,	definitive	of	the	1968	student	movement.43	Hence,	for	Ross,	the	students,	who	produced	signage	and	slogans	usable	to	the	movement	only	in	regards	to	continuing,	without	attempting	to	orchestrate	any	direction.		Speed	became	the	mode	of	artistic	critique	here,	not	articulation.	This	idea	is	of	particular	importance	in	understand	the	conclusion	of	Medium	Cool,	as	it	maps	a	way	of	thinking	about	the	political	function	of	art.	Politics	in	this	view	functions	as	the	name	for	a	contestation	against	a	calcified	order	and	the	function	of	political	art	therefore	becomes	either	engendering	or	spurring	this	contestation.	What	art	can’t	do	is	bridge	the	fissure	that	this	contestation	creates,	for	if	it	were	to	do	so	it	would	then	take	the	form	of	governance,	and	would	cover	over	its	role	as	site	of	rupture.	This	reconfiguration	of	the	roles	of	art	in	regards	to	politics	then	favors	openings	over	closings,	and	engagement	over	resolution.	For	this	model	of	art	to	function	it																																																									43	Ibid.,	15.	
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must	always	push	against	the	principle	of	meaninglessness;	it	must	strive	to	make	us	see	
something	but	never	tell	us	how	to	see	it.	This	is	a	very	difficult	dynamic	to	maneuver,	as	it	demands	art	neither	function	as	example	nor	ever	as	authority.	Art	must	remain	between,	it	must	ask	us	to	rethink	the	social,	but	never	quite	tell	us	how	or	why.	It	must	refuse,	and	in	this	refusal	renounce	too	its	own	form.		 This	category	of	art	then	becomes	very	difficult	to	locate,	and	furthermore	generates	a	strange	set	of	question:	can	a	political	artwork	exists	outside	its	context?	Can	it	be	made	to	deliberately	do	anything?	Can	it	account	for	its	own	outcomes?	This	is	all	to	ask,	what	can	political	art	say	in	contexts	like	these?	For	Ross,	and	perhaps	too	for	Wexler,	the	answer	must	be	nothing,	for	to	speak	a	meaning	is	to	redact	its	use	as	object	calling	only	for	something	new.	Medium	Cool	magnificently	enacts	this	problem	in	its	conclusion.	It	keeps	at	bay	the	forces	that	might	render	the	political	events	it	depicts	meaningful	and	understandable;	but	this	keeping	at	bay	is	always	also	its	failure,	as	a	refusal	of	meaning	is	too	a	refusal	of	coherence,	understanding,	and	autonomy.	Art	is	always	just	supplement	here,	helping	us	to	look	but	never	telling	us	what	to	look	for.	Like	the	ending	of	Sátántangó	or	Jung-rae’s	escapes	in	Woman	on	the	Beach,	Medium	Cool	pushes	up	against	the	void	of	its	own	meaninglessness,	but	its	direct	presentation	of	political	violence	highlights	the	stakes	of	this	dynamic.	What	are	we	to	do	now?	Having	seen	this	film	and	understood,	perhaps,	what	it	has	shown	us,	what	available	avenues	for	response	does	it	engender?		 Alain	Touraine	likewise	discusses	the	student	movements	of	May	1968	in	France,	albeit	from	a	different	perspective.	For	Touraine,	the	movement	had	two	distinct	sources	from	which	it	drew	its	strength,	and	these	generally	stood	opposed	to	one	and	another.	The	first	of	these	arrives	from	those,	like	Claude	Lefort	and	Edgar	Morin,	who	lionize	the	
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disruptive	and	anarchic	elements	of	the	movement.	Touraine	represents	these	views	by	saying	that,	for	these	thinkers,	“The	movement	is	defined	by	the	capacity	to	transcend	its	own	objectives”	and,	“Is	defined	less	by	its	objectives	than	by	the	type	of	community	that	it	creates.”44	Touraine	associates	these	types	of	thinkers	with	the	university,	and	I	think	it	is	how	we	can	define	Medium	Cool.	For	this	film,	the	value	of	the	political	movement	that	it	depicts	is	not	to	be	located	in	its	adherence	to	a	particular	set	of	principles;	its	value	can	instead	be	found	in	the	simple	perpetuation	of	its	position	of	rejection—it	seeks	only	to	maintain	an	opposition	to	authority.	In	Touraine’s	words,	Medium	Cool	strives	to	locate	an	“antisociety,”	what	is	defined	through	its	opposition	to	a	dominant	order,	not	through	any	allegiance	to	a	particular	set	of	goals	or	principles.		 But,	as	Touraine	notes,	this	antisociety	also	produces	its	own	set	of	problems.	For	Touraine,	the	rejection	that	propels	this	kind	of	movement,	“Either	leads	to	marginality	or	ends	by	overturning	the	social	order,	but	it	is	impotent	in	the	face	of	the	political	problems	of	governing	and	directing	society.”45	This	is	to	say	that	this	kind	of	anarchic	social	movement	constantly	rubs	against	the	inability	of	an	agenda-less	arrangement	to	present	a	coherent	response	to	the	problems	that	they	are	rallied	around	defeating.	This	is	too	a	criticism	of	Medium	Cool,	for,	as	we	have	seen,	its	turn	to	disruption	over	and	above	coherent	critique	is	productive,	in	a	sense,	for	the	project	of	depicting	the	effects	of	a	violent	government.	But	where	it	stumbles	is	in	its	capacity	to	produce	a	unifying	alternative	to	the	problems	it	finds.	
																																																								44	Alain	Touraine,	The	Post-Industrial	Society,	trans.	Leonard	F.	X.	Mayhew	(New	York:	Random	House),	89.	45	Ibid.,	90.	
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	 Pushing	against	the	antisociety	mode	is	what	I	shall	call	the	definitional	aspect	of	these	movements.	Less	aligned	with	the	universities—for	which	Touraine	has	many	concerns—the	definitional	pull	strives	to	clearly	articulate	its	oppositional	points	and	produce	an	alternative.	As	Touraine	indicates,	In	the	United	States,	the	movement	at	Berkeley	and	Columbia	cannot	be	separated	from	the	struggle	against	the	Vietnam	War	and	the	black	revolt;	in	the	socialist	countries,	the	student	action	was	part	of	the	struggle	against	Stalinist	or	post-Stalinist	techno-bureaucracy;	so,	almost	immediately,	the	major	concern	in	France	was	the	union	of	students	and	workers	against	the	Gaullist	regime	and	capitalist	society…	The	struggle	constantly	moved	out	of	the	university	faculties	and	developed	in	the	streets,	led	by	students	and	young	workers	who	were	more	and	more	at	one	with	each	other.46		For	Touraine	it	is	when	these	definitional	and	antisociety	drives	meet	that	a	movement	can	begin	to	attempt	to	be	broadly	effective.	At	once	concerned	with	self-expression	and	predicated	on	building	a	community	determined	by	its	opposition,	but	also	keeping	track	of	its	definitional	aspirations	and	its	real	visions	for	a	different	kind	of	society,	governance	and	economy,	these	two	kinds	of	social	movements	are	prepared	to	begin	to	level	critique	
and	replace	it	with	a	new	vision	for	society	only	when	they	are	incorporated	in	equal	measures.	It	is	the	capacity	to	both	oppose	order	via	solidarity	while	maintaining	a	staunch	relationship	to	openness	and	also	give	oneself	over	to	the	capacity	of	a	new	collective	to	constitute	something	in	particular	that	these	youth	movements	at	their	best	represent.	
Medium	Cool,	however,	refuses	the	second	half	of	this	equation,	it	demands	openness	but	provides	no	recourse	for	the	reconstitution	of	society,	and	in	this	regard	nobly	fails,	as	it	must,	to	actually	bring	about	the	change	that	it	indirectly	demands.	This	film	is	the	site	of	contestation	but	never	its	solution,	and	in	this	way	this	way	it	is	political.	
																																																								46	Ibid.,	90-91.	
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The	danger	here	is	always	the	slipping	back	into	authority.	Medium	Cool’s	own	capacity	to	reproduce	order	is	disavowed	in	the	name	of	an	opening	to	potential	but—apart	from	the	failings	of	saying	nothing	in	particular—this	approach	always	also	leaves	available	the	possibility	for	a	new	authority	to	approach,	to	rise	from	the	darkness	or	take	hold	of	these	openings.	For	radical	openness,	despite	all	its	rejections,	always	provides	the	room	for	the	very	thing	it	rejected	to	reemerge,	for	negative	forces	to	find	new	shapes	and	to	take	hold	of	the	ambiguities	to	which	films	like	Medium	Cool	cling.	For	within	its	eternal	openness	and	adamant	waiting	is	to	be	found	radical	difference,	but	also	the	repetition	of	the	same	and	indeed	perhaps	also	something	worse.	Medium	Cool	is	a	film	about	and	enacting	force,	but	what	it	lacks	is	faculty.	This	is	its	major	problem:	in	order	to	say	what	it	wants,	it	must	say	nothing	at	all;	it	must	be	adamant	in	its	ambiguity,	and	in	this	way	it	must	always	fail.	Its	attempts	to	render	politics,	to	chart	a	course	through	all	this	tumult	and	unrest	and	to	provide	something	like	a	précis	for	these	events,	something	that	might	make	them	understandable,	manageable	and	that	might	point	towards	something	else	must	always	come	up	empty.	It	must	fail,	fail	at	coherence,	fail	at	narrative,	fail	at	filmmaking,	and	fail	at	politics.	For	to	not	fail	would	be	to	do	exactly	what	it	resists.	This	is	the	impossible	bind	of	Medium	Cool,	and	this	brand	of	anti-authoritarian	art	cinema	broadly	defined:	it	must	all	always	fail,	and	in	doing	to	open	up	the	possibility	for	something	else,	something	new.		 	
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CONCLUSION		 The	Possibility	of	Action			 Each	of	the	films	discussed	in	this	project	rejects	authority	in	the	name	of	revolutionary	politics.	As	I	have	shown,	by	rejecting	all	authority,	even	and	primarily	the	filmmaker’s	own,	these	films	must	turn	to	ambiguity.	The	difficulty	of	these	films	is	constituted	by	this	turn,	because	the	embrace	of	ambiguity	as	politics	means	that	there	is	no	guarantee	that	anything	new	will	arise.	The	positive	outcome	of	this	gamble	is	that	these	films	might	result	in	thought,	thought	about	politics	and	about	the	possibility	to	realize	something	different;	the	negative	outcome	is	that	these	films	remain	absent	of	meaning.	There	are	therefore	risks	involved	in	these	undertakings:	the	risk	of	irrelevance,	the	risk	of	inaction,	the	risk	of	appearing	to	say	nothing	at	all.		 	In	Germany	Year	Zero,	when	Edmund	finally	gently	hangs	up	his	coat	and	jumps	from	the	opened	side	of	a	bombed	Berlin	building	to	his	death,	openness	is	extended	to	its	limit.	The	impossibility	of	his	situation,	the	unbearability	of	his	available	avenues	for	action,	has	exhausted	him	and	us,	and	the	only	system	that	can	leave	open	the	possibility	for	total	difference	is	to	be	found	in	the	film’s	refusal	to	make	a	decision	as	to	the	responsibility	and	orientation	of	his	violent	acts	and	the	status	of	his	punishment.	So	he	must	jump,	and	thanks	to	this	jump	this	film	makes	its	refusal;	with	anger	it	declares	that	it	will	not	resolve	the	political	future	of	Edmund’s	world.	Edmund’s	future	is	closed,	but	the	possibility	for	different	political	outcomes	remains	open.	Likewise,	in	Sátántangó	when	the	Doctor	finally	boards	himself	into	his	home,	he	too	makes	the	decision	to	preserve	openness;	here,	ironically,	he	accomplishes	this	by	confining	himself	to	his	drab	house,	resigned	to	inaction.	Alone	in	his	mud	soaked	town,	the	Doctor	demands	that	we	act	just	like	him,	that	we	watch	
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as	the	denizens	of	this	town	slowly	leave,	and	then	that	we	watch	as	he	finally	closes	out	all	light.	Alone	in	his,	and	our,	inaction,	the	film	asks	whether	refusal	is	a	path	towards	change,	but	it	refuses,	as	it	must,	to	answer	this	question.	Indecision,	or	perhaps	the	raging	against	decision,	is	complicated	by	Woman	on	the	Beach	as	Jung-rae’s	model	for	how	the	world	might	engage	differently	with	knowledge	and	decision	is	directly	stated.	But	this	film’s	ambivalence	toward	Jung-rae’s	claims,	as	examined	through	the	possibility	that	he	might	just	be	using	them	as	avenues	for	escape,	complicates	their	validity.	When	this	film	ends,	Mun-suk	points	her	car	towards	what	might	be	a	positive	horizon.	But	in	so	doing,	she	gets	stuck	in	the	sand	and,	as	a	result,	heads	back	the	way	she	came.	The	film	likewise	traces	this	path	between	the	appeal	of	openness	and	the	possibility	for	decision,	now	with	palpable	frustration	as	to	how	openness	to	change	can	be	manipulated.	Finally,	at	the	end	of	Medium	Cool,	when	John	and	Eileen	die	abruptly	in	a	car	wreck	and	the	twin	cameras	turn	on	each	other	with	such	dramatics,	this	openness	as	refusal	is	once	and	for	all	codified.	The	dueling	cameras,	which	bring	into	question	the	capacity	of	media	to	withstand	and	represent	refusal,	finally	find	in	each	other	only	a	black	screen,	thus	signaling	the	possibility	for	difference	that	relies	on	the	absolute	negation	of	the	means	and	methods	for	representation.	In	this	most	extreme	dedication	to	openness,	this	mode	of	anti-authoritarian	cinema	finds	its	limit:	a	dedication	to	difference	that	blocks	its	ability	to	say	anything	at	all.	These	chapters	have	been	arranged	to	broaden	the	scope	of	rejection	as	each	proceeds:	First,	authoritarianism	is	rejected,	then	the	economic	corollaries	of	capitalism	and	communism	are	dismissed,	and	finally	even	democracy	is	put	aside.	These	rejections	signal	towards	some	kind	of	positive	alternative,	but,	as	each	of	these	endings	makes	clear,	
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they	always	refuse	to	picture	it,	some	refusing	to	picture	anything	at	all.	Each	less	declarative	than	the	last,	these	films	always	come	near	to	meaning	but	never	quite	arrive.	This	is	the	fulfillment	of	their	anti-authoritarian	wish,	but	it	also	amounts	to	a	position	of	indecision.	This	ambiguity	renders	any	reading	of	these	films	unstable.		 The	dark	rejoinder	to	these	refusals	is	to	be	found	in	the	possibility	that	their	hope	in	a	positive	future	might	be	overturned,	for	ambiguity	not	only	renders	these	films	without	content,	but	it	also	presents	opportunities	for	cooption.	A	dedication	to	total	openness	is	not	only	ineffective,	it	also	makes	these	films	available	for	unforeseen	actants	to	take	as	their	own.	That	is,	the	forces	of	power	in	the	world	today,	in	particular	the	forces	of	neoliberal	democratic	capitalism,	can	point	to	just	these	fixations	on	ambiguity	and	say	“this	is	us	too”—they	can	claim	also	to	maintain	a	radically	open	status,	and	can	take	ownership	of	the	creative	powers	of	contingency	and	ambiguity.	The	dynamic	that	allows	for	this	cooptation	on	the	part	of	powerful	and	in	particular	market	oriented	forces	is	particularly	pernicious	given	the	likelihood	that	in	moments	of	openness	the	prevailing	forces	of	power	will	likely	be	the	first	things	to	come	to	fill	these	openings,	so	long	as	the	piece	fits.	The	task	of	the	forces	of	contemporary	authority	and	control	is	to	create	a	dominant	ideology	that	is	as	malleable	and	aleatory	as	the	avenues	of	ambiguity	and	anti-authority	that	might	critique	it.	Hence,	the	current	structure	of	the	ideology	that	accompanies	neoliberalism	results	in	a	worldview	open	to	inclusivity,	but	one	that	also	takes	for	granted	the	unassailability	of	capitalism	and	the	market,	a	rationale	whereby	all	methods	of	thought	are	justified	by	their	closeness	and	similarity	to	the	market.	It	is	perhaps	the	capacity	to	render	an	anti-authoritarian	critique	silent	and	ineffective	by	beating	it	to	its	
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own	arguments	that	has	made	neoliberalism	so	effective—we	simply	have	no	system	by	which	to	reject	it.		 These	films	then	fight	against	authority,	but	they	present	no	rejoinder	for	the	new	kinds	of	authority	that	have	taken	root	in	our	post	1989	world.	This	is	not	to	say	that	these	films	failed,	but	to	question	whether	their	methods	are	the	right	ones	for	today.	What	now	remains	for	a	cinema	dedicated	to	combating	the	rise	of	unchecked	authority?	Is	authority	even	the	problem	anymore?	And,	finally,	if	these	films	are	representative	of	global	art	cinema	broadly	defined—particularly	in	regards	to	their	embrace	of	ambiguity	as	well	as	its	failings—what	is	the	role	of	this	tradition	of	cinema	in	any	attempt	to	combat	dishonest	and	destructive	forces	in	the	world?	These	concluding	remarks	will	proceed	by	following	a	different	path	for	evaluating	the	potentials	for	the	style	of	cinema	addressed	here:	what	I	contend	is	that	where	these	films	find	their	use	is	not	in	their	capacity	to	produce	meaning,	but	in	their	ability	to	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	producing	thought.	But	the	thought	they	produce	is	of	particular	value;	it	is	a	style	of	thinking	that	provides,	ideally,	the	space	for	a	unified	political	project,	one	that	is	not	aleatory	but	rooted	in	a	general	claim	for	the	well-being	of	a	society.	What	these	films	might	do	is	provide	the	grounds	by	which	thinking	might	arise,	but	might	also	find	its	way	into	action	anchored	by	a	unified	politics—in	these	contexts	a	politics	built	around	the	needs	of	the	dejected,	misguided,	or	otherwise	imperiled	characters	that	each	film	presents.		 For	Hannah	Arendt	the	traditional	relationship	between	thinking	and	action	has	been	reversed	in	the	modern	world,	leading	to	myriad	problems	in	the	relationship	between	thinking	and	politics.	Traditionally,	Arendt	notes,	“Thought	was	conceived	as	the	most	direct	and	important	way	to	lead	to	the	contemplation	of	truth.	Since	Plato,	and	
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probably	since	Socrates,	thinking	was	understood	as	the	inner	dialogue	in	which	one	speaks	with	himself	[sic]…	and	although	this	dialogue	lacks	all	outward	manifestation	and	even	requires	a	more	or	less	complete	cessation	of	all	other	activities,	it	constitutes	in	itself	a	highly	active	state.”1	In	this	arrangement,	thought	functions	as	a	personal	interchange	in	which	different	avenues	and	options	are	considered	and,	through	an	inner	dialectic,	the	thinker	prepares	to	behold	truth,	despite	its	possible	non-arrival.		 If	these	films	strive	to	produce	a	window	upon	contemporary	events	in	the	hopes	of	opening	the	possibility	to	see	something	anew,	and	if	their	ambiguity	refuses	any	artificial	conclusion	that	might	disrupt	this	process	of	renewed	vision,	then	one	way	to	look	at	these	films	is	as	serving	to	provide	avenues	for	thought.	That	is,	they	offer	up	a	series	of	familiar	looking	but	otherwise	difficult	to	order	images	and	ask	that	the	audience	arrive	at	some	understanding	regardless	of	a	readily	available	meaning,	and	in	this	way	they	ask	for	thought.	They	ask	that	a	viewer	reconcile	these	images	with	their	understanding	of	the	world,	an	interchange	that	relies	on	the	hope	that	the	viewer	might	find	in	them	some	new	idea	or	perspective.	The	particular	subject	of	each	film	here	is	the	topic	of	political	transition,	and	ideally	each	provides	the	space	for	a	dialectic	that	can	yield	to	some	conclusion,	in	this	sense	they	are	films	that	inspire	thought.	Thinking	in	this	way	is	not	distinct	from	action	but	is	in	fact	a	specific	form	of	action,	one	that	calls	forth	a	whole	category	of	subsequent	actions,	those	known	as	“work.”		As	Arendt	explains:	Thinking	and	working	are	two	different	activities	which	never	quite	coincide;	the	thinker	who	wants	the	world	to	know	the	‘content’	of	his	[sic]	thoughts	must	first	of	all	stop	thinking	and	remember	his	thoughts.	Remembrance	in	this,	as	in	all	other																																																									1	Hannah	Arendt,	The	Human	Condition	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1958),	291.	
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cases,	prepares	the	intangible	and	the	futile	for	their	eventual	materialization;	it	is	the	beginning	of	the	work	process,	and	like	the	craftsman’s	consideration	of	the	model	which	will	guide	his	work,	its	most	immaterial	stage.2		This	cinema	of	transition	asks	us	to	think	and	hopes	to	serve	as	the	beginning	of	what	might	later	be	called	work,	or	rather	the	rebuilding	of	things	that	results	from	thought	and	that	can	help	turn	these	insights	into	material	change	in	the	world.	But	in	the	modern	world,	which	for	Arendt	is	the	world	after	Galileo,	the	function	of	thought,	and	of	philosophy	in	particular,	has	been	radically	altered.	For	Arendt,	“After	Descartes	based	his	own	philosophy	upon	the	discoveries	of	Galileo,	philosophy	has	seemed	condemned	to	be	always	one	step	behind	the	scientists	and	their	ever	more	amazing	discoveries,	whose	principles	it	has	strived	arduously	to	discover	ex	posto	facto	and	to	fit	into	some	over-all	interpretation	of	the	nature	of	human	knowledge.”3	In	the	modern	world,	for	Arendt,	the	domain	of	truth	is	thought	to	be	addressed	only	by	science,	and	philosophy	is	left	either	to	attempt	to	understand	or	critique	the	epistemological	underpinnings	of	science	or	to	attempt	to	address	current	conditions	with	clarity	but	without	any	appeal	to	any	overall	solution.	As	Arendt	notes,	speaking	again	of	philosophers,	In	both	instances,	whether	they	looked	upon	nature	or	upon	history,	they	tried	to	understand	and	come	to	terms	with	what	happened	without	them.	Obviously,	philosophy	suffered	more	from	modernity	than	any	other	field	of	human	endeavor;	and	it	is	difficult	to	say	whether	it	suffered	more	from	the	almost	automatic	rise	of	activity	to	an	altogether	unexpected	and	unprecedented	dignity	or	form	the	loss	of	traditional	truth,	that	is,	of	the	concept	of	truth	underlying	our	whole	tradition.4		For	Arendt	the	process	of	thought	leading	to	material	change	has	been	seriously	diminished	in	the	modern	world.	This	is	because	in	order	for	thought	to	work,	to	bring																																																									2	Ibid.,	90-91.	3	Ibid.,	294.	4	Ibid.,	294.	
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about	anything	in	terms	of	change,	there	must	still	be	the	possibility	of	truth,	the	possibility	for	an	idea	to	be	found	that	holds	within	it	some	claim	for	a	universal	solution	to	the	problems	that	the	world	faces.	The	value	of	thought	is	further	illuminated	in	its	difference	from	contemplation.	For	Arendt	via	Plato,	thinking	is	a	highly	active	process,	but	it	is	also	the	preparation	for	beholding	truth,	whereas	contemplation	is	the	stillness	that	accompanies	truth’s	arrival,	the	state	of	being	with	the	universal.5	But	without	a	claim	to	truth	this	system	loses	its	motor,	the	work	that	might	arise	from	thought	fails	to	materialize,	or	materializes	only	as	personal	creative	endeavor,	as	hobby.6	Thought	in	the	modern	world	can	never	become	work	because	work	must	hold	within	it	a	reason	for	its	being	that	carries	some	claim	for	its	worth	in	society;	today	only	science	can	make	this	claim.	 Without	a	claim	to	a	universal	truth,	the	work	that	derives	from	thinking	cannot	find	purchase,	cannot	be	justified	as	a	project	undertaken	for	a	general	good.	The	thinking	provoked	here	has,	under	Arendt’s	views,	no	possibility	for	finding	its	way	out	of	the	cinema	and	into	the	world.	Ernesto	Laclau,	in	his	essay	“What	do	Empty	Signifiers	Matter	to	Politics?,”	offers	a	possible	out	to	this	bind.	Speaking	of	Rosa	Luxemburg’s	model	for	how	class	struggle	finds	unification	in	moments	of	intense	opposition,	Laclau	posits	that,	“In	a	climate	of	extreme	repression	any	mobilization	for	a	partial	objective	will	be	perceived	not	only	as	related	to	the	concrete	demand	or	objectives	of	that	struggle,	but	also	as	an	act	of	
																																																								5	It	is	for	this	reason	that	I	think	that	the	current	category	of	contemplative	cinema	is	a	bit	of	a	misnomer.	This	is	a	cinema	that	demands	an	active	mind,	a	mind	engaged	in	thought	rather	than	the	passivity	of	contemplation.	6	Hannah	Arendt,	The	Human	Condition	(Chicago:	The	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1958),	128.	
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opposition	against	the	system.”7	In	this	way	politics	built	around	the	struggle	against	an	oppressive	system	finds	its	unity	not	through	compromises	between	competing	ideas,	but	by	virtue	of	their	common	identity	as	oppositional.	For	Laclau,	this	relationship	allows	for	unity	where	it	would	otherwise	be	unavailable,	and	not	as	solidarity	with	other	issues,	but	as	the	formation	of	a	unified	struggle	that	does	not	distinguish	between	its	constitutive	parts.	Laclau	continues,	“Luxemburg's	argument	is	that	a	revolutionary	mass	identity	is	established	through	the	overdetermination,	over	a	whole	historical	period,	of	a	plurality	of	separate	struggles.	These	traditions	fused,	at	the	revolutionary	moment,	in	a	ruptural	point.”8	In	this	way,	a	revolutionary	program	builds	a	unified	platform	not	in	spite	of	its	differences,	but	because	these	differences	no	longer	appear	to	be	differences	at	all.	A	natural	seeming	process	that	covers	over	difference	in	the	formation	of	a	unified	category,	this	process	makes	the	need	for	a	general	truth	irrelevant	as	unity	is	taken	for	granted	in	a	process	that	“simultaneously	asserts	and	abolishes	its	own	singularity.”9	For	Laclau,	this	process	is	build	around	the	capacity	of	what	he	calls	“the	empty	signifier”	to	aid	in	unification.	The	role	of	the	signifier	in	this	scenario	is	to	serve	as	the	fulcrum	for	fusing	different	ideas	and	platforms,	and	the	reason	it	must	be	empty	is	because	the	less	it	holds	the	more	valuable	it	is	as	a	vessel	for	a	unifying	principle.	These	empty	signifiers	appear	at	the	outset	to	be	fully	formed,	if	perhaps	vague,	words	or	concepts,	but	they	have	the	capacity	to	be	refilled	with	a	promise	that	overcomes	difference	and	in	fact	serves	as	a	nodal	point.	Terms,	like	“liberty”	for	instance,	which	call	forth	a	set	of	ideals	but	provide	no	particular	map	or	discrete	set	of	principles	are	thus	taken	up	and	re-																																																								7	Ernesto	Laclau,	“Why	do	Empty	Signifiers	Matter	to	Politics?,”	in	Emancipation(s)	(London	&	New	York:	Verso,	1996),	40.	8	Ibid.,	41.	9	Ibid.	
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authored	by	a	cause,	and	in	this	way	they	serve	as	unifying	forces	that	propel	a	movement	forward.	They	can	do	this	because	their	relationships	to	their	signifieds	are	adrift,	because	they	are	in	the	first	place	ambiguous.	The	films	discussed	here	share	many	qualities	with	these	empty	signifiers.	Necessarily	empty	of	meaning,	they	take	the	form	of	an	empty	vessel	that	can	be	pushed	in	any	number	of	directions.	Like	an	empty	signifier,	Germany	Year	Zero	maintains	a	link	to	the	world	of	recognizable	things	and	occurrences,	but	this	link	is	tentative	as	the	film	at	times	complicates,	as	I’ve	discussed,	its	relationship	to	its	spaces	and	events.	It	resists	comment	and	disallows	particularity,	it	cannot	be	said	to	“have	any	form	of	representation	of	its	own,”	as	Laclau	puts	it.10	Emptied	of	meaning,	it	waits	to	see	what	might	happen	in	or	to	its	ambiguous	aesthetics,	and	waits	to	see	who	might	take	them	up	and	why.	All	the	while	it	asks	for	thought,	thinking	that	might	turn	successfully	into	work	once	its	truth	claim	has	been	restored.	In	moments	of	transition,	when	these	films	ask	for	us	to	think,	they	do	so	at	a	moment	when	their	empty	status	also	lends	them	to	be	used	for	the	cause	of	opposition.	Like	“liberty,”	Germany	Year	Zero	is	vague	enough	to	be	a	catalyst	for	the	unification	of	a	cause.	The	plight	of	Edmund,	for	instance,	is	capable	of	speaking	to	different	groups	in	different	ways,	but	the	general	need	to	alleviate	his	misery	is	just	enough	to	potentially	allow	for	divergent	approaches	to	be	unified.	In	this	way,	and	in	the	right	context,	differing	approaches	to	politics	can	find	their	unifying	point,	their	commonality	as	opposition.	This	is	a	film	that	can	ask	for	a	form	of	thought	that	has	the	possibility	for	unification,	and	it	can	do	so	because	of	the	combination	of	narrative	and	aesthetic	ambiguity	with	verisimilar	photography.	This	is	the	possibility	of	art	cinema.																																																									10	Ibid.,	42.	
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This	proposal	I’ve	presented	here	is	speculative,	and	the	possibility	of	these	films	finding	this	renewed	form	of	thought	is	slim.	But	this	potential	is	nonetheless	valuable	in	examining	the	work	that	these	films	can	do,	and	examining	what	the	art	cinema	form	has	to	offer	to	politics.	For	Laclau,	empty	signifiers,	in	addition	to	being	filled	up,	can	also	be	used	up:	 If	'workers'	struggle'	becomes	the	signifier	of	liberation	as	such,	it	also	becomes	the	surface	of	inscription	through	which	all	liberating	struggles	will	be	expressed,	so	that	the	chain	of	equivalences	which	are	unified	around	this	signifier	tend	to	empty	it,	and	to	blur	its	connection	with	the	actual	content	with	which	it	was	originally	associated.	Thus,	as	a	result	of	its	very	success,	the	hegemonic	operation	tends	to	break	its	links	with	the	force	which	was	its	original	promoter	and	beneficiary.11		Through	this	process,	the	empty	signifier	fills	with	meaning	in	moments	where	it	takes	on	this	universalizing	project,	but	in	the	long	term	regains	its	empty	status	once	more.	Once	the	groups	that	it	had	brought	together	have	lost	their	unification	point	and	have	fallen	apart	again,	their	item	of	alliance	again	appears	different,	or	even	irrelevant,	to	each	now	distinct	grouping.	Anti-authoritarian	cinema	of	this	type	can	too	slip	into	and	out	of	a	cause.	What	appears	to	have	lost	any	link	to	action	can	find	its	claim	to	truth	again,	and	just	as	quickly	truth	can	be	lost.	The	films	discussed	here	are	not	stable	in	their	resignation	to	inaction.	The	thoughts	they	encourage	can	again	find	their	purchase	and	this	is	because	they	so	clearly	reject	meaning,	because	they	are	so	resigned	to	emptiness.	These	films,	of	course,	have	each	been	made	at	exactly	the	wrong	moment	to	find	uses	as	empty	signifiers.	Each,	with	the	exception	of	Medium	Cool,	has	been	made	after	their	oppositional	moment,	immediately	after	they	might	stand	opposed	to	a	centralized	power	and	might	find	their	unified	potential	in	the	concerns	of	those	who	resist	this	power.	But,	as	with	the	empty	signifier,	it	is	always	a	surprise	what	concepts	will	be	taken	up	to	speak	to																																																									11	Ibid.,	45.	
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newly	unifying	forces.	This	is	a	cinema	of	waiting;	it	is	a	cinema	that	finds	its	politics	not	through	its	own	actions	but	through	a	spurring	of	thought	that	might	generate	action.	Ultimately,	for	it	to	be	political,	ambiguous	cinema	must	place	its	hope	in	the	possibility	that	one	day	the	thoughts	that	it	encourages	will	find	their	use	in	the	world.	That	these	films	will	find	their	universalizing	functions	is	another	messianic	wish,	and	its	arrival	is	always	unexpected.	The	anti-authoritarian	cinema	that	I’ve	discussed	then	holds	within	it	two	potentials:	first,	it	is	a	space	of	thought,	an	object	through	which	ideas	can	be	measured	and	weighed.	It	demands	a	dialectical	mode	of	interaction	because	it	refuses	to	ever	verify	any	particular	set	of	ideas.	It	provokes	us	with	verisimilar	images	that	are	at	once	locatable	and	escape	location,	and	speaks	of	particular	events	without	ever	exactly	commenting	on	them.	In	this	way	it	incites	thought	and,	later,	remembrance.	The	specifics	of	the	thinking	that	these	films	encourage	are	likewise	of	value.	Each	is	dedicated	to	thought	in	times	of	change,	and	in	this	way	strives	to	prepare	viewers	for	the	possibility	of	a	new	politics,	a	new	cause	that	can	arise	from	the	thoughts	that	are	provoked.	Whether	this	thinking	will	find	its	way	into	work,	however,	is	in	question,	as	for	these	thoughts	to	find	their	outlet	in	work	they	must	be	justified	by	a	claim	to	truth.	This	is	where	the	second	potential	of	this	mode	of	anti-authoritarian	cinema	steps	in:	as	ambiguous,	empty	objects	these	films	open	up	the	possibility	for	renewed	unification.	These	films	provoke	the	viewer	to	think,	but	also	provide	the	possibility	that	their	emptiness	might	be	taken	up,	filled	so	to	speak,	and	used	to	bridge	difference	in	pursuit	of	a	unified	claim.	This	combination	of	propelling	thinking	while	also	remaining	empty	is	a	product	of	ambiguity,	and	is	central	to	the	history	of	art	cinema.	The	capacity	to	reproduce	
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images	that	claim	a	relationship	to	reality,	what	might	be	called	verisimilitude,	but	to	also	remain	ambiguous	is	what	makes	art	cinema	political.	Its	emptiness,	its	refusal	of	meaning,	is	why	it	is	valuable.	Here,	in	these	moments	of	transition,	art	cinema	is	most	adamant	in	its	rejections,	and	as	a	result	finds	its	most	radical	form	of	hope.	Provocations	for	thought	without	the	structure	for	molding	it,	emptied	husks	that	hope	for	renewal,	these	films	are	anti-authoritarian	by	virtue	of	the	fact	that	they	offer	nothing	at	all.
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